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This thesis utilises a neo-Gramscian theoretical approach to test its hypothesis and 
determine whether ALBA can be seen as counter-hegemonic regional movement 
engaged in a war of position against US hegemony and by extension neoliberalism. 
Critical IPE, particularly Robert Cox’s critical theory of hegemony, world order and 
historical change forms the basis of this works theoretical approach or analysis. 
With the utilization of this approach, this thesis will provide a historical account 
and critically access the various factors, which have led to the creation of ALBA, its 
early developments, and its current form. This approach provides a very clear and 
coherent framework for understanding the various ways in which contestation or 
resistance against the common sense can occur. Therefore, within the parameters 
of this neo-Gramscian/Coxian framework, ALBA can be critically assessed, to 
determine if it can be seen as a viable counter-hegemonic regional movement, that 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Hypothesis and research aims 
 
Resistance movements and counter-hegemonic responses to neoliberalism within 
academic literature have been notably plentiful, particularly throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s. Coinciding with the launch of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, the Zapatistas launched their uprising. This kind of 
response for academics such as Worth and Kuhling (2004),  
Demonstrated that particular forms of resistance (counter-
hegemonic movements) can both address international and local 
political economy and can directly challenge the supranational 
structures of neoliberal globalisation through the mobilisation of 
international blocs around issues of local land rights (Worth and 
Kuhling, 2004 pp.35-36). 
Additionally, academics have used the Seattle protests in 1999 to provide an 
account of a counter-hegemonic movement that successfully impeded free trade 
negotiations being held by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in Seattle. Within 
a neo-Gramscian theoretical framework, both forms of resistance represent a 
counter-hegemonic response against the neoliberal historic bloc, which attempted 
to destabilise its legitimacy and consent.  A counter-hegemonic response,  
Begins with a critique of common sense but seeks to transcend 
rather than re-embed it. This is a task of critical education that 
seeks to move beyond common sense ideological understandings 
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to reconstruct a collective will: an ideological worldview 
conscious of humanities self-constructive powers (Worth and 
Kuhling, 2004 p.35). 
This reconstruction of the collective will can lead to the creation of a common 
ground on which a counter-hegemonic bloc can be established.  While a counter-
hegemonic historic bloc has not yet been established, there are many examples, like 
the aforementioned, that represent counter-hegemonic movements, which are 
engaged in a war of position against neoliberalism.   
The purpose of this thesis is to examine one such movement, the Bolivarian 
Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas or ALBA.  ALBA was specifically chosen 
because it is considered by many, and indeed by itself, as the clearest and most 
prominent example of a counter-hegemonic movement. Therefore, the main 
hypothesis that this research seeks to test is that ALBA is a form of counter-
hegemonic resistance, which is engaged in a war of position against US hegemony 
and by extension neoliberalism. This research aims to determine the extent that 
ALBA can be viewed in this light. As ALBA is a regional project and the first of its 
kind, this research will also investigate how ALBA’s self-professed counter-
hegemony has affected or influenced the wider dynamics of regionalism with Latin 
American. Considering the alternative and anti-US/neoliberal structure that ALBA 
was built on, this thesis also sets out to determine whether ALBA can be seen as a 
‘post-hegemonic’ regionalism movement. Post-hegemonic regionalism refers to a 
type of regionalism, which has moved beyond the hegemonic model (open 
regionalism) of regional integration and cooperation, replacing it with a plurality of 
models that coexist and overlap.  
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The research also aims to access ALBA’s progression over its fifteen-year lifespan 
and evaluate how well ALBA’s stated goals and objectives have translated into 
tangible and measurable progress and results, as well as its ability to garner 
support with the region. Finally, this thesis will carry out an in-depth investigation 
into the political and economic upheavals in Venezuela since 2017 and critically 
assess the effect it has had on ALBA. 
This research will use a neo-Gramscian theoretical approach to test its hypothesis 
to determine whether ALBA can be seen as a counter-hegemonic regional 
movement engaged in a war of position against US hegemony and by extension 
neoliberalism. Critical IPE, particularly Robert Cox’s critical theory of hegemony, 
world order and historical change forms the basis of this works theoretical 
approach or analysis. With the utilization of this approach, this thesis will provide a 
historical account and critically access the various factors, which have led to the 
creation of ALBA, its early developments, and its current form. This approach 
provides a very clear and coherent framework for understanding the various ways 
in which contestation or resistance against the common sense can occur. Therefore, 
within the parameters of this neo-Gramscian/Coxian framework, ALBA can be 
critically assessed, to determine if it can be seen as a viable counter-hegemonic 
regional movement, that is challenging US hegemony and by extension the 





1.2 Research methodology 
 
Academic research carried out on ALBA has been notably sparse.  This shortfall has 
meant that the available literature on the Alliance is both dated and to a large 
extent out of touch. As a result, this examination has been conducted in order to 
produce an up-to-date research paper that sheds light on ALBA’s evolution and 
current situation. Much of the current literature available on ALBA is comprised of 
government sanctioned ALBA declarations and official progress reports; therefore, 
a certain bias exists within the available literature.  Guided by the desire to produce 
an up-to-date and accurate account of ALBA’s challenges, progression, and likely 
future, keeping in line with this thesis’s overall objective:  to determine the extent 
that ALBA can be seen as a viable counter-hegemonic regional movement, this 
work has used primary research, in the form of semi-structured interviews with 
various political elites that work within ALBA, as its principal method of 
assessment. Political elites were specifically chosen because they could offer a 
unique perceptive as to how the regional movement operates but also because they 
could give an insight into the evolution of the movement, from its beginning to its 
current form. Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the primary method of 
analysis because this research wanted to gain an understanding of ALBA through 
the political elites own experiences, thus it offers a complete new avenue to explore 
the inner workings of the regional movement, as well as gaining an understanding 
of where each participant felt the movement was going. This aspect can be 
considered extremely important, given the current situation in Venezuela but also 
if one considers the crisis of the left in Latin America presently. Through the 
utilization of the material gathered from the interviews, the official ALBA 
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documents available along with the academic literature carried out on the regional 
project, the overall aim of this work is to provide an accurate and up-to-date 
account of ALBA, its progression and challenges. 
As stated above, the use of semi-structured interviews with ALBA political elites 
forms the methodological parameters for this study. The objective of semi-
structured interviews is to grasp the interviewee’s point of view and allow him or 
her to talk freely to offer a personal interpretation of a certain event (Marsh and 
Stoker, 1995, p. 138). Considering that in official terms, ALBA sees itself as a 
counter-hegemonic response to US hegemony, gaining valuable insight into the 
personal interpretation of what this means, in addition to the ways in which this 
has been carried out as well as ALBA’s potential future is paramount for 
understanding the reality of ALBA, particularly given the current economic and 
political crisis of Venezuela. Using semi-structured interviews as the principal 
method of analysis provides an important avenue for understanding ALBA, its 
progression and its problems from an internal perspective.  By conducting 
interviews in this way, this thesis gains an insight into the internal workings of the 
regional movement, allowing it to determine the extent of the gap between the 
participating political elites’ aspirations for the regional project and the reality of 
where the movement actually is.  
The field research undertaken took place in both London, at the Venezuelan 
embassy, and in Caracas with various political elites working within the ALBA. It is 
important to note, that field research took place in 2017 at the beginning of the 
current Venezuelan crisis. In 2017 the crisis had not yet reached a level of abysmal 
deterioration that it is currently experiencing. Political elite participants ranged 
from ALBA’s executive secretariat, the head of its social movements, the 
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Venezuelan ambassador to Antigua and Barbuda who was the former head of Petro 
Caribe, the head of the political division in the Venezuela embassy in London, as 
well as the head of the economic division in the Venezuelan embassy in London, 
who was a former advisor with the SUCRE implementation. All participants were 
specifically chosen as they could offer a detailed insight into the internal workings 
of the project, its progression, and its problems. By structuring the interviews 
around political elites, the research has attempted to understand ALBA from an 
internal position. More specifically, this research wanted to gain an understanding 
of ALBA, its positive attributes as well as its challenges, from a specific set of actors 
that were instrumental in the development of the project, therefore it is attempting 
to understand what specifically are the challenges ALBA now faces and the root 
causes of said challenges. 
However, although this method for investigation is invaluable for understanding 
ALBA, it is important to note that because the various political elites are closely 
associated with specific governments involved in ALBA, namely Venezuela, the 
findings from the interviews very often represent an official perspective or outlook 
of the organisation. Thus, a semi-structured interview method was favoured, as the 
participants were more likely to give their own unofficial opinion on the regional 
project. With that being said, the use of academic literature in combination with 
semi-structured interviews, have been used to paint a clearer picture of the reality 
of ALBA, its internal workings, progression, and challenges.  
1.3 Chapter synopsis 
 
Chapter two of this dissertation will provide a literature review that will 
predominately focus on assessing the work of key academics within the field of the 
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critical international political economy. The central objective of this chapter is to 
assess the key features of the neo-Gramscian/Coxian critical theory approach to the 
study of the contemporary international political economy. By drawing on the 
work of Gramsci, Gill, and Cox, in particular, this chapter aims to provide a strong 
theoretical basis, which will allow for an in-depth empirical and critical analysis 
that aims to determine the extent that ALBA can be considered a counter-
hegemonic regional movement. 
Chapter three will provide a second literature review, which aims to facilitate 
understanding the current global trend towards regionalism. The chapter will 
mainly focus on literature that uses Robert Cox’s notion of world order to explain 
the contemporary rise of regionalism. It will then go on to use relevant academic 
literature that specifically looks at the relationship between regionalism and 
neoliberalism in order to determine how the rise of neoliberalism has affected and 
shaped regionalism in the contemporary era. From here, academic literature that 
focuses on the evolution of Latin American regionalism and its relationship with 
neoliberalism will be presented. Lastly, this chapter will look at the available 
academic literature on the rise of post-hegemonic regionalism in Latin America and 
will look at the contributing factors that have led to this development. It will then 
look at the various forms of contestation to neoliberalism that has emerge in Latin 
America within the post-hegemonic regional order setting. It will specifically focus 
on the creation of the ALBA in 2004 and look at the various academic literatures 
that views ALBA as a form of contestation. 
Chapter four is an empirical chapter on ALBA.  It will firstly look at the rise of the 
contemporary left in Latin America; specifically, it will look at the emergence of 
leftist governments in the region and will look at how and why they rose to power. 
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Following on from this, the chapter will look specifically at Chavez and the idea of 
21st-century socialism and investigate how this idea gained momentum with leftist 
governments across the regional. It will then move on to discuss the role of the left 
in reshaping Latin American regionalism and look at specific regional integration 
projects. From here, the chapter will turn its attention to the creation of the 
Bolivarian historic bloc and the establishment of a post-neoliberal regionalism 
movement with the creation of ALBA. It will look at the social forces that led to its 
creation and the history of the regional project. Finally, it will look at the ‘pink tide’ 
in the post-Chávez era, paying special attention to the recent electoral losses of two 
prominent leftist governments in the region and the possible effect a decline of the 
left will have on leftist inspired regional integration projects such as ALBA.  
Chapter five will specifically look at the structure of ALBA and will historically 
track its evolution from its creation to its present form. It will look at the origins of 
ALBA, specifically focusing on the factors leading to its creation, namely the 
proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, and the Joint Declaration signed 
by Cuba and Venezuela in 2004. It will then look at the expansion of ALBA with the 
incorporation of the Peoples Trade Treaty (TCP) in 2006 and outline the goals of 
ALBA. From here, this research will look at the organizational structure of ALBA. It 
will look at the various Councils that make up the alliance, whose functions consist 
of planning, coordinating and advises on various topics that determine the function 
of ALBA. This work will specifically look at the Presidential Council, the Political 
Council, the Economic Council, the Social Council and finally the Social Movements 
Council. The next part of the chapter will give an account of the various ALBA 
projects. It will look specifically at areas in relation to telecommunications, banking 
and finance, oil and social programmes. This will be done in order to give an in-
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depth account of how successful ALBA programmes have been. Finally, this chapter 
will consider whether ALBA can be seen as a complete entity.  
Chapter six will begin with a section on methodology. It will give a detailed account 
of why and how semi-structured interviews were used with the research. The 
overall objective of this research’s chosen methodology is to gain valuable insight 
into the internal workings of the regional movement, from various ALBA political 
elites’ perspectives. This will aid in this research’s objectives to determine the 
extent of the gap between the participating political elites’ aspirations for the 
regional project and the reality of where the movement actually is. Chapter six will 
also determine the extent that Venezuelan foreign policy has influenced ALBA. It 
specifically will determine how the deterioration of ALBA’s primary financial 
backer has affected the project’s ability to attract members, in light of the current 
economic and political upheavals that the Maduro government is presently 
experiencing. Finally, chapter six will investigate the level of commitment from 
Caribbean member states to ALBA’s and determine whether their commitment 
goes beyond financial gain brought about by membership of Petrocaribe and Petro 
ALBA. It will determine the extent that ideological alignment has played in 
Caribbean membership.  
Chapter Seven will situate ALBA understanding its demise and potential future 
within a neo-Gramscian framework. The chapter’s overall purpose is to determine 
the extent that ALBA can be viewed as a form of resistance that is engaged in a war 
of position against open regionalism, US hegemony and, by extension, 
neoliberalism. It will then investigate ALBA as a form of counter-hegemony, paying 
specific attention to its effectiveness and potentialities. From here, chapter seven 
will look at ALBA’s specific form of regionalism and investigate the effectiveness of 
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its internal structure and commitments from its member states. It will then look at 
Venezuela’s central role to ALBA and investigate the extent that their ALBA’s future 
potentialities are dependent on Venezuela’s ability to financially back the regional 
movement. Lastly ALBA’s specific brand of ‘post-neoliberal’ regionalism will be 
explored. It will investigate whether the Alliance should, in fact, be categorized as 
such and determine ALBA’s alternative regional structure, which claims to confront 
and contest various neoliberal processes across various domain, can in fact 
undermine or even potentially replace open regionalism. 
Chapter eight of this thesis will highlight the core points of synthesis and discuss 














Chapter 2: Cox, Gramsci and understanding counter-hegemony 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The central objective of this chapter is to assess the key features of the neo-
Gramscian/Coxian critical theory approach to the study of the contemporary 
international political economy. By drawing on the work of Gramsci, Gill and, Cox, 
in particular, this chapter aims to provide a strong theoretical basis, which will 
allow for an in-depth empirical and critical analysis. An analysis that aims to 
determine the extent that ALBA can be considered a counter-hegemonic regional 
movement. The following sections will lay the theoretical foundations for this 
project. This will be done to highlight the usefulness of using a neo-Gramscian 
approach for this study. Although critics of the approach have and continue to 
question the legitimacy of transposing Gramsci’s political thought to the 
international (Femia, 2005), (Germain and Kenny, 1998), while others have been 
critical of the method of its application (Robinson, 2005), (Worth, 2008), (Ayers, 
2013). Scholars such as Gill (1989) and Cox (1981) have utilised the approach in 
order to show how consent and power are created and sustained in international 
politics. At the centre of this approach lies the influential work of Robert Cox 
(1981), specifically his work on world order and the role of hegemony in 
international politics, which will now be discussed in detail in order to prove the 
validity of the neo-Gramscian approach.  
2.2 World Order 
 
The notion of world order within international politics is generally viewed as the 
configuration of power and order. Within the realist tradition of International 
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Relations (IR), the international system is characterized by its anarchic nature thus; 
states are the main power players in international politics. The central belief of 
realism holds that international politics embodies a struggle for power between 
states, where each is attempting to maximize their national interests, as a result, 
states are self-help entities that are power-seeking by nature. Accordingly, order 
within the inter-state system is maintained through the use of the balance of power 
mechanism, whereby a state acts to prevent any one state from dominating.  
By contrast, one of the most unique and influential approaches to world order has 
been offered by the work of Robert Cox. Critical of realist approaches to 
understanding international politics, Cox’s interpretive approach to world order 
provides a general framework for understanding the nature of world orders from a 
historical, philosophical, and geopolitical perspective, which has illuminated how 
politics can never be separated from economics. In essence, his concept allows for 
an understanding of how the nature of a specific world order has historically been 
determined by a ‘configuration of forces’.  Beginning with a series of early articles 
Cox investigated questions of world order and political economy from a historical 
materialist perspective. Drawing on the work of theorists such as Sorel, Vico, 
Collingwood, Braudel and most importantly Gramsci, provided Cox with a strong 
historical foundation that paved the way for his exploration into and his 
understanding of the nature of world orders.   
For Cox (1981), the notion of world order represents more than just a  ‘’‘world 
system’ as it is more indicative of a structure having only a certain duration in time 
and avoiding the equilibrium connotations of ‘system’’’ (Cox, 1981 p.141).  
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For Cox, the notion of world order refers to ‘’the particular configurations of forces 
which successfully define the problematic of war and peace for the ensemble of 
states’’ (Cox, 1995 p.100).  As Worth (2011) explains,  
The idea of World Order is one in which embedded norms and laws are 
transposed onto the international stage…a World Order represents a 
specific era, or if you like a historic bloc, that was determined through 
social forces, organised through a combination of production, ideology 
and institutionalism (Worth, 2011 p.376).   
Cox’s use of world order allows him to bridge the national with the international by 
linking material capabilities, ideas, and institutions. He suggests that a prevailing 
order is marked by this ‘configuration of forces’. He explains that these forces 
reciprocally interact to establish a historical structure. Here, ideas should be 
understood as shared beliefs or as the collective image of social order. Material 
capabilities understood as natural resources as well as production, technological 
and organisational capabilities. Lastly, institutions should be understood as a force, 
which is utilised or acts as a means to stabilize and maintain a particular order.  
Cox (1995) explains,  
I deliberately avoid using a term like ‘international relations’ since it 
embodies certain assumptions about global power relations that need 
to be questioned. ‘‘International relations’’ implies the Westphalian 
state system as its basic framework, and this may no longer be an 
entirely adequate basis since there are forms of power other than state 
power that enter into global relations. ‘’World order’’ is neutral as 
regards the nature of the entities that constitute power; it designates 
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an historically specific configuration of power of whatever kind (Cox, 
1995 p. 494). 
IR theorists such as Waltz (1964), asserts that international order can only exist 
provided it rests on one powerful state which dominates all other states through its 
dominance in military and economic capabilities. By contrast, Cox’s approach 
emphasises the significance of the internal characteristics of states that informs 
states behaviour within the international. He suggests that not only macro forces 
arising from the global order influence state behaviour, but also, pressure from civil 
society influence state behaviour. For Cox, International Relations is a  ‘‘misleading 
way of describing the object of our search for knowledge’’ (Cox in Jones, 2001 p. 
45). In an attempt to situate his approach outside of the realm of interstate 
relations, he places an emphasis on world order where states make up only a single 
element. By viewing the discipline of IR in terms of global order, Cox escapes the 
state-centrism of the discipline (Budd, 2013). For Cox, the notion of world order 
represents more than just an ‘inter-state system as it is relevant to all historical 
periods’, in this way an inter-state system should be understood as only one 
historical form of world order. Cox’s central criticism of Waltz’s neorealism is 
focused on the question of theory. From Cox’s perspective ‘’theory is always for 
someone and for some purpose’’ (Cox, 1981 p. 128), therefore, theory can never be 
objective. For Cox, Waltz’s neorealism has provided a theory that serves to justify 
the behaviour of great powers endeavouring to maintain a bipolar system. Cox 
(1995) notes, ‘’there is an unmistakable Panglossian quality to a theory published 
in the late 1970s which concludes that a bipolar system is the best of all possible 
worlds. The historical moment has left its indelible mark on this purportedly 
universalistic science’’ (Cox, 1995 p.57) 
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Cox also criticizes Waltz’s theory for abandoning the traditional realist diverse 
combination of positive and interpretive methodologies in exchange for a solely 
positivist problem-solving theory. A problem-solving approach, according to Cox, 
takes the world as it is, it sees it as a fixed order, and does not differentiate between 
present and past systems. In this sense, Cox argues that the approach is ahistorical 
because it sees the political and social order of the present system as being a 
mirror image of the past and future. He argues that this type of theory is unable to 
account for the possibility of historical change or structural transformation, as the 
theory is founded on a statist ideological obligation which serves to assert and 
maintain the US’s position in a bipolar system (Cox, 1995). 
The following section will access the validity of the heterodox theoretical approach 
to IPE, looking specifically at the post-positivist turn, critical theory and critical IPE. 
2.3 Post-positivism, critical theory and critical IPE approach 
 
In order to test this work’s hypothesis and determine if ALBA can be seen as a 
counter-hegemonic regional movement that is engaged in a war of position against 
US hegemony and by extension neoliberalism, this work will apply a neo-
Gramscian/critical theory framework for its critical analysis.  Before justifying why 
this theoretical approach is a useful method of explanation and how it fits with the 
chosen methodology employed in this thesis, it is firstly necessary to understand its 
emergence within the field of international political economy and how this 
emergence has influenced and led to development of heterodox theoretical 
approaches geared at explaining changes within the political and economic 
landscape.  
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Situated within the broad theoretical discipline of IR, International Political 
Economy (IPE) began to emerge as a sub-field of International Relations in the late 
1960s. It has been suggested that IPE arose as a reaction to the significant changes 
of the political and economic landscape following the disintegration of the post-
World War II economic order, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the 
resulting floating of major currencies, the oil crisis and the ensuing debt crisis 
affecting a number of developing countries. As suggested by Strange (1998) IPE  
Concerns the social, political, and economic arrangements affecting 
the global systems of production, exchange and distribution and 
the mix of values reflected therein. Those arrangements are not 
divinely ordained, nor are they the fortuitous outcome of blind 
chance. Rather they are the result of human decisions taken in the 
context of manmade institutions and sets of self-set rules and 
customs (Strange, 1998 p. 18).  
Since the late 1980s, IPE has generally proceeded to develop along very diverse 
and separate paths or ‘cultures’. This split can be mainly attributed to discontent 
with mainstream theorizing within IPE. As Staniland (1985) notes, there was ‘’an 
increasing openness to Marxist and other heterodox ideas’’, demonstrated by the 
appearance of the ‘critical school’, in response to the failure of orthodox IPE to 
wholly explain why changes occur (Staniland, 1985). 
In response, IPE diverged into two schools of scholarly enquiry.  The first school 
tends to focus on empirical research questions, in an attempt to comprehend the 
underlying dynamics of actors within the international system and as for the 
second, the primary focus lies on an ‘’ontological enquiry into its historical 
evolution’’ (Shields et al., 2011).  
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This division, over time, has extended into the ‘British’ post-positivist school and 
the ‘American’ or positivist school, leading to the ‘fourth great debate’ between the 
two schools. Post-positivism is a broad term that refers to an interpretive approach 
or critique of scientific approaches that treat facts and assumptions as independent 
features of theory or permanent conceptual tools for measuring and objectifying 
phenomena (Sojo, 2005). As Cohen (2007) has pointed out, ‘’The American and 
British schools of IPE are two cultures divided by a common subject’’ (Cohen, 2007 
p. 200). 
Generally speaking, the differences between the two schools can essentially be 
characterised by how each school assesses global politics, either through adopting 
an interpretive approach or a reflective one. The American school is largely thought 
of as the orthodox or prevailing form of IPE. It is inclined to be extremely 
reductionist and positivist, with regards to its epistemological approach. By 
contrast, the British variant tends to reject reductionism epistemology, favouring 
the pursuit of broader, normative questions (Weaver, 2009). Methodologically, the 
American school has tended to favour positivist economical approaches to social 
science enquiry, focusing a narrowly restrictive set of questions. The preferred 
paradigms used within the school are essentially state centric and analysis tends to 
be based on the twin core values of positivism and empiricism. As McNamara 
(2009) notes, the American school is “largely converged around a single theoretical 
perspective, liberalism; a single ontological position, rationalism; and a single 
method, quantitative analysis" (McNamara, 2009 p. 73). British IPE, by contrast, 
rejects the usefulness of positive social science enquiry; instead it favours a post-
positivist approach that centres its inquiry on broad normative questions ethical 
matters, morality, social justice and equality (Cohen, 2007). Generally speaking, the 
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dominant style of the British school tends to be “open intellectually, normative in 
ambition and critical in inclination” (Cohen, 2007 p. 209).   
Closely associated with the British school, critical theory emerged as an alternative 
approach to IR and later to American IPE.  Its emergence in International Relations 
was the result of dissatisfaction with the mainstream theorizing within the field. 
Essentially it was a response to the failure of the classical traditions to explain why 
changes occur (Staniland, 1985).  Initially, Marxian inspired critical theory emerged 
as a critique of ‘rationalist’ or ‘problem-solving’ neo-realist IR with the work of Cox, 
Ashley, and Hoffman, which eventually extended itself into the sub-discipline of IPE. 
In its initial stage critical theory ‘’enlarged the parameters of the discipline by 
showing how efforts to reconstruct historical materialism offer direction to 
International Relations in the post-positivist phase’’ (Smith et al., 1996 p. 281) In 
its present stage, in contrast to the orthodox realist-liberalist duopoly of American 
IPE, critical theory overtly embraces theoretical diversity and as a result, it has 
sought to expand its subject matter, by studying a broader range of actors and 
processes beyond the traditional emphasis on states and markets. As Shields et al 
(2011) points out, ‘’The development of critical perspectives in IPE have brought 
with it interpretations that have drawn from Marx, Gramsci, Polanyi, Schumpeter 
and from post structuralism (especially Foucault) and have been applied to a wide 
variety of cases’’ (Shields et al., 2011 p. 1). 
Both the work of Strange with States and Markets (1988) and Cox with his 1981 
and 1983 seminal articles, represent for many, two major advances in the critical 
IPE literature. Cox’s specific brand of critical theory, a critical theory of hegemony, 
world order and historical change has been extremely influential with regards to 
IPE.  His work provided an alternative method that critically evaluated orthodox 
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approaches to IPE. Drawing on the work of Gramsci, particularly his conceptions of 
hegemony and of state and society, rooted in historical materialism, Cox was able 
to develop a comprehensive framework for better understanding social change. 
This framework for understanding has since provided the basis of the ‘neo-
Gramscian school’, which has become highly significant within critical IPE. As Jones 
2001 notes, Cox’s ‘’critical theory has not only contributed to the critique of the 
mainstream but has also made substantive contributions of its own to the study of 
world politics’’ (Jones, 2001 p.2). 
 With the publication of a series of seminal articles in the late 1970s and 1980s, 
established Cox as a captivating and ground-breaking theorist who explored 
normative questions of political economy, hegemony and world order from a 
distinctly historical materialist outlook (Hoogvelt et al., 1999). Furthermore, his 
work provided an alternative method that critically evaluated orthodox approaches 
to IPE. The development of Cox’s approach to ‘’new International Political 
Economy’’ (Tooze and Murphy, 1991) was undoubtedly aided by his incorporation 
and further development of Gramscian theory.  Although Cox took inspiration from 
other theorists, such as Sorel, Vico, Collingwood, and Braudel, he drew heavily from 
Gramsci’s political thought. For Cox, the political thought of Gramsci offered an 
expansive conception of hegemony and of state and society, rooted in historical 
materialism. Drawing from this, Cox developed a comprehensive framework for 
better understanding social change. This framework for understanding has since 
provided the basis of the ‘neo-Gramscian school’, which has become highly 
significant within critical IPE. Drawing on key concepts such as historical 
materialism, hegemony, world order, historic bloc, common sense and the idea of 
consent, all of which will be discussed in detail in the proceeding chapters, sets the 
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parameters of this dissertation. This framework incorporates the dynamic 
interaction and mutual influence between three layers: social forces, forms of 
states and world order. As Worth (2011) notes, Cox’s engagement with Gramsci’s 
work was largely undertaken in order to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of hegemony than that used by positivist International Relations 
scholars at the time, and has since provided the basis of the ‘neo-Gramscian school’ 
that has become highly significant within critical IPE (Worth, 2011). The neo-
Gramscian theoretical framework, which draws on the aforementioned concepts as 
tools of explanation for understanding, will be utilised in the proceeding chapters, 
as it offers significant analytical and explanatory scope for better understanding 
the social forces and interests and that have led to the creation of ALBA but also for 
understanding ALBA’s development and future prospects, as a counter-hegemony 
regional movement.  
The following section will investigate both the concepts of world order and 
hegemony in relation to the international from various theoretical approaches to 
understand why Cox’s notions of world order and hegemony are relevant to this 
research. 
2.4 Hegemony and World Order 
 
The concept of hegemony within International Relations has traditionally been 
understood as a condition whereby a dominant state controls and shapes the 
international system by exerting its authority, influence and power (Keohane 1984; 
Gilpin 1987). However, for many, this interpretation, which has become the 
cornerstone within the conservative school of realism, is quite limited and 
repressed in scope. Drawing on the political thought of Antonio Gramsci, the 
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concept of hegemony becomes more expansive and unrestrained, as suggested by 
Williams (1977), Gramsci’s concept of hegemony can be explained as 
An order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in 
which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its 
institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all 
taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all 
social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral 
connotation (Williams, 1977 p.110). 
Throughout his work, Gramsci uses the notion of hegemony to denote the 
predominance of one social class over others. The dominance of a particular 
hegemonic class within a society is maintained, by securing the consent of 
subordinate groups. 
Thus, a hegemonic order is created and maintained when consent, rather than 
force or coercion is established, by a ruling or dominant class. Hegemony in this 
sense not only represents the ability of a dominant class to gain political and 
economic control, but also reflects their ability to project their own ideas and 
beliefs onto the masses in such a way that their beliefs and ideas become the norm 
and are accepted as ‘common sense’. As suggested by Alvarado and Boyd-Barrett 
(1992), common sense is '’the way a subordinate class lives its subordination’' 
(Alvarado and Boyd-Barrett, 1992).  
Drawing on the ideas of Gramsci, Cox expanded the concept of hegemony and 
transposed it to the international, in an attempt to illustrate how power and 
consent are maintained in global politics. Cox utilises his original concept of world 
order as a framework to understand how hegemony is framed within international 
politics (Worth, 2011). From Cox’s perspective, a world order represents a 
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moderately resilient pattern of global relationships that may or may not be orderly 
in the traditional sense. Cox argues that the presence of stable world orders can be 
explained by the internationalisation of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony.  With the 
application of Gramsci’s concept to International Relations, Cox identifies and 
differentiates between two kinds of world orders, ‘hegemonic’ and ‘non-hegemonic’. 
As Hobson (2000) explains,  
The social-hegemonic powers of the dominant class within a 
powerful national economy ‘spill over’ from the domestic to the 
international sphere. When this spill over occurs, the hegemonic 
state establishes institutions and economic regimes, that inevitably 
serve to legitimate and materially advance the needs of its 
bourgeoisie (Hobson, 2000 p. 131).   
According to Cox (1987), this leads to the establishment of a stable ‘hegemonic’ 
world order. A ‘hegemonic’ world order for Cox cannot be constructed on force and 
affluence alone. To be hegemonic, Cox explains,  
A state would have to found and protect a world order that was 
universal in conception, i.e. not an order directly expressing the 
interests of one state but an order that most other states could find 
compatible with their interests given their different levels of power 
and lesser ability to change that order. The less powerful states 
could live with the order even if they could not change it (Cox, 1981 
p. 45).  
Coz illustrates his point with the examples of Pax Britannica – ushering in the first 
hegemonic era and Pax Americana, which like its predecessor, established a 
hegemonic world order based on liberal international regimes. According to Cox, a 
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‘non-hegemonic’ world order occurs when the hegemonic state loses its legitimacy 
and its ability to generate support amongst the masses. When this occurs, the 
hegemonic state  
Has to resort to non-legitimate and coercive forms of dominance. 
Hegemonic leadership is transformed into naked domination based on 
strength and violence, thereby ushering in a new non-hegemonic world 
order … In sum, the fundamental cause of these processes lies with 
domestic class struggles within the ‘historic bloc’, which eventually 
transform the hegemonic world order into a non-hegemonic one (Cox, 
1987 p. 216). 
Here a brief explanation of the concept of the historic bloc- a term Cox borrows 
from Gramsci, is necessary, in order to understand how both a hegemonic and non-
hegemonic world order are formed. The ‘historic bloc’ in its most basic form refers 
to the reciprocal relationship ‘’between ideas, politics, ethics, and the social 
relations that result from the material conditions of production’’ (Cox, 1983). A 
hegemonic social class and a state that ‘maintains cohesion and identity within the 
bloc through the propagation of a common culture’ are necessary perquisites for its 
formation and continuation, thus it should be seen as a national phenomenon (Cox, 
1983). These perquisites are vital in order to guarantee that the interests of the 
subordinate classes are provided for, although it must be said that the interests of 
the subordinate classes are only accommodated as long as they do not threaten the 
interests of the dominant class (Leysens, 2008). Thus, a historic bloc can be 
characterized by a concentration of class interests and the implementation of a 
specific mode of production beyond national borders.  
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As Worth (2011) notes, academics such as Bellamy (1990), Germain and Kenny 
(1998), have suggested that the application of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to 
the international arena is inappropriate and incompatible, as his idea was 
developed within a specific national and historical context, and the ‘’international 
arena lacked a concrete hierarchical form in which hegemony could be constructed’’ 
(Worth, 2011). However, as Budd, Gill and Cox himself have argued, Cox’s 
transposition of hegemony to the international, is consistent with Gramsci’s own 
internationalized use of hegemony. As Budd (2013) has pointed out, Gramsci has 
indeed suggested that hegemony ‘‘occurs not only within a nation, between the 
various forces that comprise it, but in the entire international and world field, 
between complexes of national and continental civilizations’’ (Budd, 2013 p. 32).  
Within this global context, Gramsci suggests, ‘‘the history of subaltern states is 
explained by the history of hegemonic states’’ (Gramsci, 1971). Aligned with 
Gramsci, international hegemony for Cox represents more than just state 
dominance rather it is an expression of broadly based consent. Cox (1981) 
proposes that hegemonic world orders are,  
 Based on a coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of 
material power, the prevalent collective image of world order 
(including certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer 
the order with a certain semblance of universality (i.e. not just as the 
overt instruments of a particular state’s dominance) (Cox, 1981 p. 
139).  
It is this configuration or fit between ideas, institutions and material capabilities at 
a world order level that forms the basis of categories of power that lead towards 
the absence (instability) or presence of hegemony (stability). For Cox, hegemony 
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within this framework or structure should be understood as an expression of 
broadly based consent, ‘’which is initially established by social forces occupying a 
leading role within a state, but is then projected outwards on a world scale’’ (Cox, 
1981 p. 139).   
Hegemonic structures are established under the circumstances of a certain 
configuration of forces. Cox distinguishes between three types of reciprocal 
interacting forces, which make up a hegemonic structure. Firstly, material 
capabilities, which are understood as natural resources as well as organisational 
and technological capabilities. Secondly, ideas are seen as common beliefs or as the 
collective image of social order. And lastly, institutions are used to stabilize a 
certain order.  
Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an order 
among states. It is an order within a world economy with a dominant 
mode of production, which penetrates all countries and links into 
other subordinate modes of production. It is also a complex of 
international social relationships, which connect the social classes of 
the different countries. World hegemony is describable as a social 
structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; and it 
cannot be simply one of these things but must all three (Cox, 1995 
p.137).  
In order to understand why Cox’s notions of world order and international 
hegemony are relevant to the current world economy and to this research, it is 
necessary to examine the rise of the neoliberal world order.   
 33 
2.5 Neoliberal World Order 
 
As Cox has suggested, the hegemonic era of Pax Americana was constructed and 
established by the US after the Second World War. Its ascendance to international 
hegemonic status has its origins in the changes that occurred with regards to the 
social relations of production, namely under Fordism and through the 
establishment of the Keynesian welfare state, at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. Once the US gained consent for Fordism at home, the system was 
transposed to the rest of the world, through ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie, 1983), 
in a successful attempt to gain international consent for a Pax Americana world 
order (Chodor, 2014). As Cox (1987) notes, the economic system of embedded 
liberalism sought to guarantee equilibrium between ensuring that markets 
remained open to foreign goods while at the same time shielding economies from 
outside shocks, that could undermine, weaken or destabilise the Keynesian 
economic model (Cox, 1987). The above dual political-economic project ushered in 
a new American-led capitalist system that in turn produced a type of liberal 
capitalism, which gave way to the creation of a Pax Americana hegemonic order 
and the ‘golden age of capitalism’ (Chodor, 2014). 
As Overbeek (1993) notes, the ‘organic crisis’ of Pax Americana and world 
capitalism was evident by the mid- 1970s and cannot be traced to any one single 
event. He explains, ‘’It was a fundamental crisis of ‘normality’ affecting all aspects of 
the post-war order: social relations of production, the composition of the historic 
bloc and its concept of control, the role of the state, and the international order’’ 
(Overbeek, 1993 p.14). The Pax Americana crisis presented itself in a series of 
political, economic and ideological crises. The economic crisis was reflected in the 
global recession and a sharp rise in unemployment in the US. These events 
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highlighted the limits of the Fordist mode of production (Harvey, 1989) and as a 
result, the capitalist sector began to pursue different avenues to rid themselves of 
the restraints of the Fordist and Keynesian system, in an attempt to revive profits 
(Hooey, 1992). Most notably, the sector pursued strategies that would facilitate 
capital mobility, in order to relocate production to the periphery where production 
and cost were more advantageous. As Chodor (2014) explains, ‘’this generally 
meant ‘going global’ by relocating the labour-intensive parts of the production 
process to the periphery’’ (Chodor, 2014). The globalisation of the financial system 
brought about vast benefits for corporations while at the same time lessened the 
legitimacy of the Fordist/Keynesian historic bloc, thus, capitalist economic 
interests were able to undermine the balance of social forces within the historic 
bloc.   The political crisis of the 1970s was a direct result of the failure of the 
Keynesian state. The global recession, which led to a dramatic increase in 
unemployment, resulted in an increase in state social spending. The increase in 
social spending, however failed to bring about sustain economic recovery; it 
resulted instead in a fiscal crisis which resulted in a loss of confidence in the 
Keynesian model and fuelled growing resentment towards the state. The 
ideological crisis was fuelled by both the economic and political crises. As Gramsci 
(1971) suggests, ‘’organic crises would first arise on the terrain of civil society in 
the form of challenges to dominant class power over question that did not seem 
intuitively political, but which in fact were signs of things to come’’ (Gramsci, 1971). 
Such challenges were emerging from two sides domestically. Counter-cultural 
movements gained momentum and began to question the hegemonic common 
sense, specifically on matters concerning the moral conduct of the US in Vietnam 
(Hall and Jaques, 1983) and how western governments along with corporations 
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seemed to be ruling society in repressive and unjust ways, and were far from 
representing the peoples will (Harvey, 2007b). From the other side, conservatives 
losing faith in the ability of the Fordist/Keynesian model exacerbated the 
ideological crisis. This concern was transposed to the international and resulted in 
the organic crisis of US hegemony. As Hall and Jaques (1983) note, 
If the crisis is deep – ‘organic’ – these efforts cannot be merely 
defensive. They will be formative: aiming at a new balance of forces, 
the emergence of new elements, the attempt to put together a new 
‘historic bloc’, new political configuration and ‘philosophies’, a 
profound restructuring of the state and the ideological...These new 
elements do not ‘emerge’: they have been constructed. Political 
ideological work is required to disarticulate old formations, and to 
rework their elements into new ones (Hall and Jaques, 1983 p.43). 
Social forces from the most powerful states of Western Europe argued that 
Keynesian economics, the idea of the welfare state, as well as the ‘’embedded 
liberalism’ of Pax Americana needed to be replaced with a more dynamic version of 
global capitalism. This more dynamic version of global capitalism would offer a 
much-needed solution to the problems of growth, prosperity and stability. This 
resulted in the emergence of a neoliberal world order and the reinstatement of US 
hegemony, although as Strange (1987) has argued, instead of asserting itself as the 
dominant hegemonic power within the international system in the traditional 
sense, the US used international institutions such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund as a mechanism to assert its power (Strange, 1987). 
With the emergence of a new world order, neoliberal capitalism slowly began to 
replace Keynesianism as the global economic model. Neo-classical economists 
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Milton Friedman and Alan Walters of the Chicago School developed this liberal shift, 
emphasizing the doctrine of monetarism. As Gamble (2001) points out, 
neoliberalism rose to stardom as an economic critique of, and an alternative model 
to Keynesian economics, however, the idea of monetarism put forth, ‘’was a part of 
a wider critique of state involvement in the economy associated with the Austrian 
School and in particular with Friedrich Hayek’’ (Gamble, 2001 p. 75). Hayek’s free-
market theory which ‘’assumed it best to leave as many decisions as possible up to 
the market’’, in combination with Friedman and Walters emphasis on monetarism 
(a method to control inflation), allowed for the neoliberal capitalist model to be 
internationally recognised as the most viable political and economic strategy for 
restructuring capitalism (Goddard et al., 2003b). Thus, neoliberalism slowly 
became the new dominant ‘‘common sense, the paradigm shaping all policies’’, 
making Keynesianism obsolete and bringing capitalism into a new global era 
(Gamble, 2001 p.129). 
In the 1980s and again in the 1990s neoliberalism or the Washington Consensus, as 
it became later known as, rose to prominence in the developing world, with the 
adoption of this economic and political neoliberal strategy by key International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank (WB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and belatedly the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
According to Leysens (2008), institutions are produced to maintain and stabilize a 
particular order, ‘’ Institutions encapsulate and give voice to the universal norms 
that are part of the common sense ideology of a hegemonic world order…as such 
they mirror perspectives that favour dominant state and economic classes’’ 
(Leysens, 2008 p.49). These international organisations influence over developing 
economies domestic policymakers was significantly enhanced, along with their 
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heightened authority to enforce punitive measures, following the debt crisis of the 
1980s.  
Consequently, the power of these institutions over the poorer countries 
greatly increased just as their influence on the developed countries was 
disappearing. Thus, countries seeking financial aid or debt rescheduling 
from the Bank or the IMF must now not only adopt approved 
macroeconomic stability programmes but also agree to ‘’structural and 
political reforms, which extend the influence of the markets- via 
liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, etc.- and reduce the 
economic role of the state (Kozul-Wright and Rayment, 2007 p.16). 
 As a result, the adoption of the neoliberal economic model by key IFIs, as Harvey 
(2007b) points out, ‘’Neoliberalization has in effect swept across the world like a 
vast tidal wave of institutional reform and discursive adjustment’’ (Harvey, 2007b 
p.145). The adoption and implementation of neoliberal policies in developed and 
developing countries have varied greatly. As a result neoliberal policies, contrary to 
its prevailing ‘win-win’ rhetoric, have tended to produce and reproduce winners 
and losers, within the international economic arena, generating a favourable 
economic climate for western economies, whilst creating for the most part, an 
unfavourable environment for many developing economies. ‘’Neoliberalism has not 
proven effective at revitalizing global capital accumulation, but it has succeeded in 
restoring class power. As a consequence, the theoretical utopianism of the 
neoliberal argument has worked more as a system of justification and 
legitimization’’ (Harvey, 2007b p.145). Although it is apparent that neoliberalism 
has succeeded in restoring class power to ruling elites, it has also been 
instrumental in the reordering of class structures domestically and in creating the 
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necessary conditions for capitalist class construction and dominance, both 
domestically and within the international economic system. 
The various policies and processes that are currently grouped 
together under the term [Neoliberalism]... are largely a consequence 
of the dynamics of the capitalist economies of North America and 
Western Europe and in many important respects are organised to 
perpetuate their continued dominance’’ (Kozul-Wright and Rayment, 
2007 p.16). 
Furthermore as Gill (1995) points out, market driven economic restructuring in the 
developing world has tended and continues to produce domestically, a deepening 
of social inequality, an increase in the rate and intensity of the exploitation of 
labour, a rise in social polarization, gender inequality, a sweeping sense of social 
and economic uncertainty, and, ‘’not least, pervasive disenchantment with 
conventional political practice’’ (Gill, 1995b p.420). It is this deepening of social 
inequalities and the pervasive disenchantment with neoliberal orientated political 
practices that have led to a critical reassessment and rejection of neoliberalism by 
many people and groups globally. In the west for example the rejection and 
criticisms have come in the form of ‘’the occupy and alter globalisation movements 
springing up in many areas of the neoliberal core- in the United States and in 
Western Europe- to agitate for a more democratic and socially just world order 
than that experienced under neoliberal capitalism (Chodor, 2014). As Worth and 
Kuhling (2004) suggests,  
Movements at the level of the global, national, regional and local that 
contest these changes can be seen to act as a counter-movement, which 
intersects with a larger, democratising counter-hegemonic project as it 
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seeks to contest the ideological norms and practices that have been 
embedded through the logic of the free market (Worth and Kuhling, 
2004 pp.33-34) 
The purpose of this section was to give an account of how and in what ways the 
neoliberal world order has created a deepening of social inequality, an increase in 
the rate and intensity of the exploitation of labour, a rise in social polarization and 
a sweeping sense of social and economic uncertainty. Through highlighting the 
negative connotations closely associated with the neoliberal world order, this 
research will now be able to investigate how opposing forces have attempted to 
dismantle the common sense through resistance and counter-hegemonic 
movements. The following section will look specifically at the notion of counter-
hegemony and how it relates to the current world order.  
2.6 Counter-hegemony 
 
Drawing from the work of Gramsci, although the term was never used by Gramsci, 
counter-hegemony generally refers to what Boggs (1984) has suggested as “a 
creation of an alternative hegemony on the terrain of civil society in preparation 
for political change’’ (Boggs, 1984). Thus, it refers to an attempt to create the 
possibility of social transformation and a new hegemonic order by critiquing and 
by attempting to dismantle the ‘’common sense’’. According to Gramsci (1971), 
‘organic crisis’ plays a critical role in creating the possibility for a new hegemonic 
order. For Carroll (2010), organic crisis occurs when ‘’the structures and practices 
that constitute and reproduce a hegemonic order fall into chronic and visible 
disrepair, creating a new terrain of political and cultural contention, and the 
possibility (but only the possibility) of social transformation’’ (Carroll, 2010 p.170). 
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According to Cox (1999), civil society should be considered both a terrain that 
sustains the hegemony of the bourgeoisie, but also it represents a terrain on which 
resistance to hegemony, allowing for an emancipatory counter-hegemony to be 
formulated (Cox, 1999).  For Gramsci (1971) civil society represents an avenue by 
which one could first understand the power and strength of the status quo and 
secondly through this understanding it was then possible to develop a strategy for 
its transformation (Gramsci, 1971). Although in Gramsci’s writing, civil society has 
several different meanings, generally he defines it as a function of the state 
‘'State=political society+civil society’’ (Gramsci, 1971). According to Cox (1999), 
‘’The emancipatory potential of civil society was the object of his thinking’’ (Cox, 
1999 p.97). When attempting to understand the dynamics and mechanisms of 
counter-hegemony activities, two important concepts are vital to its understanding, 
war of position and war of manoeuvre/movement. For Gramsci, the latter 
represents a type of warfare that results in an attack of the state.  He uses the 
example of the Bolshevik revolution to illustrate this type of resistance to 
hegemony. As Worth and Kuhling (2004) explain, ‘’In a war of movement, the entire 
legitimacy of hegemony is contested by an ideological attack not only on the major 
agencies and structures of the order, but also on the complex forms of civil societal 
common sense that hold the order together’’ (Worth and Kuhling, 2004 p.35). 
For Gramsci (1971) such an assault, would not be by itself sufficient to challenge 
the powers of the dominant classes in the west as it was entrenched in the ‘’fortress 
and earthworks’’ of civil society (Gramsci, 1971). For a war of manoeuvre to 
achieve any level of success, in relation to creating a space for an alternative 
hegemonic project, a full-frontal attack of the state is necessary. By contrast, a war 
of position is subtler in form. It represents a more restrained method of 
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contestation and resistance, which is ‘’strategically aimed at transforming common 
sense and consciousness’’ (Worth and Kuhling, 2004 p.35). A war of position 
endeavours to destabilise the hegemon by exposing the tensions, failures and 
contradictions of the existing within the historic bloc, thus it attempts to 
delegitimize the engrained common sense, in an attempt to elicit consent for a 
more favourable hegemonic project. Although the organic crisis of 
Keynesianism/Fordism in the 1970s, which eventually led to its replacement with 
neoliberalism is an example of a war of position, it represents a strategic move by 
the dominant class attempting to hold on to its power in the face of crisis. This 
strategic move is what Gramsci terms, as a passive revolution whereby neoliberal 
organic intellectuals, successfully restructure society from above, constructing a 
new historic bloc, through securing consent, while reproducing and extending the 
power position of the dominant class through a passive revolution. A war of 
position in a counter-hegemonic sense involves attempts to restructure society 
from below, in an effort to establish or potentially establish a new hegemonic 
project. A war of position within a counter-hegemonic movement  
Seeks to restructure ideological self-understandings so that they 
can inform a revolutionary praxis. A counter-hegemonic war of 
position, therefore, also begins with a critique of common sense, 
but seeks to transcends rather than re-embed it. This is a task of 
critical education that seeks to move beyond common sense 
ideological understandings to reconstruct a collective will: an 
ideological worldview conscious of humanities self-constructive 
powers (Worth and Kuhling, 2004 p.35). 
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The resulting reconstruction of the collective will can enable it to create the 
common ground on which a counter-hegemonic historic bloc can be established. 
Although presently, a counter-hegemonic historic bloc has not been established, 
there are many examples of counter-hegemonic movements engaged in a war of 
position against the neoliberal historic bloc, attempting to destabilize its legitimacy 
and consent. In 1994 the Zapatistas launched their uprising to coincide with the 
launch of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which as Worth and 
Kuhling (2004) explains,  
Demonstrated that certain forms of resistance can simultaneously 
address international and local political economy…the Zapatistas 
constitute an example of a counter-hegemonic movement that directly 
challenges the supranational structures of neoliberal globalisation 
through the mobilisation of international blocs around issues of local 
land rights (Worth and Kuhling, 2004 pp.35-36). 
Likewise, the Seattle protests in 1999 can be seen as a counter-hegemonic 
movement, which successfully blockaded free trade negotiations being held by the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in Seattle.  As Gill (1993) argues, ‘’the [Seattle] 
protests form part of a worldwide movement that can perhaps be understood in 
terms of new potentials and forms of global political agency’’ (Gill, 1993 p.137). In 
agreement with Gill, many others have argued that both the Zapatista uprising and 
the Seattle protests are ‘’iconic representatives of one of the most important social 
movements to emerge on the world stage in recent years’’ (Eschle and Maiguashca, 
2005 p.2).  With the above considered, the aim of this thesis is to critically assess 
ALBA within a neo-Gramscian framework, to determine if it can be seen as a viable 
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counter-hegemonic regional movement, that is challenging US hegemony and by 
extension the neoliberal world order.   
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has assessed the key features of the neo-Gramscian/Coxian critical 
theory and its approach to International Political Economy (IPE). Through this 
thorough assessment, the chapter laid a strong theoretical foundation and 
validated the use of a neo-Gramscian approach to the study of ALBA. The chapter 
began with an in-depth and critical analysis of world order. The chapter discussed 
the work of Robert Cox and his approach to world order. In an attempt to situate 
his approach outside of the realm of interstate relations, Cox places an emphasis on 
world order, in which states make up only a single element. In essence, the idea of 
world order as Worth (2011) has articulated  ‘’Order is one in which embedded 
norms and laws are transposed onto the international stage…a World Order 
represents a specific era, or if you like a historic bloc, that was determined through 
social forces, organised through a combination of production, ideology and 
institutionalism’’ (Worth, 2011 p.376). It is through this expanded understanding 
that Cox has been able to bridge the national with the international by linking 
material capabilities, ideas and institutions. He suggests that a prevailing order is 
marked by these ‘configuration of forces’.  The chapter then went on to suggest that 
Cox’s explanation for the causes of different world orders through history allows 
for an expansive understanding of the international system. Particularly in relation 
to his emphases placed on demonstrating that the variation of world orders is 
caused by reciprocal relations between production and forms of states. Relations 
that are both related to the rise and the development of capitalism. From here, the 
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chapter discussed the emergence of IPE and the subsequent theoretical approaches 
that came out of the field.  IPE emerged as a reaction to significant changes with the 
political and economic landscape following the disintegration of the post-World 
War II economic order, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the oil crisis and 
the ensuing debt crisis which crippled numerous developing economies.  It looked 
at the development of IPE and the subsequent separation of the discipline into two 
schools of thought. The American School, a school that favours a positivist and 
empirical approach whereas the British School favours a post-positivist and critical 
approach to the study of IPE. From here, critical theory was discussed. It suggested 
that critical theory emerged as a critique of rationalist or problem-solving 
neorealism traditions within International Relations with the work of Cox and 
Strange among others. Cox’s specific brand of critical theory, a critical theory of 
hegemony, world order and historical change has been extremely influential with 
regards to IPE.  His work, which was undoubtedly aided by his incorporation and 
further development of Gramscian theory, provided an alternative method that 
critically evaluated orthodox approaches to IPE. Cox’s engagement with Gramsci’s 
provided a more comprehensive understanding of hegemony than that used by 
positivist International Relations scholars at the time and has since provided the 
basis of the ‘neo-Gramscian school’ that has become highly significant within 
critical IPE. The chapter then went on to looked at how Cox expanded Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony and transposed it to the international, to illustrate how 
power and consent are maintained within global politics. It then discussed how Cox 
used his concept of world order as a framework for understanding how hegemony 
is framed within international politics. By exploring the hegemonic and non-
hegemonic nature of world orders the chapter was able to provide an 
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understanding of how either can be established. For a hegemonic world order to be 
established institutions and an economic regime needs to be created at a global 
level to legitimize and materially advance that particular world order. Essentially 
the hegemonic state would have to found and protect the world order that was 
universal in conception meaning it would have to be agreeable for the majority. 
According to Cox, a ‘non-hegemonic’ world order occurs when the hegemonic state 
loses its legitimacy and its ability to generate support amongst the masses. When 
this occurs, the hegemonic state must resort to non-legitimate and coercive forms 
of dominance. Hegemonic leadership is transformed into naked domination based 
on strength and violence, thereby ushering in a new non-hegemonic world order. 
From here, the chapter examined the rise of the neoliberal work order to illustrate 
Cox’s theory. It looked at the organic crisis of Pax Americana and the ushering in of 
the hegemonic era of neoliberalism. It suggested the organic crisis of Pax 
Americana came in the form of both a political crisis, via the failure of Keynesian 
and an economic crisis, via the global recession of the 1970s. Both of which, under 
the direction of social forces, eventually led to the establishment of a neoliberal 
world order and the reinstatement of US hegemony (although not in the traditional 
sense, rather the US used international institutions such the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund as mechanisms to assert its power). The chapter then 
went on to discuss how neoliberalism slowly became the new dominant common 
sense, the paradigm shaping all policies, which swept across the world like a vast 
tidal wave of institutional reform and discursive adjustment. From here the chapter 
discussed how the neoliberal world order created a deepening of social inequality, 
an increase in the rate and intensity of the exploitation of labour, a rise in social 
polarization and a sweeping sense of social and economic uncertainty. Through 
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highlighting the negative connotations closely associated with the neoliberal world 
order, the chapter was then able to look at how opposing forces have attempted to 
dismantle the common sense through resistance and counter-hegemonic 
movements. Cox’s concepts of war of position and war of manoeuvre/movement 
were introduced here. This was purposely done; in order to provide a clear 
understanding of the different ways contestation against the common sense can 
occur. In doing so this chapter has provided the parameters in which ALBA can be 
critically assessed, in order to determine if it can be seen as a viable counter-
hegemonic regional movement, that is challenging US hegemony and by extension 
the neoliberal world order. To critically assess ALBA in this light, it is first 
necessary to situate the validity of the study within a world order approach to 












Chapter 3: A World Order approach to regionalism 
3.1: Introduction 
 
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, this thesis is using Cox’s critical 
theory of hegemony, world order and historical change to assess ALBA as a 
counter-hegemonic regional movement, its significance, and its likely evolution, 
within the current world order. In order to investigate the aforementioned, it is 
necessary to firstly give an overview of the academic literature that can aid in an 
understanding of the current global trend towards regionalism.  This section will 
mainly focus on academic literature, which utilises Robert Cox’s notion of world 
order to explain the current rise of regionalism. In order to do so, it is necessary to 
firstly understand what the term region and its derivative concepts, regionalism 
and regionalization mean. This regional focus is important to the overall thesis as it 
aids in the establishment of a coherent framework in which an analysis of ALBA 
can be built on. According to Ghany et al (2014),  
A region is considered the projection of a social, political or economic 
concept over a geographical area or territory. In other words, it is the 
application of human perception to make sense of the physical 
environment. Defining a region is a way to making discreet and 
otherwise, undifferentiated landmass, a strategy to make human 
sense of it (Ghany et al., 2014 p.4). 
Regionalisation, a derivative concept of region, can be understood as a descriptive 
term that refers to the ‘’actual practice of linking geographical areas under diverse 
jurisdictions to achieve military, cultural, social, political or economic purposes’’ 
(Ghany et al., 2014 p.6). In short, regionalisation can be seen as a process that can 
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lead to the establishment of a region, whereas, regionalism refers to a movement 
towards regional integration and forms of regional governance within politics. It 
can occur when a group of economies merges specific interests or policies. It often 
arises within regions that share geographical, cultural and political similarities. As 
Gamble and Payne (1996) have suggested, regionalism can be defined as a state-led 
project, which attempts to reorganise the political and economic relations in a 
certain area. In other words, ‘’Regionalism is seen as something that is being 
constructed, and constantly reconstructed, by collective human action’’ (Gamble 
and Payne, 1996 p.17). Within the current literature however, there are divergent 
interpretations of both regionalism and regionalisation. For instance, Capling and 
Nossal, in a book edited by Fawn (2009), have suggested that regionalism  should 
be seen as  ‘’… state-led efforts to deepen regional integration through the fostering 
of other formal mechanisms to support institutionalised cooperation and collective 
action’’ (Fawn, 2009 p. 148). They suggest, that regionalisation can be described as 
‘’… the process of economic integration that is driven from the bottom-up by 
private actors such as firms in response to the opportunities created by the 
liberalisation of investment and trade’’ (Fawn, 2009 p. 148). In other words, 
regionalism should be understood as formal, de jure cooperation among 
governments whereas the process of regionalisation should be understood as 
informal, de facto heightened interactions between a variety of private actors from 
different countries. In agreement with this interpretation, Kim (2004) adds to this 
understanding, by broadening the domain of regionalism. He suggests that 
regionalism should also be understood as being based on shared aspirations, 
identity, norms and values. Regionalism, according to Kim (2004), should therefore 
be considered as ‘‘state-led projects of cooperation that emerge from 
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intergovernmental dialogues and agreements’’ (Kim, 2004 p. 40). Ghany et al. 
(2014), however, disagrees with the aforementioned interpretations of both 
regionalism and regionalisation. They are not convinced that either definition is as 
clear-cut as is suggested. Instead they suggest, regionalism should be conceived by 
governments as well as private actors, whereas both state and non-state actors can 
practice regionalisation. Although Ghany et al. (2014), point out that in general 
governments and state actors may be the dominant players in regionalism and in 
most instances private actors are predominant in the regionalisation process, it is 
not always the case. Indeed, private actors such as corporations, non-governmental 
organisation and criminal organisations, may choose to engage in regionalism 
whenever it is in their interest to do so. Generally, this occurs whenever these non-
state actors strategically plan to expand their economic activities across borders, 
‘’when they create master plans to take advantage of the assets that different 
territories offer to enhance the reach of the goals they pursue’’ (Ghany et al., 2014 p. 
7). Likewise, state actors can and often do practice regionalisation ‘‘whenever they 
reach across their boarders to achieve specific objectives, without necessarily 
having a larger normative scheme in mind’’ (Ghany et al., 2014 p. 7). States often 
find temporary solutions to persistent problems that develop internally as well as 
outside their territories. These piecemeal solutions often attempt to find short-
term fixes for those issues without assessing the long-term impacts. Moreover, 
states may also engage in practices that divert from regionalism plans, either 
because they are applying tactical adaptions of broader strategies or because 
regionalism is not delivering the expected results (Ghany et al., 2014 p. 7). By 
contrast, Kacowicz (1999) defines  regionalism as ‘’… the process of the 
governments and peoples of the states to establish voluntary associations and to 
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pool together resources in order to create common functional and institutional 
arrangements’’ (Kacowicz, 1999 p.9). Kacowicz (1999) considers regionalisation to 
represent the expansion of societal integration within a given region, ‘’this includes 
all undirected processes of economic and social interaction between units’’ 
(Kacowicz, 1999 p.9). Rozman in an edited book by Armstrong (2006), has 
suggested that regionalism consists of five dimensions; social integration, 
institutional integration, economic integration, the formation of a regional security, 
and  identity (Armstrong, 2006). By contrast, Fawcett and Hurrell (1995), view 
regionalism as an ideology which informs a regional identity, that can in turn, lead 
to a deepening of regionalization through the establishment of a regional identity, 
closer integration and cooperation.  Regionalisation according to Fawcett and 
Hurrell (1995) represents a set of carefully orchestrated moves directed by market 
forces that act to enable, enhance and shape closer global regional integration. 
Furthermore, Hurrell and Fawcett (1995) see regionalism as multi-dimensional, 
consisting of five parts:  regionalization, regional identity and awareness, state-
promoted regional integration, regional cohesion and regional interstate 
cooperation (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995). 
To understand the importance of regionalism within a world order setting it is first 
necessary to discuss the distinct phases of regionalism, the latter of which is closely 
linked to the structural transformation of the global system. The first regional 
initiatives began in the 1950s after the Second World War. This distinct form of 
regional groupings came to be known as old regionalism or first generational 
regionalism, which was primarily seen as a process geared around security 
alliances and economic integration and geographical groupings. Or as Worth 
(2015) notes, ‘’Old regionalism refers to the bodies of (largely military) 
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organizations that were founded during the Cold War and were to define the 
period’’ (Worth, 2015 p. 131). The establishment of NATO (The North Atlantic 
Treaty Association), OAS (Organisation of American States), and the original 
institutions of the EC (European Community) can be seen as regional organisations 
that were under the influence of the west.  Organisations such as the Warsaw Pact 
and Comecon (The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) were built on the 
socialist principles of the Soviet Union. According to Pedersen (2002) old 
regionalism can be defined as a theory of ‘co-operative hegemony’. In his 
teleological view, increased economic cooperation leads to increased political 
cooperation between multiple states and as a result states are less likely to go war 
if they have high levels of commercial and economic interdependence (Pedersen, 
2002).  
By contrast, new or open regionalism refers to a new wave of regionalism that has 
occurred since the 1980s. The rise to prominence of new regionalism should be 
seen in the context of the complete structural transformation of the global system 
and therefore should be understood in its historical context. As Hettne and 
Soderbaum (2000) suggest, the new wave of regionalism must be related  
To the structural transformation of the world, inter alia including (i) 
the move from bipolarity towards a multipolar or perhaps tripolar 
structure, with a new division of power and new division of labour; (ii) 
the relative decline of American hegemony in combination with a 
more permissive attitude on the part of the USA towards regionalism; 
(iii) the erosion of the Westphalian nation-state system and the 
growth of interdependence and ‘globalisation ’; and (iv) the changed 
attitudes towards (neoliberal) economic development and associated 
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political system in the developing countries, as well as in the post-
communist countries (Hettne et al., 2000 p. 457). 
Examples of this type of regionalism can be seen with the creation of the EU (the 
European Union), NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), the AU (The 
African Union) and ASEAN (The Association of South East-Asian Nations). In 
agreement with Hettne al (2000), Palmer (1991)suggests that the rise of new 
regionalism was the result of a growing positive consensus towards international 
cooperation as well as the decentralisation of the global system brought about by 
the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism. Likewise Worth (2015) 
suggests, that  
 Coinciding with the birth of the neoliberal doctrine, new regionalism 
was to gain greater significance by the end of the Cold War as states 
looked to forge partnerships in an attempt to regulate the wider 
processes of globalization that were arising through the rapidly 
changing global economy (Worth, 2015 p. 131). 
 Indeed, increasingly transactions across global politics are being expressed 
through co-operation and free trade arrangements by regional bodies. With the rise 
of new regionalism has come an unusual development. Unlike old regionalism, 
which was geared around security alliances and geographical groupings, new 
regionalism has witnessed a new development where states are seeking 
memberships of various regional organisations to serve self-interest (Bergsten, 
1997). From a world order viewpoint, this form of new/open regionalism has acted 
as a mechanism that has facilitated the practices of neoliberalism in such a way that 
it has ‘’added to the structural conditions of the prevailing neoliberal world order 
(Worth, 2015 p. 135). This new wave accepts international competition as the main 
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engine of economic growth, it takes the global market as a given and urges states to 
open up to competition following the rules of neoliberal capitalism. As Ghany et al. 
(2014) notes,  ‘’Regions become the pieces that conform to the global order, a new 
form of transnational governance, spaces of competition, investment and trade 
flows where national states get involved in order not to be marginalized by 
globalization’’ (Ghany et al., 2014 p.8). 
Although Cox’s minimal analytical interest in regionalism only appeared in his later 
work (Cox, 1999, 2004), other authors such as Gamble and Payne (1996, 2001), 
Grugel and Hout (2003) and Lipietz (1992) have applied Cox’s theoretical 
framework of world order to the study of regionalism. As Gerard Strange (2009) 
notes, ‘’The World Order approach to the study of contemporary regionalism 
commences from a critical analysis of accumulation, regulation and crisis within 
the context of change and instability in this complex of historical structures’’ 
(Strange, 2009 p. 4). The world order approach is specifically interested in 
structural and social change and the role of regionalism (viewed as a state-led 
project) takes in the creation and remaking of world orders. As Gamble and Payne 
note in an edited book by Söderbaum and Shaw (2004), regionalism should be 
understood as a strategy used by states, or more specifically it is a strategy used by 
state/society complexes, to influence the very nature of the world order in pursuit 
of achieving their economic goals (Söderbaum and Shaw, 2004). Cox’s world order 
approach provides us with a useful foundation for understanding how the current 
shift in world order is producing a global trend towards regionalism and vice versa. 
The emergence of regionalism and regionalization can be connected to the 
ideological and processional shifts that are occurring in the historical structure of 
the prevailing world order. These changes are creating a dialectical tension 
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between the prevailing/dominant and alternative social forces. The potential 
outcome of these global shifts as envisioned by Cox will result in one of two future 
scenarios. The first of which as Cox suggests, is the relative deterioration of US 
hegemony, which in turn will give way to ‘‘to a more plural world with several 
centres of world power that would be in continuous negotiation for a constantly 
adjustable modus vivendi, much akin to the European 19th-century balance of 
power system’’ (Cox, 2009 p.1). The second possible future scenario as suggested 
by Cox is the continuing struggle for global domination, that pits the United States 
against a ‘’potential consolidation of Eurasian power’’ (Cox, 2009 p.2). In either 
future scenario, it is blatant that regional arrangements have an important role. 
Following on from this Ghany et al (2014) note, that if US hegemony is 
deteriorating, regional arrangements could possibly be a rational alternative to the 
concentration of power that has defined US hegemony. They also suggest that if the 
United States continues its struggle for global dominance, the rise of regional 
arrangements could be one geopolitical method of opposing that trend (Ghany et al., 
2014).  Gamble and Payne (1996) taking queue from a neo-Gramscian/Coxian line 
of thought have adopted a world order approach to regionalism which clearly 
inserts regionalism into the structures and processes at global level. They have 
suggested that the prominence of contemporary regionalism is the result of the 
decline of US hegemony, the global economic crisis and the uneven impact of 
economic globalisation. In their view, the current trend towards regionalism is the 
result of a growing awareness that a global hegemony centred around one state is 
no longer possible or likely. Furthermore, Gamble and Payne (2003) in agreement 
with Grugel and Hout (1999),  envision that the ‘weight’ of regional cores will 
heighten the unevenness of relations and that a deepening of integration will lead 
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to enhanced polarization between different part of the world but also between 
regions. Gamble and Payne (2003) have also argued that, regionalist arrangements 
should be seen as tools that further advance the interests of distinct state-society 
complexes, most notably those in Western Europe and the United States. These 
interests are not perceived as entirely homogeneous, although authors such as Gill 
(2013), has contended that regionalist arrangements help to discipline other actors 
such as business groups, social actors and states and compel them to ‘’subscribe to 
the principles of deregulation and limited state interference in economic activity’’ 
(Gill, 2013 p.22). From this perspective it is evident that regionalism can be seen as 
an instrument for achieving ‘’the regional ‘hegemony’ of neo-liberal economic 
principles... In order to serve their own economic interests, the political-economic 
elites in the semi-periphery will try to ‘lock in’ the semi peripheral economy with 
that of the core’’ (Grugel and Hout, 2003 p.24). In agreement with Grugel and Hout 
(2003), Hurrell (2007) has argued that regional arrangements have often been 
used as a mechanism to ‘’regulate the processes of the global economy and to co-
ordinate strategic global objectives’’ (Hurrell 2007 cited in Worth, 2015 p.130). 
However, some regional movements such as ALBA, was established in opposition 
to this process. Instead ALBA forms a type of resistance that opposes being used as 
a neoliberal instrument to regulate the processes of the global economy.  
In order to understand how regionalism has affected the prevailing world order it 
is necessary to explore its relationship with neoliberalism.  
3.2 Neoliberalism: facilitator or obstacle 
 
The crisis of Pax Americana during the 1970s and early 1980s as discussed in the 
previous chapter, gave rise ‘’to a more dynamic projection of global capitalism as a 
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solution to the problems of growth, stability and prosperity’’ closely associated 
with the Pax Americana world order (Chodor, 2014 p.121, Grugel and Hout, 2003 
p.24). This more ‘dynamic projection of global capitalism’ emerged in the form of 
the neoliberal world order which saw the reinstatement at its centre of American 
hegemony. In a neo-Gramscian sense, the crisis of Pax Americana from the mid-
1970s onwards, allowed for the emergence of a war of position on the terrain of 
national and global civil society orchestrated by a variety of neoliberal organic 
intellectuals in the media, politics, the corporate sector, and universities. The 
emergence of a war of position by neoliberal organic intellectuals involved taking 
command of or establishing new institutions in civil society both globally, as 
exemplified with the founding of the Mont Perlin Society in 1947 which ‘’aimed to 
establish a transnational network of neoliberal thinkers looking to critique the 
mixed-economic Keynesian consensus emerging at that time’’ (Worth, 2015 p.130) 
or the Trilateral Commission (Gill, 1991), or from within states, via the Chicago 
school’ economists in the United States and the Institute of Economic Affairs in 
Great Britain (Chodor, 2014).  
Neo-classical economists Milton Friedman and Alan Walters of the Chicago School 
developed the liberal shift, which emphasized the doctrine of monetarism. As 
Gamble (2001) points out, neoliberalism rose to stardom as an economic critique of 
and an alternative model to Keynesian economics, however,  the idea of 
monetarism put forth, ‘’was a part of a wider critique of state involvement in the 
economy associated with the Austrian School and in particular with Friedrich 
Hayek’’ (Gamble, 2001 p.128). Hayek’s free market theory which ‘’assumed it best 
to leave as many decisions as possible up to the market’’ (Goddard et al., 2003a p. 
23), in combination with Friedman and Walters emphasis on monetarism (a 
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method to control inflation), allowed for the neoliberal capitalist model to be 
internationally recognised as the most viable political and economic strategy for 
restructuring capitalism.  
In the 1980s and again in the 1990s neoliberalism or the Washington Consensus, as 
it became later known as, rose to prominence in the developing world, with the 
adoption of this economic and political neoliberal strategy by key International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank (WB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and belatedly the World Trade Organization (WTO). These 
international organisations influence and surveillance over developing economies 
domestic policymakers were significantly enhanced, along with their heightened 
authority to enforce punitive measures, following the debt crisis of the 1980s. As a 
result, the adoption of the neoliberal economic model by key international financial 
institutions, as Harvey (2007) points out, ‘’Neoliberalization has in effect swept 
across the world like a vast tidal wave of institutional reform and discursive 
adjustment’’ (Harvey, 2007 p.145). With the strengthening of these neoliberal 
institutions a global ideological assault on the Keynesian common sense was 
launched, neoliberalism slowly became the new dominant ‘common sense, the 
paradigm shaping all policies’ (Gamble, 2001 p. 129) making Keynesianism 
obsolete and bringing capitalism into a new global era. 
The current world order has undoubtedly been shaped by what Gill (1995b) has 
referred to as a ‘worldwide market revolution’ that is closely associated with both 
globalization and neoliberalism. This ‘worldwide market revolution’, as Gill and 
Cutler (2014), have suggested, can been characterized as ‘’processes of economic 
integration beyond state borders culminating in a global marketplace of 
commodities, ideas and identities’’ (Gill and Cutler, 2014 p.5). In agreement with 
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this characterization, Cutler (2010) and Kobrin (2004) have suggested, that the 
global market revolution can also be intrinsically linked to the ever-increasing 
prominence of transnational corporations and the capital mobility through foreign 
investment, as well as ‘the networks of trade in goods and services that span the 
global’, all of which have facilitated this economic integration beyond state borders 
(Cutler 2010 and Kobrin 2004 in Gill and Cutler, 2014). 
 Worth (2015) has suggested, that from a Coxian/neo-Gramscian world order 
perspective, open regionalism facilitates and complements the practices of 
neoliberalism very efficiently. As the creation, development and purpose of 
regional bodies have been centred around enhancing more trade, ‘’increased 
liberalization and greater harmonization on regulation on investment’’ (Worth, 
2015 p.129). Gamble and Payne (1996) have argued, regional bodies viewed in this 
light have contributed to the ‘’structural conditions of the prevailing order’’ 
(Gamble and Payne, 1996). Gill (1998) elaborates on this perspective with 
reference to the EU seen as a regional body that seeks to ‘’consolidate the wider 
structures of the global order’’ (Gill, 1998). Likewise, Hurrell (2007) has argued 
that regional arrangements have often been used as a mechanism to ‘’regulate the 
processes of the global economy and to co-ordinate strategic global objectives’’ 
(Hurrell, 2007 p.130). Unquestionably, the most comprehensive effort to apply a 
world order perspective to the notion of open regionalism, with reference to a 
specific regional body has been with the pioneering work of Gill and his influential 
approach which evaluated the European Union through his original concept of new 
constitutionalism.  For Gill (1998) the European Union should be seen as a regional 
project that seeks to establish a constitution ‘’basing itself around the principles of 
neoliberalism’’ (Gill, 1998 p.17). Initially the conceptualisation of world order in 
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terms of new constitutionalism with reference to open regionalism emerged with a 
number of articles written by Gill in the 1990s. Since then his pioneering approach 
has been applied by a number of neo-Gramscian scholars, most notably Pijl (1998) 
Van Apeldoorn (1998, 2000, 2002), Kelly (2005), Plehwe et al. (2006), Shields 
(2003), Bieler and Morton (2004) and Graz (2003). For Parker (2008), new 
constitutionalism understood as a concept and a mode of legal regulation, is 
analytically distinguishable from disciplinary neo-liberalism, which should be 
understood as both a concept of political economy and as a set of social practices. 
According to Gill and Cutler (2014), however, each concept should be seen as 
intrinsically linked and ‘’equally significant in facilitating neo-liberal forms of global 
economic integration and the extension of the world market’’ (Gill and Cutler, 2014 
p.6). In essence, new constitutionalism for Gill and Cutler (2014) represents the 
political judicial counterpart to disciplinary neo-liberalism, whereas the latter 
refers principally to the ‘’processes of intensifying and deepening the scope of 
market disciplines associated with the increasing power of capital in organizing 
social and world orders, and in so doing shaping the limits of the possible in 
peoples everyday lives’’ (Gill and Cutler, 2014 p.6). From Gill’s new 
constitutionalist’s perspective, European regionalism has acted as an important 
mechanism that has both acted to facilitate the ‘elite’s global project’ and at the 
same time, has been able to disarticulate ‘’potential sources of opposition to it by 
establishing a supra-national governance framework beyond the nation state’’ (Gill 
cited in Strange, 2009 p.7). Both of which are intended to institutionalize 
neoliberalism in accordance with the structural necessities of capital and as a result 
has weaken the ‘’policy autonomy of the nation state and of labour’’ (Strange, 2009 
p.7). Furthermore, Strange (2009) has argued that the key element of the EU’s new 
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constitutionalism has been the institutional and legal embedding of the single 
market, beginning in the mid-1980s with the establishment of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) leading to the creation of the Euro zone 
(Strange, 2009). For Strange (2009), the depth of European economic integration 
or ‘hard constitutional governance’ acts to  ‘‘lock in through constitutional 
mechanisms, a macroeconomic policy bias in favour of neoliberalism, thereby 
foreclosing progressive alternatives’’ (Strange, 2009 p.7). As argued by Gill (1995b), 
the most noteworthy feature of monetary union and of constitutionalism in general 
is considered to be the way in which it ‘‘depoliticizes’ policy, substituting the rule of 
money, the market and rule-bounded technical governance for discretionary, 
democratic politics’’ (Gill, 1995b p.416). As a result, according to Burnham (2001), 
new constitutionalism as a legal framework and function of the EU has ‘’removed 
policymaking, particularly macro-economic management – the bedrock of social 
democracy - from the realm of contestable politics (Burnham, 2001 p.133). For 
Strange (2009),  
 The Single Market, the Maastricht convergence criteria, the Stability 
and Growth pact and finally monetary union (under the auspices of a 
European Central Bank granted independence from direct democratic 
accountability and constitutionally committed to prioritising monetary 
stability) are the key aspects of the EU’s new constitutionalism (Strange, 
2009 p.7). 
Strange (2009) has argued European new constitutionalism, exists within and 
forms part of the neoliberal world order. As a result, it should be viewed in terms of 
the role it plays in supporting and strengthening the institutionalized ‘‘deflationary 
bias of the wider Bretton Woods institutions post embedded liberalism’’ (Strange, 
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2009 p.7). Thus, on par to the International Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP), the European Union's monetary stabilization policy has been 
able to operate, without automatic fiscal stabilizers, to enforce supply-side market 
disciplines, particularly in relation to labour interests. As a result, it is evident that 
the EU’s prioritization of monetary discipline has become the cornerstone of the 
new constitutionalism’s ‘’anti-social democracy’’ (Strange, 2009 p.8). 
In sum, regionalism is understood by Gill (1995b), as a mechanism in which the 
‘‘the autonomy of even the most powerful states [is] subordinated to the interests 
of large capital and a rentier view of monetary policy’’ (Gill cited in Strange, 2009 
p.8), as is evident with the case of the EU, or acts as a means to politically lock in 
neo-liberal reforms as is the case with the creation of NAFTA. In agreement with 
Gill (1995b) and Gill (1995a), Strange (2009) has suggested that strategic 
regionalism, as exemplified by NAFTA, provides a regional mechanism for insertion 
into the global economy. According to Axline (1994), strategic regionalism also acts 
as a mechanism for ‘’globalizing the neo-liberal ideology that defines the form and 
direction of sub-regional policies chosen for this insertion’’ (Axline, 1994 p.33). By 
contrast, many academics have used Polanyi’s framework of double movement and 
social transformation to understand global developments, neoliberalism and open 
regionalism. Polanyi’s defining work ‘The Great Transformation’ (1944) has argued 
that the advancement of market societies over the past few hundred years has been 
shaped by a ‘double movement’. On one side is the movement of laissez faire, which 
constitutes the consorted efforts made by a variety of elites to increase the scope 
and influence of self-regulating markets. Whereas on the other side, it can be 
described as a movement of protection, which takes the form of initiatives driven 
by a wide variety of social actors, in an attempt to insulate the fabric of social life 
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from the damaging effect of market pressures. For Block (2008), capitalism or 
market societies should be considered the product of both these movements; ‘’it is 
an uneasy and fluid hybrid that reflects the shifting balance of power between 
these contending forces’’ (Block, 2008 p.1). Many contemporary academics have 
found Polanyi’s concept of double movement valuable in understanding global 
developments over the last few decades (Block, 2008), (Berman, 2009), (Bugra and 
Agartan, 2007), (Evans, 2008) and (Silver and Arrighi, 2003). Bjorn Hettne (2000) 
drawing on the work of Karl Polanyi (1944) and his theoretical framework of 
double movement and social transformation conceptualizes a contrasting view of 
open regionalism. According to both regionalization and globalization epitomize 
related yet different features of the contemporary transformation of world order. 
For Hettne et al (2000), in agreement with Polanyi’s classical theory, contemporary 
globalization can be seen as a ‘double movement’, a ‘second great transformation’ 
where development and intensification of the market is ensued by a political 
intervention acting as a shield for social cohesion. Here the development of the 
market constitutes the initial movement and the societal reaction the second. 
Hettne et al (2005) suggests the second movement is comprised of counter-
movements, which are created by the displacements associated with market 
infiltration into new areas. Thus regionalism can be seen as being part of both the 
first and second movement; ‘’with a neoliberal face in the first, and a more 
interventionist orientation in the second. There is thus a transnational struggle 
over the political content of regionalization, as well as over that of globalisation’’ 
(Hettne et al., 2005 p.548). 
 Furthermore, open regionalism in the contemporary world order, for Hettne et al 
(2005) increasingly represents  ‘‘A political intervention in defence of social 
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cohesion’’ (Hettne et al., 2005 p.548), reacting to economic globalisation by moving 
towards the creation and development of a post-Westphalian system of 
transnational and regional governance ‘’which is more than the political 
articulation of the transnational capitalist class‘’ (Hettne et al., 2005 p.548). 
Carranza (2010) drawing on the work of Strange (2009) and Hettne (1995, 2001, 
2005) among others, has adopted a conceptualization of open regionalism that 
applies Polanyi’s theoretical framework of the ‘double movement’ dialectic. 
Carranza (2003, 2006, 2010), work has emphasized how historical moments of 
market dominance and promotion have seen driven through the medium of new 
regionalism and this has led to the emergence of counter-movements of political 
responses in addition to more transformative politically driven change (Carranza, 
2010). The emergence of these counter-movements which exist at multiple levels 
of politics be it local, national, regional and global, have sought to check, control or 
modify the effect of market forces. From Carranza’s (2010) perspective new 
regionalism should be viewed as a form of opposition to neoliberalism, as it can in 
some instances serve as a form of resistance. Additionally, it should be viewed as a 
mechanism or platform where alternative norms and practices can be established 
(Carranza, 2010). An example of this kind of form of resistance can be seen with the 
emergence of ALBA. In agreement with Carranza (2003, 2006, 2010), ALBA at least 
in its early years, can be seen as a form of resistance that was created in response 
to a neoliberalism orientated regional movement (FTAA), which sought to check, 
control and modify the effect of neoliberal market forces. 
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3.3 Latin American regionalism 
 
 From the late 1950s regionalism has been a powerful and essential force in Latin 
America. Since its beginnings, regionalism within the Americas has been a platform 
from which to comprehend the complexities of internal and external influences. As 
Pia Riggirozzi in Hurrelmann and Schneider (2015) has suggested, the general 
understanding about Latin American regionalism has developed from the view that 
‘’Latin America engaged defensively in regional cooperation schemes to either 
counteract or better cope with the pressures of external forces’’ (Hurrelmann and 
Schneider, 2015 p.232).  The evolution of regionalism within the Americas can be 
understood by looking at the distinct waves that have occurred within the region. 
The first wave of regionalism known as closed regionalism was created and 
developed under the inspiration of dependency theory in the 1960s. This first wave 
of closed/defensive/old regionalism, according to Riggirozzi and Grugel (2012), 
can be seen as direct response to the construction of the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1957 and the ‘’access of former colonies to the EEC by means 
of preferential agreements’’ (Riggirozzi and Grugel, 2012 p.6). As Mattli (1999), has 
highlighted, the following statement proclaimed by the President of Uruguay in the 
1960s illustrates the extent of defensive regionalism’s popularity, he declared that 
‘‘the formation of the European Common Market is a state of near-war against Latin 
American exports. To an integration scheme we must respond with another 
integration’’ (Mattli, 1999 p.140). At the time, the general consensus with regards 
to this defensive orientation was that economic integration would enhance the 
‘’bargaining position and facilitate industrialisation through import substitution on 
a regional scale’’ (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012 p.6). In other words, regional 
arrangements within the Americas were created with the distinct objective of 
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establishing barriers against foreign goods, supporting regional industrialisation 
and seeking local markets for goods manufactured in the region. This defensive 
orientation emphasised through economic integration can be seen as the central 
element of old regionalism in Latin America, of which trade can be viewed as the 
main mechanism propelling this integration. The establishment of the Latin 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1960 can be seen as the first relevant 
trade initiative that was created out of a push for economic integration, whose 
main objective was to eliminate all barriers to intraregional trade between its 
member states. According to both Lewis (2005) and Panitch and Leys (2004), at the 
centre of this interregional trade initiative was the idea of ‘bounded sovereign 
states’, that had the ability to control the character of regional commitments and at 
the same time had the ability to protect their own domestic producers, through 
tariffs and subsidies, from external competition (Panitch and Leys, 2004). 
Riggirozzi (2012), has suggested, ‘’In this context, economic nationalism framed a 
new way of thinking and speaking about politics, economics, and culture; while 
regionalism became a generalised reaction to the liberal rule’’ (Riggirozzi, 2012 
p.6). Similar initiatives began to spring up within the region starting with the 
Central American Common Market, which emphasized the creation of a free trade 
area and the implementation of a common external tariff. Followed by the 
establishment of the Andean Community in 1969, which attempted to create an 
even more institutionally ambitious common market project through the 
development of an executive body ‘’with ‘supranational’ powers and mechanisms 
to promote an equitable distribution of benefits’’ (Riggirozzi, 2012 p.6). Followed 
on by the creation of the Caribbean Free Trade Agreement (CARIFTA) in 1967. 
Despite these regional developments, economic protectionism and political 
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nationalism led to an uncompetitive and overvalued exchange rate for exports, 
leading to a trade deficit. Additionally, as Haggard and Kaufman (1992) have 
argued, public spending in the region was financed by growing external 
indebtedness, this took most of the region into a lost decade by the 1980s, which 
can be defined by economic collapse as well as a massive drop in living standards 
and employment (Haggard and Kaufman, 1992). The unsustainability of the 
aforementioned nationalistic development projects coupled with the failure of 
import substitution industrialization along with the many years of political 
repression, under military dictatorships that followed, ‘’affected the spirit and the 
progress of closed regionalism‘’ (Mattli, 1999 p.145). This decline, according to 
Riggirozzi (2012), represented not only ‘’a failure to tie the region closely in terms 
of its cohesion but critically, a dilution of its identity’’ (Riggirozzi, 2012 p.6). As a 
result highly indebted economies within the region had no choice but to align 
themselves closely with the United States ‘’a gatekeeper to external finance, and 
standard-bearer of ‘open markets and open regionalism’ ’’  (Riggirozzi, 2012 p.6).  
 The early authoritarian implementation of neoliberal restructuring in Latin 
America began in the 1970s with the dictatorships of Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia and 
Argentina. By the late 1980s the majority of Latin American countries had 
conformed and adopted neoliberal, market-orientated reforms. The neoliberal turn 
in the America’s, however, was not the result of coercion but rather it was carried 
out through a complicated interrelationship between pro-neoliberal national 
governments, transnational corporation and intellectuals (typically economist) 
who forcefully promoted the neoliberal orthodoxy. Collectively according to 
Kellogg (2007), they manufactured consent for neoliberalism, which dominated 
Latin America for more than a generation (Kellogg, 2007). As Biglaiser and De 
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Rouen (2004) have suggested ‘’Economic hardship caused, in part, by the previous 
initiation of import-substituting industrialization (ISI) policies, convinced these 
governments to reduce the role and size of the state in the economy’’ (Biglaiser and 
DeRouen, 2004 p.562). In the 1980s open regionalism became the dominant 
strategy for the economic integration of Latin American countries, attempting to 
link the economic inter-dependency of the economies of the Americas to 
deregulation and liberalization.  According to Jilberto and Hogenboom (1996),  
This neoliberal approach to insertion into the world economy by means 
of regionalization constitutes a clear shift away from the Keynesian 
concept of economic integration through import-substitution 
industrialization (ISI). Instead of focusing on national industrialization, 
the efforts are now directed at industrialization on a regional scale 
(Jilberto and Hogenboom, 1996 p.4). 
Jilberto and Hogenboom (1996) have also suggested, that open regionalism in the 
Americas was based on two pillars. The first is centred on the growing economic 
interdependency occurring at a regional level, ‘’urged by various Latin American 
integration agreements aiming to increase competitiveness in the world market’’ 
(Jilberto and Hogenboom, 1996 p.4). The second pillar is constructed on the 
regionalization of ‘’national private elements that have been strengthened by the 
selling of public enterprises‘’ (CEPAL, 1994). Additionally, open regionalism 
operates as a strategy of regulation and as a mechanism against the protectionist 
propensities of other regional economic blocs (Jilberto and Hogenboom, 1996).As  
Ghany et al. (2014), have suggested, Latin American open regionalism from the 
1990s, was  
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Congenial with the neo-liberal free trade policies of what John 
Williamson aptly called the ‘Washington consensus’, that is, the 
combination of economic policies preferred both by the international 
financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, IDB) and the US federal 
government (Ghany et al., 2014p.9). 
Although the Washington Consensus ‘’was mute about regional integration’’ 
(Dabene, 2012), the neo-classical economists closely associated with the region 
saw free markets and free trade as the only tangible route to faster growth. ‘’Even 
the ECLAC revisited its doctrine, pressing for “open regionalism” (Dabene, 2012). 
Motivated by U.S. trade initiatives, most notably the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and by the European Union’s move towards a unified market, a new 
treaty signed which initiated the establishment of Mercosur (The Common Market 
of the South).  As Jilberto and Hogenboom (1996) have stated, the establishment of 
Mercosur arose as a response to the international strategy of bloc formation. It 
aimed to improve its negotiation capacity with the EC and US. However,  
Only under the regimes of Collor de Mello (Brazil) and Menem 
(Argentina) did Mercosur acquire a neoliberal character. For Argentina, 
Mercosur has since been considered a mechanism to consolidate its 
neoliberal reforms and as a anteroom for later entry into the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Jilberto and Hogenboom, 
1996 p.8). 
The academic literature available on the relationship between Mercosur and 
neoliberalism is divergent.  On one side of the argument, authors such as Dabene 
(2012) and Oelsner (2013), view Mercosur as a regional project that is attempting 
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to mitigate the potentially pernicious effects of neoliberalism in the region. Pimenta 
(2014) has suggested that the  
Regional framework of open economies for the member-states and 
maintenance of (reduced) barriers to other regions could provide time 
for the adaptation of private and public actors to the new conditions of 
free market and global competition, besides attracting foreign capital 
interested in penetrating a region with growth potential (Pimenta, 
2014 p.12).   
Contrastingly Phillips (2004) has argued that the reasoning under the 
transformation of the Argentina-Brazil cooperation treaties into the Mercosur was 
based on a lock-in of neoliberal principles’’ (Phillips, 2004). Thus, guaranteeing the 
creation of neoliberal institutions and markets would be the primary objective of 
the movement, furthermore ensuring the insertion of Mercosur in the ‘’context of a 
neoliberal globalized economy’’ (Pimenta, 2014 p.12).  In agreement with Phillips 
(2004) and Pimenta (2014), Kellogg (2007) has argued that Mercosur is a 
‘’creature of the Washington Consensus’’, which acts as a facilitator for 
neoliberalism. The launch of Mercosur in 1991 with the signing of the Treaty of 
Asuncion occurred at the height of the neoliberal restructuring.  According to 
Kellogg (2007) Mercosur should be viewed as a ‘’regional integration scheme that 
functions within the neoliberal capitalist matrix because the push for Mercosur 
surged at the height of the Washington Consensus’’ (Kellogg, 2007 pp.194-195). 
Kellogg (2007) argued, that even its name (Common Market of the South) denotes 
that it is a ‘’capitalist economic integration project’’, where privatization can be 
seen as its central pillar since its establishment in 1991. Mercosur should therefore 
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be viewed as a regional project that is embedded in the neoliberal orthodoxy 
(Kellogg, 2007). 
The above literature on Mercosur, which situates the regional project as a function 
of neoliberalism, is relevant to this thesis as it operates in contrast to ALBA. Unlike 
Mercosur, ALBA can be seen as a very visible form of contestation against 
neoliberalism, at the very least, from an ideological basis. In order to understand 
how and in what ways ALBA has been created to act as a form of resistance to both 
US hegemony and by extension neoliberalism, it is necessary to look at the 
development of post-hegemonic/post-neoliberal regionalism in Latin American 
and the various factors which led to the creation of ALBA.  
3.4: Post-hegemonic regionalism and the creation of ALBA as a form of resistance 
 
Along with Mercosur and CAN, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the 
hemisphere-wide free trade agreement proposed by the US in 1994, can also be 
seen as a form of neoliberal/open regionalism. As Chodor and McCarthy-Jones 
(2013) have suggested, the FTAA ‘‘Sought to ‘lock in’ the neoliberal reforms 
achieved over the previous decade, thus entrenching the American political and 
economic model in the region, while also opening up new and favourable markets 
to American capital’’ (Chodor and McCarthy-Jones, 2013 p.214). By integrating 
Latin America politically, through enforcing American inspired political structures 
and liberal democratic values and economically through the liberalization of 
economic policies, the FTAA provided the US with an opportunity to remake its 
relationship with the Americas. As Nelson (2008) notes, ‘’In the absence of an 
immediate threat in the hemisphere, the United States was given a window to 
ensure its hegemony in the Americas on the basis of common political and 
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economic values without recourse to coercive methods’’ (Nelson, 2008 p.1). 
Furthermore as Prevost and Oliva (2002),  have argued the FTAA should be seen as 
a form of neo pan-Americanism - a neoliberal regional project designed by the US 
to integrate the hemisphere under its leadership (Prevost and Oliva, 2002).  In 
agreement with Prevost and Oliva (2002) Riggirozzi (2012) has suggested that the 
FTAA symbolizes the US’s ambition in relation to intra-hemispheric relations which 
bears resemblance to the old vision of Pan-Americanism, under the new umbrella 
of neoliberalism. Likewise, Marchand (2005) in an edited book by Eschle and 
Maiguashca (2005), has argued that the FTAA is a reflection of a modern 
Monrovian geopolitical paradigm, where the US seeks to establish its presence 
within the Americas, in an attempt to economically compete with other regional 
agreements in Asia and Europe and/or to keep non-US competition out of the 
Americas (Eschle and Maiguashca, 2005). 
For some scholars, most notably Riggirozzi (2012), the creation of FTAA as well as 
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) as models of American-led 
regionalism should be seen as a double-edged sword. However, according to Tussie 
(2009), NAFTA’s establishment  ‘’triggered panic reactions in a spate of excluded 
countries’’ (Tussie, 2009 p.172). Although, the very idea of neoliberal regionalism 
was highly contested by social actors internally within one major partner, Mexico, 
but also, externally by the global financial crisis of 1995 and its subsequent Tequila 
effect. Indeed, by the end of the 1990s the unfavourable effects of integration in 
relation to both development and social cohesion contributed to deep seeded 
disillusionment with neoliberal policies as they failed to make any significant 
impact on the region a side from controlling inflation. As a result of this failure, 
many economies within the Americas experienced unsustainable levels of 
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inequality, rising indebtedness and poverty, which resulted in a change of attitudes 
within the region towards pro-market reforms (Riggirozzi, 2012). This resulted in 
growing disenchantment with neoliberalism, leading to the FTAA negotiations 
encountering major difficulties. Support for the US inspired regional project began 
to dwindle and lose legitimacy. The lack of enthusiasm for neoliberalism and the 
open regionalism that was associated with it was heightened as the US hegemonic 
intentions for the region became more pronounced during the FTAA negotiations, 
with the US unwilling to compromise on issues of concern for countries in the 
Americas. Most importantly the US refused to budge on agricultural subsidies 
(Burges, 2016).  As the agenda of integration ushered in by the FTAA negotiations 
encountered the difficulties of losing support and legitimacy, the US paradoxically, 
turned to a number of bilateral trade deals that, although more resilient, 
‘’profoundly shook the US transformational goal of hemispheric integration‘’ 
(Phillips, 2004 p.23). Consequently, according to Riggirozzi (2012), the diminishing 
appeal of neoliberal/open regionalism has been linked with ‘’a dwindling leverage 
of US hegemonic power in the Americas, a general loss of faith in neoliberal 
economics, and the gradual re-emergence of nationalistic views of political 
economy across the region’’ and the emergence of the ‘new left’ (Riggirozzi, 2012). 
The rise of the new left in the Americas, reflected a rejection of both marketised 
versions of democracy and neoliberalism and propose instead a ‘’new politics’, 
founded on an altered understanding of inclusion and democracy. At a regional 
level, this transformed understanding led to an increase in regional commitments 
in an attempt to enhance cooperation amongst Latin American nations and has 
acted as a form of resistance to US power.  As Riggorizzi (2012) has suggested,  
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Ideational aspects of what Latin America should mean in the face of the 
crisis of neoliberalism together with the establishment of ad hoc 
institutions supporting new transnational networks of solidarity were 
in fact the two elements that redefine the contours of regionalism in 
Latin America since the early 2000s (Riggirozzi, 2012 p.431). 
 At the Fourth Summit of the Americas in 2005, it was evident that support for the 
proposed FTAA was divided, between those favouring the proposed FTAA, notably 
Canada, Mexico and the US along with a few Latin American countries that were 
dependent on US preferential trade agreements and another dissenting group, 
which included participating countries in Mercosur along with Bolivia and 
Venezuela. The dissenting group declared themselves against any form of US 
inspired hemispheric trade agreements and rejected the FTAA as a whole (Kellogg 
2007). As Riggirozzi (2012) notes, ‘‘it soon became clear that the window of 
opportunity that opened for Washington to remake the hemisphere in its own 
image had found clear limits’’ (Riggirozzi, 2012 p.431). 
From the early 2000s onwards, changes in the Latin American political economy 
began to emerge. A rise of left and centre left political forces exponentially grew in 
popularity, resulting in their ascendance to government across the region; 
‘’beginning with the election of Hugo Chavez to Presidency of Venezuela in 1998 
and then spreading to Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, El 
Salvador, Paraguay and Honduras’’ (Sader, 2008). As a consequence of the rise of 
the left, the proposed formation of the FTAA never materialized. Instead, the Latin 
American region began to reinvent itself, forming, what some have called, a post-
hegemonic regional order which redefined the boundaries of regional integration 
(Chodor and McCarthy-Jones, 2013). One of the defining elements of this ‘post-
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hegemonic’ regional order is ‘’its move away from integration through economic 
means like free trade and markets, towards a more explicitly ‘political’ focus on 
attaining autonomy from external forces, so that the region can set and regulate its 
own political agenda’’ (Burges, 2016 p.102). According to Burges (2016) this aspect 
of ‘post-hegemonic’ regionalism is reflective of not only an increasingly intense and 
strained relationship with the US, but it also signifies a recognition of the 
inadequacies of the first wave of regionalism in the 1960s, where ‘’the American 
domination of the regional political architecture allowed it to intervene in the 
region and shape the political agenda to suit its interests’’ (Burges, 2016 p.102). 
Furthermore, the ‘post-hegemonic/post-liberal’ regional projects represent a move 
away from neoliberal/open regionalism, as this new wave of regionalism in the 
Americas moved beyond its commitment to Washington, putting forth an explicit 
developmental agenda, where the state’s role became prominent. According to 
Burges (2016) a fundamental feature of this is the attempt to enhance the 
autonomy of Latin America in the global economy, especially 
 From transnational capital and the IFIs- so that the region can pursue an 
‘endogenous’ development strategy reflective of the regional context, 
rather than submitting to a universalist one defined in Washington. It is 
also a project that promotes a ‘social’ dimension to development, 
including a focus on alleviating poverty and disadvantage and correcting 
developmental asymmetries between countries in the region (Burges, 
2016 p.41).   
Overall, this move towards a ‘post-hegemonic/post-liberal’ regional order signified, 
at least in the 2000s, a renewed pursuit for regional autonomy, from both the 
global economy and from American hegemony, and its economic and political 
 75 
agenda for the Americas. Both Riggirozzi (2012) and Burges (2016) have suggested 
that this move towards a ‘post-hegemonic/post-liberal’ regional order in the 
Americas, represents a return to Bolívar’s alternative vision of regional integration, 
one that invokes his vision directly and openly as it seeks to create and develop a 
regional order that is built on the notions of cooperation, social justice and 
solidarity (Burges, 2016).  As a result of the emergence of this new ‘post-hegemonic’ 
regional order, forms of contestation to both open regionalism and neoliberalism 
as a whole began to emerge throughout the 2000s in Latin America; most 
noteworthy was the creation of ALBA in 2004. ALBA, sometimes known as the 
pillar of Venezuelan foreign policy (Pimenta, 2014) was initially established from 
the 2000 Cuban-Venezuelan Integral Cooperation Agreement and was later 
formalized with the 2004 ALBA Integration Agreement. The project was born out of 
resistance to the FTAA proposed by the US and is centred around the ideas of 
endogenous development and a ‘twenty-first-century socialism’ that replaces the 
competitive advantage with the cooperative advantage. According to Eschle and 
Maiguashca (2005), ALBA originates from the Bolivarian ideal of a united Latin 
America where Bolívar wanted all the nations of Latin America to unite and ally 
with the United Kingdom in attempt to counterbalance the Spanish and US 
hegemonic forces within the region and establish a counter-hegemonic force 
(Eschle and Maiguashca, 2005).  ALBA’s central focus resides on the inter-relations 
between Latin American nations and its main objective of establishing a strong bloc 
of solidarity against neo-liberal projects. It was originally created as a mechanism 
for forging a unified front against the US by Venezuela and Cuba. For many 
including Fritz (2007), Sanahuja (2012) and Bourbon (2012a), ALBA can be 
considered a counter-hegemonic regional movement that was created and 
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developed in a post-hegemonic era and as a result it is engaged in a war of position 
against the neoliberal historic bloc, attempting to destabilize its legitimacy and 
consent. For Kellogg (2007) ALBA does not just implicitly contest the FTAA and 
neoliberalism as a whole. Rather, the contestation is explicit in the founding 
document of the ALBA process. This explicit challenge to neoliberalism is evident 
with the formal articulation of the ALBA philosophy by the Venezuelan Bank of 
External Commerce (Bancoex).  
The Bolivarian Government of Venezuela is against the processes of 
liberalization, deregulation and privatization that limit the capacity of 
the state and the Government to design and to execute policies in 
defence of the right of our people to have access to essential services 
of good quality and at good prices … For the Bolivarian Government of 
Venezuela, the public services are for satisfying the needs of people, 
not for commerce and economic profit. Therefore, its benefits cannot 
be governed by the criteria of profit but by social interest (Bancoex 
2004). 
 For Kellogg (2007) this Bancoex document illustrates ALBA’s emphasis on the fight 
against social exclusion and poverty. The document situates ALBA as an extension 
of international trade which priorities the philosophy and politics of the Bolivarian 
state. Furthermore, it argues that 
 Recognizing and correcting asymmetries between participating 
countries has to be at the centre of the development and application of 
ALBA. The idea is to help the weakest countries to overcome the 
disadvantage that separates them from the most powerful countries of 
the hemisphere (Kellogg, 2007 p. 14). 
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As a result of this recognition, Bancoex argued for the establishment of 
‘’Compensatory Funds of Structural Convergence or the SUCRE’’. For Arreaza 
(2005) the creation of the SUCRE should be seen as the ‘’corner stone in the design 
of ALBA’’  (Arreaza 2005), a mechanism that acts to ensure that  ‘’trade relations do 
not become the institutionalization of a hierarchy of nations, but a mechanism for 
the levelling of that hierarchy of nations, in the interest of the poorest and smallest 
economies’’ (Kellogg, 2007 p. 14). This mechanism can be likened to the Canadian 
federal system, where equalization payments, embedded in the fiscal structure, 
have been used to transfer wealth from rich to poor sections of the polity. However, 
similarities between the Canadian equalization payments, and ALBA are only 
formal.  As Kellogg (2007) argues, ‘’The ALBA proposals are ‘’equalization 
payments’’ on a hemispheric basis, transcending national borders, and imbued with 
a distrust of traditional trade deals-equalization on anti-neoliberal steroids’’ 
(Kellogg, 2007 p. 14). 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
Overall this chapter provided an avenue by which Robert Cox’s notion of world 
order can be utilised in order to understand the contemporary rise of regionalism. 
It looked specifically at the relationship between open regionalism and 
neoliberalism in order to determine how the rise of neoliberalism has affected and 
shaped regionalism in the contemporary era. It then gave a detailed account of the 
evolution of Latin American regionalism. It looked at specific factors and events, 
which shaped the closed regionalism era and investigated the region’s transition 
into open regionalism by means of neoliberalism. The chapter then gave a detailed 
account of factors, which have led to the failure of the FTAA. It was suggested that 
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from the early 2000s onwards a new Latin American political economy emerged. 
This change can be directly associated with the rise of the left and centre left 
political forces and their exponential growth in popularity, which has resulted in 
the ascension of left and left centred governments across the region.  It has looked 
at how the Latin American region has reinvented itself in an attempt to attain and 
enhance autonomy and in the process has, according to some academics, created a 
post-hegemonic regional order, which has redefined the boundaries of regional 
integration. It has also suggested that the emergence of ‘post-hegemonic’ 
regionalism in Latin America is reflective of not only an increasing intense and 
strained relationship with the US but also signifies a recognition of the 
inadequacies of neoliberal open regionalism.  Furthermore, this section has argued 
that the ‘post-hegemonic’ regional project represents a new wave of regionalism in 
the Americas, one that has moved beyond its commitment to Washington, and has 
put forth its own explicit developmental agenda, one where the state’s role is 
prominent. From this change in the Latin American political economy, forms of 
contestation to open regionalism have emerged; most noteworthy was the creation 
of ALBA in 2004.  The argument put forth in the piece has suggested that ALBA 
should be seen as a form of contestation to US hegemony and to neoliberalism. It 
has suggested that it represents a modern-day Bolivarian project that’s central 
focus resides on the inter-relations between Latin American nations and its main 
objective of establishing a strong bloc of solidarity against neo-liberal projects. As a 
result, this work has argued that ALBA can be considered a form of resistance that 
is attempting to move beyond neoliberal open regionalism.  
The following chapter will focus specifically on the social forces that led to the 
creation of ALBA. It will give a detailed account of the rise of the left and twenty-
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first-century socialism, in an attempt to understand how and why ALBA emerged 






















Chapter 4: The rise of the contemporary left in Latin America 
4.1: Introduction 
 
In the 1990s the Americas was essentially used as a laboratory for neoliberal 
experiments. During this decade, Latin America was seen as a privileged territory 
of neoliberalism, particularly in Bolivia and Chile, where it was initially 
implemented. However, according to Sader (2008), by the 2000s, the Americas had 
‘’rapidly turned into the leading arena not just for resistance but for the 
construction of alternatives to neoliberalism’’ (Sader, 2008 p.5). To understand 
how and why this transformation took place, it is first necessary to look at the 
historical evolution of neoliberalism in the Americas in the 1980s and 1990s and 
assess the model’s failure to consolidate the necessary social forces for its 
stabilization. Through analysing these historical events, this chapter will then focus 
on the rise of the contemporary left in the region and look at how and in what ways 
this shift in political ideology became a form of counter-hegemonic resistance 
against neoliberal hegemony. This chapter will also reflect on the sustainability of 
the so-called ‘Pink Tide’, a term used frequently throughout the 2000s to describe 
the rise of the left as a whole. Whilst the sustainability of the ‘Pink Tide’ within 
Latin America in the 2000s was indeed more optimistically reflected in academic 
literature (Chodor 2014; Muhr 2016), over the last few years, its very existence has 
been called into question. This retreat will be reflected throughout the chapter; 
with reference made to the recent move right in various Latin American countries.  
In the 1950s and 1960s, many governments across Latin America implemented 
Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) as the principal economic model, in an 
attempt to achieve socio-economic modernization and economic growth. Prior to 
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the ISI model, severe economic crisis in the region had triggered widespread social 
unrest, resulting in mass stabilization and development efforts led by both the 
urban bourgeoisie and technocratic state officials from across the region. These 
efforts, according to Cardoso and Faletto (1979) led to the creation and 
development of historic blocs which sought to produce capitalist development 
through the strategy of import substitution industrialisation (Cardoso, 1979). ISI 
attempted to move the region away from its dependence on exports of primary 
commodities towards the development of domestic markets and industrialization. 
According to Chodor (2014), the ISI historic bloc was successful because ‘’it fitted 
within the broad framework of the Pax Americana order but also reflected the local 
context’’ (Chodor, 2014 p.66). By the 1970s however, cracks were appearing across 
the Americas, with regards to the model’s ability to solve the region’s development 
problems. According to Baer (1972), unemployment was on the rise, industrial 
growth had slowed, income distribution remained unchanged and in some 
countries it had even become more concentrated and lastly, prices of industrial 
goods produced in the region increased so dramatically that the exportation of 
such goods was severely limited (Baer, 1972). The positive attributes of the ISI 
model, most notably self-sufficiency, autonomous development and increased 
economic growth rates across the region quickly fell to the waste side as a soaring 
debt crisis began to suffocate the region’s development aspirations. As a result, the 
ISI historic bloc fell into an organic crisis from the mid-1970s onwards. This 
organic crisis was revealed at a regional level with the emergence of multiple 
political crises, economic upheavals, growing civil unrest and mass mobilization. 
The combination of which, ultimately led to its unravelling and its failure paved the 
way for military takeovers eventually leading to the creation of a neoliberal world 
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order. A neoliberal world order which attempted to reconstruct Latin American 
societies by curtailing the state’s role in the economy and reorienting the region’s 
focus towards integration within the global economy.  
Of the factors leading to the organic crisis of the ISI bloc, mass mobilization in some 
instances had radicalized, as was the case with Chile in the early 1970s. Led by 
Salvador Allende, the Popular Unity Coalition came to power and aspired to 
implement socialism through democratic methods. Subsequently, in countries such 
as Colombia and Uruguay, guerrilla movements inspired by Marxism, started to 
appear, actively seeking to overthrow the ruling elite, in an attempt to instil 
socialism through force. According to Munck (2006) however, in many cases the 
demands were not as far-reaching, instead they were limited to the preservation of 
existing gains or the implementation of industrialisation where it did no exist 
(Munck, 2006). In response to the growing civil unrest in Chile in the 1970s, the 
Chilean military stepped in and took power. This military response was replicated 
throughout the region and by the mid-1970s almost every country within the 
Americas (with the exception of Venezuela, Costa Rica and Colombia) was under 
military or authoritarian control. As Wiarda and Kline (2000) have pointed out, the 
sheer magnitude of military takeovers across the region exposed the fundamental 
failure of the ISI bloc’s ability to achieve a lasting hegemony (Wiarda and Kline, 
2000). Furthermore, Chodor (2014) suggests, that ‘’Ultimately the bourgeoisie 
failed to become a hegemonic class that could move beyond its own narrow 
‘economic-corporative’ mind-set and offer the kind of leadership that would ensure 
widespread consent’’ (Chodor, 2014 p.71). 
As a consequence of this failure, from a Gramscian perspective, the military played 
a ‘Caesarist’ role, a third force if you will, intervening in a conflict where both the 
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bourgeoisie and the subordinate classes were not powerful enough to overcome 
the other. Munck (2007) has argued that military regimes across the region 
attempted to resolve the problems that had led to the organic crisis of the ISI bloc. 
For many military regimes, the crisis was the result of an excess of ‘populism’ that 
had led to the politicization and radicalization of society, the combination of which 
had the potential to lead to a ‘socialist takeover’.  ‘’Accordingly, the military regimes 
announced that they would cleanse their societies of the ‘cancers’ of populism and 
socialism in order to make them ‘safe for capitalism’’ (Munck, 2007 p.36). 
Although military methods for extinguishing socialist aspirations varied within the 
region, most methods employed repressed these anti-capitalist tendencies through 
fear and violence. However, in some instances, states went beyond mere repression 
tactics, as was the case with the regime of Augusto Pinochet in Chile 1973. US-
backed Pinochet overthrew Salvador Allende in 1973 and began an ambitious 
project. Backed by a group of Chilean economists, who trained under Milton 
Friedman of the University of Chicago, right-wing Pinochet attempted to transform 
the economy, under the guidance of the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP), by unleashing its market forces. Chile essentially became the laboratory for 
neoliberalism, as the regime set out to radically curtail the state’s role in the 
economy and re-orient its focus towards integration with the global economy. By 
reducing tariffs and liberalizing finance and trade, the country was flooded with 
cheap imports, which led to the destruction of domestic industries. Additionally, 
the Chilean economy returned to a reliance on primary exports as its main source 
of economic growth. The state itself withdrew from the economy by eliminating 
subsidies and price controls, privatizing state assets, deregulating labour and 
investment, drastically reducing state spending and ‘’extending market logics to all 
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aspects of social life, so that even the social security system was privatised’’ 
(Chodor, 2014 p.71). The regime’s justification for its policies according to Munck 
(2007) ‘’was a harbinger of the ideological project the neoliberal forces would 
propagate against Keynesianism’’ (Munck, 2007 p. 38). The Junta justified its 
position by arguing that it was saving the country from statism, which had allowed 
a Marxists like Allende to cease power, and who had attempted to guide Chile 
towards totalitarianism (Munck, 2007). Throughout the course of the 1990s, ‘‘the 
combined and closely related processes of military dictatorships and the 
application of neoliberal models acted together to yield an extreme regression in 
the balance of power between social classes’’ (Sader, 2008 p. 7). 
Indeed, neoliberalism infiltrated the Americas across the political spectrum.  As 
was the case with Pinochet’s Chile, it found other right-wing willing participants, 
such as Peru’s Alberto Fujimori but also, according to Sader (2008), neoliberalism 
incorporated forces that had historically been associated with nationalism, forces 
such as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) of Mexico, the Nationalist 
Revolutionary Movement of Bolivia and the Peronism in Argentina under Carlos 
Menem. From here, neoliberalism turned its attention to social democracy, 
captivating the hearts and minds of Venezuela’s Acción Democrática, the Brazilian 
Social-Democratic party, and the Chilean Socialist Party. In short, neoliberalism  
‘’became a hegemonic system across almost the entire territory of Latin America’’ 
(Sader, 2008 p. 7). Although neoliberal reforms in the Americas were essentially 
imposed from above, the construction of the neoliberal historic bloc was not 
established merely through coercive means, as has been indicated by the 
aforementioned. The construction of the neoliberal world order was accompanied 
by an ideological struggle; accordingly, in order to achieve consent neoliberal 
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forces extended a specific worldview among policymaking elites, which was 
founded on a preference for the market over the state, with regard to economic 
development. This ideology became known as the Washington Consensus. By the 
1990s the Washington Consensus ideology was essentially hegemonic amongst 
policymaking elites in the Americas, ‘’who came to accept its basic tenets as 
common sense, as they lost faith in the possibility of resolving the organic crisis 
through heterodox means’’ (Chodor, 2014 p. 76). Western-educated Latin 
American technocrats and economists on returning to their homelands, became 
‘’their own country’s free market organic intellectuals, carrying out wars of 
position aimed at winning consent for neoliberal restructuring’’ (Chodor, 2014 p. 
76). This consent was pursued through the establishment of an ideological project, 
a project that not only identified the reasons behind Latin America’s economic and 
political problems but also more importantly proposed an antidote to tackle the 
organic crisis. This antidote came in the form of free-market economics, which 
attempted to rid the region of its predecessor’s inefficiencies by restructuring the 
entire region’s economic and political structure, in the name of progress and 
prosperity. However, neoliberal hegemony in the region was tenuous at best. As 
Gramsci and later Cox have highlighted, hegemony is considerably more 
problematic in the periphery because it is developed through a process of passive 
revolution, which represents only a limited transformation of the social order. With 
this considered, neoliberalism despite its promises, failed to achieve its goal to 
consolidate the necessary social forces for its stabilization in the region. This failure 
resulted in crises that sweep across the region. The most affected by this failure 
were Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999) and Argentina (2002), who all experienced a 
dramatic economic crisis. These separate yet related incidences highlighted the 
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inadequacies of the neoliberal mandated Structural Adjustment Programme, which 
failed to deliver on its promises. As Sader (2008) points out, it was neoliberalism’s 
poor and inadequate economic performances in the region, which in many 
instances, led to the defeat of the governments that initiated it. Overall, the 
neoliberal passive revolution in Latin America resulted in the creation of a fragile 
order. This fragility allowed for a far-reaching and increasingly vocal rejection of 
neoliberalism resulting in counter-hegemonic responses within the region.  
The Latin American counter-hegemonic forms of contestation began initially with a 
wide variety of social movements emerging on the terrain of civil society, 
demanding social justice and inclusion in social order. Such movements operated 
outside the formal structures of political society and included landless workers’ 
movements and peasants, indigenous movements and new political parties and 
unions. Empowered by a discourse of equality and democracy, these various 
movements according to Chodor (2014), 
Engaged neoliberalism on its own terms, demanding their rights and 
grievances be acknowledged and resolved in the context of democratic 
society. In doing so, they contested the neoliberal ideological project 
based on democracy and equality, challenging the meanings associated 
with these ideas, and seeking to construct new, more democratic, and 
socially just ones (Chodor, 2014 p. 87).  
The emergence of such social movements across the region highlighted 
neoliberalism’s organic crisis and signified that it was no longer accepted as the 
common sense. Indeed, the crisis of neoliberalism and mass resistance engendered 
by social movements organized to contest the neoliberal policies of exclusion and 
inequality can be seen as representative of Polanyi’s double movement (the evident 
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push for social protection against marketization by social movements). 
Furthermore, as these social movements gained momentum and strength, they 
began to unite with other radical social forces to contest the inequalities produced 
by neoliberalism. The unification of both the various social movements and radical 
social forces resulted in a space within the political sphere for left-leaning, anti-
neoliberal ideologically driven parties to gain support from the masses.  This push 
back against neoliberalism eventually resulted in leftist governments taking office 
across the region. Beginning with the election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998, 
followed by the election of left and centre-left governments in Chile in 2000, 2006 
and 2013, Brazil in 2002, 2006 and 2010, Argentina in 2003, 2007 and 2011, 
Bolivia in 2005 and 2009, Uruguay in 2005, 2010, Ecuador in 2006, 2009 and 2013, 
Nicaragua in 2006 and 2011, Guatemala 2007, Paraguay in 2008 and El Salvador in 
2009 and 2014.  
The following section will look specifically at the rise of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, 
the symbolic figurehead of the so-called ‘Pink Tide’ movement. It will mainly focus 
on Chávez’s idea of twenty-first-century socialism and investigate how and in what 
ways this particular ideology gained momentum across the region.   
4.2 Hugo Chávez and twenty-first century socialism 
 
Undoubtedly the election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998, Morales of Bolivia 
in 2005 and Correa of Ecuador in 2006 represented a turning point for the politics 
of Latin America. Specifically, Chávez’s ascendance to power, as it is often cited, can 
be considered as a pinnacle symbol of the beginning of the ‘Pink Tide’ and the move 
left across the region. This leftist rise in the 2000s led to the construction of various 
forms of resistance in the wake of the organic crisis of neoliberalism. However, it is 
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necessary to point out that, unlike the Bolivian experience, the Venezuelan split 
from the neoliberal state with the election of Chávez was not a result of the mass 
mobilization of radical social forces. As Silva (2016) has argued, prior to Chávez’s 
election, the episodes of contestation that occurred within Venezuela throughout 
the 1990s were unsuccessful in creating a united coordinated anti-neoliberal front 
against the state, which as Burron (2014) points out, ‘’managed confrontation with 
labour by maintaining elements of the old national-popular compromise that 
predated neoliberalism’’ (Burron, 2014 p. 62). Thus, the radicalization of Venezuela 
under Chávez that ensued over the preceding fourteen years was equally the result 
of the intensified class struggle from below as it was from the radical direction 
initiated from above. Chávez’s early years in power can be considered as his most 
formative, as he introduced important reforms, including a new constitution that 
was approved through a popular referendum in 1999. All the reforms that Chávez 
implemented in the early years illustrate both the protagonist and participatory 
features of democracy in Venezuela. The record number of referenda and recall 
initiatives that took place under Chávez encouraged the full political participation 
of Venezuelan citizens, giving the citizenry a voice within politics, in an attempt to 
encourage the values of democracy and protagonism in the popular common sense. 
Indeed, as Burron (2014) has highlighted,  
The establishment of a constitutional assembly and a New Magna Carta 
in 1999 (approved by referendum) provided the beginnings of a 
counter-hegemonic legal-institutional framework to replace the 
neoliberal polyarchy, one that would become a defining feature of left 
governments across the region (Burron, 2014 p. 62).   
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 With the support of the masses, Chávez put forth the idea of twenty-first-century 
socialism. This new type of socialism, according to Wilpert (2007) could not be 
considered as pre-defined or indeed foreign, but rather a homemade version and 
‘’constructed every day’’ (Wilpert, 2007 p. 239). According to Silva (2016), twenty-
first-century socialism can be defined as ‘’a comprehensive post-neoliberal 
program for socioeconomic development’’ (Silva, 2016 p. 4). Key to its construction, 
the Chávez government went about creating new social, economic and political 
structures from which 50 laws including Venezuela’s new constitution were 
implemented. It was these changes to the dynamics of the country’s political 
landscape that would, allow space for the formation of the revolutionary collective 
will. The popularity of Chávez began to change in 2001 when he introduced a series 
of laws, which challenged the privileges and rights of the capitalist class. According 
to Chodor (2014),  
This sparked a four-year period of open and, at times, violent struggle, 
as the dominant classes rejected Chávez’s legitimacy and attempted to 
remove him from power, including a failed coup in April 2002, an oil 
industry lockout in December 2002 to February 2003 that crippled the 
economy, and a recall referendum in August 2004 (Chodor, 2014 p. 
103). 
It wasn’t however, until after the failure of the US-supported coup of 2002 that the 
Bolivarian Revolution embarked on a radical path. In the wake of the coup, 
thousands of marginalized and working-class Venezuelans rallied together and 
protested on behalf of its government. As a result of this confrontational stance, 
Chavismo was ‘’subsequently push in a more popular direction by mass 
participation and the full socialization of the economy’’ (Burron, 2014 p. 63). By 
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2005, Chávez and his government had strengthened its hold over the political 
sphere and most importantly over the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A (PDVSA). 
Although on the terrain of civil society, the struggle with the dominant class 
continued to intensify. Regardless, Chávez was able to use both the state and his 
hold over the PDVSA to begin to create the necessary social, political and economic 
structures that would foster the Bolivarian collective will which was vital for the 
implementation of twenty-first century socialism. As defined by Muhr (2012) 
twenty-first-century socialism can be understood as ‘’the collective transformation 
of the system of private property, towards the ‘collective 
structuration of production and distribution ... as a material base of a just order in 
accordance with the needs of the working class’’ (Muhr, 2012 p. 228). Comparable 
to the democratic socialism under Sandinista, Chávez’s version combines several 
elements of social experiences and practices along with philosophies in the 
construction of a ‘communal economy’ (Muhr, 2012). As Chávez grew in popularity 
so too did his idea of twenty-first century socialism, eventually leading to its 
construction. The political structures as envisioned and carried out by Chávez, 
sought to embed institutionally popular participation in the development of the 
Bolivarian Revolution, this concept later became known as protagonist 
revolutionary democracy and can be considered the ‘’definitional foundation of 
twenty-first century socialism’’ (Muhr, 2012 p. 228).  The overall aim was to insert 
collective values in the consciousness of the masses in order to drive the 
revolutionary process. In relation to economic structures, the government sought 
to promote and develop the collective will by enhancing the ‘human development’ 
of the Venezuelan people. As the Government proclaimed in 1999 in Article 299 of 
the constitution,  
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The economic regime of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is based 
on the principles of social justice, democratization, efficiency, free 
competition, protection of the environment, productivity, and 
solidarity, with a view of ensuring the overall human development and 
dignified and useful existence of the community (Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, 1999). 
 With every attempt to implement new economic structures, the dominant class in 
Venezuela met it with opposition. By 2005, the Bolivarian Revolution began to 
move towards socialism, with Chávez proclaiming, ‘’every day I become more 
convinced, there is no doubt in my mind…that it is necessary to transcend 
capitalism. But capitalism can’t be transcended from within capitalism itself, but 
through socialism, true socialism, with equality and justice’’ (Sojo, 2005). A 
fundamental feature of this type of socialism was the concept of the ‘social 
economy’, in which ‘’the profit motive is replaced by a focus on the satisfaction of 
collective needs’’. According to Chávez, as cited in Chodor (2014) the purpose of 
this new focus is ‘’the construction of the new man, of the new woman, of the new 
society’’  (Chodor 2014, p.107). The construction of the social economy was carried 
out both through top-down measures, by nationalizing strategic sectors of the 
economy such as oil and electricity and bottom-up activities, with the development 
of cooperatives with incentives such as training, tax rebates, preferential contracts, 
and low-interest loans. These bottom-up measures, seek to democratise the 
workplace and encourage production and solidarity for the collective good rather 
than self-interest.  
Overall, the progression of the social economy was slow and considerably careful 
as the construction of a radical society entails years of a persistent war of position 
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in order to ‘’embed a class consciousness consistent with the Bolivarian vision of a 
genuinely democratic society’’ (Chodor, 2014 p. 108). With this considered, 
Venezuela’s primary priority was to safeguard the slowly democratizing political 
economy from the external powerful forces of the neoliberal world order. 
Subsequently, the Venezuelan government applied anti-neoliberal measures in an 
attempt to make the country more autonomous within the global economy. The 
promotion of economic growth and sovereignty was carried out through short-
term measures such as the reintroduction of tariffs, the prevention of capital flight, 
and the introduction of currency controls to stabilize the Bolívar, along with 
substantial state spending on services and infrastructure, coupled with the 
reassertion of control over the PDVSA, led to a dramatic increase in the 
government’s revenues in the 2000s (Robertson, 2012). Venezuela’s long-tern 
measures for ensuring greater autonomy in the global economy has been carried 
out through the diversification of its export markets. This has been done through 
expanding trade with non-western countries, particularly China.   
Overall, Venezuela’s anti-neoliberal economic strategy can be seen, as a crucial 
element to the construction of the Bolivarian collective will for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the macroeconomic strategy, at least initially, aided the state with the 
promotion of its autonomy within the global economy and secondly it challenged  
‘’the neoliberal common sense that promotes market logic as the modus operandi of 
economic governance and social life’’ (Chodor, 2014 p. 111). However, it must be 
stated that regardless of its radical and counter-hegemonic nature, the economic 
strategy employed continues to support a largely capitalist economy. Nevertheless, 
the government’s alternative strategy for autonomy and development through 
twenty-first-century socialism in the 2000s inspired and influenced many left and 
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centre-left governments from across the region to move beyond neoliberalism and 
has led to a variety of individual and collective attempts to construct counter-
hegemonic alternatives to neoliberalism and US-imperialism. Furthermore, this 
attempt to construct counter-hegemonic alternatives is driven by the collective 
desire to achieve regional independence and self-determination. In a neo-
Gramscian sense, this desire has translated into a Bolivarian regional historic bloc 
building initiative, which can be seen as a Latin American effort that represents a 
regional drive aimed at creating endogenous development and autonomy based on 
Simon Bolivar’s vision of a united Latin America. An example of which, can be seen 
with the creation of the Bolivarian Alliance of the People of our America (ALBA). 
Indeed, the role of the left has played a vital part in reshaping regionalism in Latin 
America. The following section will specifically look at how and in what ways like-
minded left states has led to the construction of a new era of regional dynamics in 
Latin America, in an attempt to develop an alternative model of regional 
integration within Latin America.    
4.3 The role of the Left in reshaping Latin American regionalism 
 
As outlined in the previous sections, neoliberalism failed to effectively address and 
combat the inequalities it has produced within the Latin American region. As the 
fragilities of the Washington Consensus became more apparent, the region bared 
witness to an uprising of mass movements and the growth of left or centre of left 
governments, which came together championing ideas to improve redistribution of 
social services and income, autonomy and advancing an alternative regional 
development agenda. As a result, open regionalist projects associated with 
neoliberalism such as Mercosur (Southern Common Market), began to take on a 
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leftist position, expressed in its commitment to addressing the inequitable 
distribution of wealth through social development initiatives. Indeed Mercosur, 
which Kellogg (2007) had referred to as ‘’a creature of the Washington Consensus’’ 
(Kellogg, 2007 p. 194) became an instrument for progressionists to resist 
neoliberalism and foster a socio-political agenda instead of promoting market goals 
(Tussie, 2009). Although many academics would cite the election of Hugo Chávez in 
1998 as the beginning of the ‘Pink Tide’ in Latin America, there are other significant 
benchmarks that should be considered as events that aided in its popularity and 
use of the term. In particular, the creation of the World Social Forum in 2001 and 
the election of Lula da Silva and the Workers Party in 2002, followed by the 
election of left or left-centred governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. With this left turn, regional integration projects began to be 
framed around solidarity and the consolidation of shared approaches. As Riggirozzi 
and Tussie (2012) note, ‘’South America became a ready platform for the reignition 
of regionalism incorporating the normative dimensions of a new era moving 
beyond American-led patterns of trade integration’’ (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012 
p.1).  This leftist shift in regional integration brought to the forefront of its agenda 
the issue of social inequalities as well as offering alternative paths of greater 
autonomy from the US.  Under the direction of this leftist turn, new forms of 
regional integration projects began to emerge. The expansion of Mercosur in 2003, 
along with the creation of ALBA in 2004, as well as the development of UNASUR 
(the Union of South American Nations) in 2008 can all be seen as examples of this 
shift.  For Riggirozzi and Tussie (2012), both ALBA and UNASUR should be 
considered, leftist inspired regional integration projects that are redefining new 
ideological and geographical boundaries while ‘’fostering new consensuses that are 
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defined regionally, not globally, and supported by the mainly state-led practices, 
institutions and funding mechanisms in new social fields such as education, health, 
employment, energy, infrastructure and security’’ (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012 p.6).   
Indeed, these regional integration movements began to reshape regional 
boundaries, moving beyond ‘’the historical hub of what defined US and market-led 
regionalism’’ (Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012 p.6). For Ruiz (2001) the emergence of 
this type of leftist inspired regional integration movements can be considered as 
the forth wave of regionalism, which is strategic by nature (Ruiz, 2001).  Others 
have labelled it post-liberal (Veiga, 2007) while others see it as post-hegemonic 
(Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012). 
Despite the various understandings of how to define these regional initiatives, 
there seems to be a common consensus that both UNASUR and ALBA represent a 
move away from a predominant focus on economic objectives and free trade to 
cooperation in a wide range of areas, such as from macroeconomic to industrial 
cooperation, to monetary, social and development cooperation.  With regards to 
the Union of South American Nations, a regional integration project that offers a 
single umbrella for various sub-regional schemes represents ‘’the assertion of 
newly confident governments in the region, for the first time in a generation able to 
envisage economic and social development outside of US hegemony, and looking 
for an alternative path that will allow them greater room for manoeuvre’’ (Kellogg, 
2007 p. 209). Indeed, driven by governments who have been highly critical of 
neoliberalism, its influence is visibly articulated in its objectives outlined in the 
Constitutive treaty of UNASUR, which clearly expresses the necessity of integration 
and unity amongst Latin American states, in order to support social inclusion and 
poverty eradication in ways that are based on the realization of rights (Riggirozzi 
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and Tussie, 2012). As Riggirozzi and Grugel (2015) have pointed out ‘’Supporting 
rights-based social policy, delivered through member states, came to be framed as 
‘regional’ responsibility’’ (Riggirozzi and Grugel, 2015). Thus, UNASUR became a 
space for political action. Additionally, according to Vivares (2016), UNASUR’s 
focus on social and developmental issues can be directly linked to the emergence of 
leftist governments in the region, and their push towards either developmental or 
redistributive development models (Vivares, 2016). Efforts made by the US to 
assure itself a captive market in Latin America, which endeavoured to reinforce the 
mould of US-dominated hemispheric integration, did indeed lead to the 
‘’crystallization of UNASUR by way of negative reactions among South American 
states to North American regionalist initiatives’’ (Vivares, 2016 p.30). UNASUR’s 
anti-neoliberal sentiment along with its opposition to US hegemony allowed it to 
carve its own regional development path, dethatching itself from the general open 
regional integration model which had been the dominant force within the region 
during the 1990s and 2000s (Vivares, 2016). However, as Kellogg (2007) has 
argued, the UNASUR project, although opposed to US hegemony, Brazil has become 
a sub-imperialist power within the regional project. Brazil has become a regional 
hegemon with the help of the Brazilian ruling class and continues to find ways in 
which it can ‘’assert its influence, on a capitalist basis, throughout the southern half 
of the Americas’’ (Kellogg, 2007 p. 198). Furthermore, Kellogg (2007) has 
suggested that this projection of Brazilian influence evidently seen in the UNASUR 
project has led many scholars to argue that the project ‘’is rooted in a politics from 
above - deep-rooted institutional and structural processes working themselves out 
in opposition to US hegemony, but rooted in the class power structure of Latin 
America’’ (Kellogg, 2007 pp. 199-200). If UNASUR can be seen, as Kellogg (2007) 
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has suggested, as a regional integration project rooted in the ‘’politics of above’’ 
then ALBA can be seen as an expression of regional integration ‘’from below’’. The 
ALBA regional integration project,  ‘’has become synonymous with the radical 
reforms underway in Venezuela and a symbol of the hopes for radical 
transformation that have emerged with the move Left in Latin America as a whole’’ 
(Kellogg, 2007 p. 200).   
The following section will look specifically at the specific social forces that led to 
the creation of ALBA. However, to carry out this research, it is first necessary to 
look at the particular social forces that led to the establishment of the Bolivarian 
historic bloc in Venezuela and then look at how its establishment has influenced 
other leftist states within the region.  
4.4 The creation of the Bolivarian historic bloc, post-neoliberalism and ALBA 
 
Within the Venezuelan context, the Bolivarian revolution, overall, attempted to 
construct a historic bloc that was representative of an alternative to neoliberalism. 
The Bolivarian historic bloc’s foundations were rooted in an economic project that 
attempted   
To combine a state-led reassertion of economic sovereignty in the 
global economy with the pro-motion of socialist enclaves that 
represent a departure from the neoliberal subjugation to unfettered 
capital flows and market logics. At the same time, Bolivarian 
protagonist democracy aims to challenge and replace the polyarchic 
structures of the state (Chodor, 2014 p.114). 
The Bolivarian historic bloc’s foundational structure (at least in the 2000s) was 
held together by an ideological project, based on revolutionary change, solidarity, 
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democracy, nationalism and social justice. These ideological principles highlight the 
stark contrast to that of the neoliberal social vision, which is based on the 
insistence of the TINA (there is no alternative) principle. The leadership of the 
Bolivarian historic bloc consisted, at the time, of a diverse alliance of subaltern 
social forces that include the working class, the state, the military, the informal 
masses and the rural masses. This heterogeneous alliance of the subaltern social 
forces, do not require an obligation of a single worldview on all its members. 
Furthermore, the Bolivarian collective will was not ‘’simply reducible to a working 
class consciousness, but rather incorporates all other marginalized and excluded 
subjectivities, including women, indigenous and Afro-Venezuelans, peasants and 
the informal masses’’ (Chodor, 2014 p.114). Thus, parallels can be drawn between 
the Bolivarian collective will’s internal harmonization between its various social 
forces and Gramsci’s definition of a radical collective will. For Ciccariello-Maher 
and Andrews (2013), Gramsci’s radical collective will can be defined as ‘’an active 
and reciprocal educative relationship, meaning that the various social forces learn 
from each other and translate their struggles into mutually legible terms, 
illuminating the intersecting dimensions of class, race, and gender exploitation’’ 
(Ciccariello-Maher and Andrews, 2013 p.236). In other words, the reciprocal and 
conscience relationship that exists between the social forces that form the 
Bolivarian historic bloc unite ‘’the multiplicity of dispersed wills, with 
heterogeneous aims…[into] a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common 
conception of the world’’ (Gramsci et al., 1971 p. 349). 
Even beyond this leadership structure, the historic bloc remained, a least at that 
time, much more inclusionary than the neoliberal alternative. Both the Venezuelan 
middle class and the ‘’ni-ni’’ (neither-nor) voters have enormously benefitted from 
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the prosperity achieved under Chávez. Although neither group of social forces can 
be considered revolutionary, both have generally supported the government 
because of the continually improving socio-economic conditions. Thus, their 
consent remained conditional in as much as their consent was given so long as 
their economic needs are met. Amongst other social forces in the Bolivarian 
historic bloc was domestic capital, which largely benefitted from the state’s 
macroeconomic strategy, in terms of rising demand and greater protection from 
global competition. As Weisbrot (2007) has noted, following the oil strikes in the 
country, the private sector boomed, particularly in the relation to transport, finance, 
communications, trade, insurance, and construction ‘’with its share of GDP 
increasing to 63 per cent in 2006’’ (Weisbrot, 2007 p. 8). However, since the 
country’s move towards socialism, private capital has faced numerous challenges 
as well as transnational capital, which have encountered restrictions on its profit 
margins and movements. Overall, the Bolivarian historic bloc during the 2000s 
represented a momentous departure from neoliberalism as it proposes 
increasingly coherent and well-defined alternatives to the project. Although it must 
be said, that while the Bolivarian historic bloc made Venezuela an important player 
in the pursuit of counter-hegemonic alternatives with regards to the neoliberal 
project; the historic bloc is far from complete, especially when one considers the 
current economic and political situation that has gripped Venezuela over the last 
few years and the subsequent spill-over effect in relation it Venezuelan toxicity. 
Nevertheless, during the 2000s Venezuela’s alternative vision was met with 
enthusiasm and support from left and left-centre governments from across the 
region that were, at least at the time, open to constructing alternatives to the 
neoliberal project. Indeed, in Latin America, it was evident that with the rise of the 
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left, a new political economy begun to emerge, one that can be considered as a form 
of resistance, guided by a collective distaste for the out-dated Washington 
Consensus and a rejection of US-imperialism.  Central to this transformation has 
been the return of the state, which is closely associated with twenty-first-century 
socialism and ‘post-neoliberal’ forms of governance. As Riggirozzi (2012) has noted, 
‘’Post-neoliberal projects of governance seek to retain elements of the previous 
export-led growth model whilst introducing new mechanisms for social inclusion 
and welfare’’ (Riggirozzi, 2012 p. 3). This heterodox approach, which articulates a 
new political economy of development in Latin America, began at the turn of the 
millennium with the economic and political breakdowns of Venezuela in the 1990s, 
in Argentina in 2001 and with the widespread social protests in Bolivia and 
Ecuador at the start of the twentieth century, all of which led to the rise of the left 
and centre-left. Indeed, the rise of what is often referred to as the ‘Pink Tide’ 
‘’culminated in the election of governments committed to the introduction of 
counter-cyclical policies, programmes of national (and sometimes regional) 
economic investment and the extension of social policy coverage’’ (Riggirozzi, 2012 
p. 3). Coinciding with these events, a multitude of social movements and leaders 
emerged, calling for not only the nationalization of economic resources but also 
new modes of political expression beyond liberal politics (Kaltwasser, 2011).   
The political project associated with ‘post-neoliberalism’ can be understood, 
therefore, ‘’as a call for a new form of social contract between the state and people’’ 
(Wylde, 2011 p. 436), in combination with what Riggirozzi and Grugel (2012) 
views, as the ‘’construction of a social consensus that is respectful of the demands 
of growth and business interests and sensitive to the challenges of poverty and 
citizenship’’ (Riggirozzi and Grugel, 2012 p. 4). Overall, post-neoliberalism can be 
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considered an ever-evolving effort to develop political economies that are 
accustomed to the social responsibilities of the state through twenty-first-century 
socialism, while at the same time endeavours to remaining receptive to the 
‘’demands of ‘positioning’ national economies in a rapidly changing global political 
economy’’ (Riggirozzi and Grugel, 2012 p. 4). Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela can all be seen as key actors that have led to the establishment of the 
new political economy. Although it must be said that each has developed different 
post-neoliberal governance structures and policies that reflect the different 
political, economic and social needs of each state, they are united in their collective 
rejection of the neoliberal model of development (Silva, 2016). While it is true that 
each of the aforementioned states did indeed development varying governance 
structures with a post-neoliberal framework, some have indeed purposely reverted 
back to neoliberalism mechanisms with the turn right, in recent years. However, in 
the 2000s each of post-neoliberal state’s as mentioned previously managed to 
secure consent through the implementation of social programs, particularly with 
regards to welfare spending. In Venezuela consent was secured through its poverty 
alleviation programs.  In Bolivia and Ecuador, the inflow of resources from export 
taxes has allowed for a substantial increase in welfare spending and the 
establishment of a variety of social programs. In Argentina, tax received from 
export earnings became a source of funding for the emergency programs 
introduced after 2002 such as the cash transfer programs, which were all 
instrumental in dealing with the rapid increase in poverty after the financial 
collapse in 2001.  As Riggirozzi and Grugel (2012) have suggested, with the 
Argentina case, the introduction of the Universal Child Benefit Programme 
(Asinnación Universal por Hijo) was highly significant with regards to securing 
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consent as for the first time the government of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner 
extended its welfare programs directly to workers and children who were non-
unionized (Riggirozzi and Grugel, 2012). Overall, social spending reforms signify 
both a commitment to welfare on the part of the aforementioned governments but 
also broadly speaking, it represents a shift in loyalty. Post-neoliberal states pledged 
their allegiance to the working class and the poor rather than the elites and it is this 
allegiance along with an enhanced form of participatory democracy, which secured 
consent for the development and expansion of alternative counter-hegemonic 
regional approaches to neoliberalism and US-led global capitalism in Latin America.  
As anti-neoliberal sentiments grew across the post-neoliberal states in Latin 
America, so too did a quest for an alternative regional development strategy. Under 
the direction of Chávez and Castro, an autonomous regional project was created in 
an attempt to act as a counter-hegemonic force, which would engage in a war of 
position against neoliberalism and US-imperialism. This counter-hegemonic 
regional project became known as ALBA. ALBA was born out of resistance to the US 
government’s Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) and is based on the 
principles of integration intended to reinforce sovereignty and just social relations.  
The many years of neoliberal policies led to a dramatic increase in inequalities 
amongst the working class, the poor and the indigenous people across the region. 
As a result, the privatization policies and bilateral trade agreements proposed 
under the FTTA was met with great opposition. In 2005, an alternative summit was 
organized by Latin American states that contested the FTAA. According to Tahsin 
(2009), the Mar de Plata summit can be seen as a clear sign that many Latin 
American states, particularly those on the left or centre-left, refused to accept and 
become a part of the FTAA. The combination of opposition to the FTAA as well as 
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opposition towards neoliberal policies provided the necessary conditions for the 
emergence of ALBA as an alternative integration model. In this light, the emergence 
of ALBA can be considered as ‘’simply a reaction to neoliberal policies, in search of 
alternatives’’ (Tahsin, 2009 p. 2). With its establishment, Venezuela was able to 
align itself with other Latin American states (initially with Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
and Nicaragua) that shared a similar disposition with regards to US imperialism 
and neoliberalism. Support for the project, however, went beyond state 
commitment; social forces from across Latin America had a leading role in ALBA’s 
establishment. ALBA’s creation represents according to Tahsin (2009), the rising 
demand for regional autonomy by Latin America’s social movements and capital. 
Since its creation, a wide range of social movements and civil society have 
supported and actively participated in the ALBA project. One of the main 
distinguishing features of ALBA, which acts in complete contrast to the prosed 
FTAA is that the Bolivarian alternative has actively called for popular participation 
from social movements and civil society as a whole, in both its creation and 
development (Harris, 2006). According to Cox (1999), civil society should be 
considered both a terrain that sustains the hegemony of the bourgeoisie, but also it 
represents a terrain on which resistance to hegemony, allowing for an 
emancipatory counter-hegemony to be formulated (Cox, 1999). It was because of 
ALBA’s alternative structure, civil society particularly social movements that 
operated from within, were able to articulate themselves in ALBA through the 
ALBA continental assembly of social movements and were able to participate 
openly through the Council of Social Movements (Muhr, 2013). It was this active 
participatory bottom-up integration approach, that allowed ALBA at least in the 
beginning, to both draw support and gain consent from civil society and a diverse 
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range of social movements, most notably indigenous people’s movements, trade 
unions, landless peasants’ movements, environmental groups and women’s 
organisations. Furthermore, as Harris (2006) has suggested, whilst many social 
movements were actively participating directly in ALBA either through the 
assembly or Council, other social movements  declared their support for a war of 
position within the counter-hegemonic regional movement from independent 
platforms, such as the Americas Peoples Summit and the Via Campesina congress 
(Harris, 2006).  
As we have already learned from chapter two, a war of position within a counter-
hegemonic movement  
Seeks to restructure ideological self-understandings so that they can 
inform a revolutionary praxis. A counter-hegemonic war of position, 
therefore, also begins with a critique of common sense, but seeks to 
transcends rather than re-embed it. This is a task of critical 
education that seeks to move beyond common sense ideological 
understandings to reconstruct a collective will: an ideological world 
view conscious of humanities self-constructive powers (Chodor, 
2014 p.114).   
The resulting reconstruction of the collective will can enable it to create a common 
ground on which a counter-hegemonic historic bloc can be established. The 
support of social forces leading to the creation of ALBA should therefore, be   
understood as a crucial element that has further legitimised ALBA as a counter-
hegemonic movement engaged in a war of position against the neoliberal historic 
bloc that is attempting to destabilize its legitimacy and consent. 
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However, many have suggested that the future of ALBA is dependent on the ability 
of the ‘pink tide’ governments to remain in power. The following section will look 
specifically at the left’s future in the region and how its possible decline may affect 
leftist inspired regional integration projects such as ALBA.  
4.5 The ‘pink tide’ post-Chávez 
 
Over twenty years on from the election of Hugo Chávez and the proceeding rise of 
the ‘pink tide’ that swept across Latin America, it is evident that economic decline 
coupled with political instability has led to a surge in right-leaning governments 
taking office. Macri in Argentina, Duque in Colombia and recently Bolsonaro in 
Brazil represent this changing of the tide, however the election of Macri in 2015 
should not be seen as the beginning of the right turn, rather it should be seen as a 
result of mass discontent with the left as a whole, which resulted in his election 
along with Duque and Bolsonaro. Understanding the factors, which have led to this 
discontent, is essential for understanding ALBA, and its future prospects. Since 
Chávez’s death in 2013, Venezuela’s PSUV ‘s (the United Socialist Party of 
Venezuela) approval ratings amongst the Venezuelan masses, has decreased. This 
decline in popularity became apparent with the widely boycotted election in 2018. 
While Maduro may have begun his second term in office, his legitimacy has been 
called into question, both by the Venezuelan people and by many foreign 
governments. Additionally, the political uncertainty of the Maduro Government has 
also been heightened by an economic crisis. The country has been crippled by 
falling oil prices which has led to a massive decline in the value of the Bolívar and 
debilitating shortages of basic goods. According Lopez (2014), this scarcity of basic 
goods has fueled an outbreak of violent protests in 2014, which have led many to 
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believe that the popularity of the left in the country is plummeting (Lopez, 2014). 
With Juan Guaido, leader of the opposition-controlled National Assembly, declaring 
himself interim president, it is evident that the severity of the political instability 
has reached dizzying new heights. All these events, beginning shortly after the 
death of Chávez, have led many to cast doubt on the Venezuelan left’s future. 
Likewise, in Bolivia, Evo Morales’ MAS (the Movement for Socialism) has 
experienced a political blow, when MAS lost a recent referendum, which if passed 
would have lengthened the term time of president Evo Morales.  
In Ecuador, while Lenin Moreno’s was fully supported by Correa as his successor in 
2017, his degree of left can be seen to a large extent, as moderate. Moreno’s active 
disassociation with the far or radical left more broadly can be understood partly by 
the shifting tide of politics in Latin America and the changing sentiment amongst 
the masses. This has in turn, informed the direction of the Moreno Government’s 
projected ideology and political, regional and economic affiliations. The election of 
right-wing Mauricio Macri in Argentina in November 2015 ended a twelve-year 
reign of leftist politics in the country. Macri’s government’s rise to power was the 
result of mass discontent against the previous government’s fiscal tightening in 
relation to social spending. Likewise in Brazil, corruption, impeachment and 
scandal has severely damaged the left, particularly the Workers Party  (ALBA-PTA, 
2014). Bolsonaro’s ascendance to power was a result of severe discontent amongst 
the masses. The defeat of the left in Argentina and Brazil in addition to falling 
approval ratings for many other leftist governments in Latin America have led 
many commentators, most notably, right-leaning magazines such as The Economist 
and The Wall Street Journal, to assert the claim that the ‘Pink Tide’ is dead. Although 
it is evident that the so-called ‘Pink Tide’ is currently in retreat, ‘’to ring the death 
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knell of the ‘Pink Tide’ and leftism more broadly based on these electoral losses is 
premature, especially given the overall perseverance of left-wing governments and 
the complexity of the ‘Pink Tide’‘’ (Gulliver 2016). While it can be said that several 
leftist governments in the region are experiencing low approval ratings, it remains 
to be seen whether these depressed approval ratings are an indication of further 
electoral losses for the left, however this does not take away from the fact that the 
Latin American left has to a very large extent, lost support from a very large 
majority. This is particularly true both in the case of Venezuela and Brazil. With 
that said however, according to an article in the Paraguayan newspaper Extra Press 
(2015) throughout Latin America, approval ratings for heads of states have fallen 
by 7% across the board, including right-wing governments. According to TELESUR 
(2015), two-thirds of Columbians disapprove of centre-right President Duque. 
Furthermore, while many would agree that the electoral future of the Leftist 
governments is unclear, it is evident that their political legacy will remain. It is 
apparent that state-administered social services, redistributive policies and leftist-
inspired regional integration strategies continue to be popular amongst voters 
across the region and as Gulliver (2016) points out, ‘’To be electable, right-wing 
parties will have to retain these policies, as has happened in Argentina with 
President Macri promising to continue some Kirchner initiatives’’ (Gulliver 2016). 
Furthermore, the common assumption, which supports the thesis that the ‘Pink 
Tide’ is dead, depicts a uniform and simplistic understanding of the leftist 
phenomenon itself. Academics such as Castañeda (2006) have argued that within 
the ‘Pink Tide’ exist two lefts - the good and the bad. This two-lefts thesis has been 
contested by the likes of Chodor (2014) who has argued that this orthodox thinking 
on the ‘Pink Tide’ is rooted in a simplistic binary between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ lefts.  
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According to the Castañeda’s (2006) thesis, the ‘Pink Tide’ can be divided into 
‘good’ countries such as Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay, all of which can be seen to 
embrace neoliberalism and as a result have reaped its benefits and the ‘bad’ 
countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela, which can be seen to have contested 
neoliberalism in pursuit of a fruitless alternative. While Castaneda (2016) provides 
an interesting and to an extent useful overview, his differentiation results in 
distortion in so much as the insertion of post-neoliberal projects into highly 
normative categories leads to a negative view of leftist regimes and of 
circumstances that gave rise to them. According to Chodor (2015), the ‘Pink Tide’ is 
far more complex than some scholars have suggested. For Chodor, the ‘Pink Tide’ is 
itself a disputed phenomenon, the Pink Tide is 
 An object of social struggles in a process Gramsci would recognize as 
a ‘war of position.’ Within this war of position, different social forces 
put forward alternative political, economic and social projects – 
‘historical blocs’ – that seek to respond to the organic crisis of 
neoliberalism, with … Venezuela the clearest articulations of this 
process (Chodor, 2015 p. 93). 
With the case of Uruguay for example, from a Gramscian perspective, the project 
can be seen as an example of a ‘passive revolution’, in as much as it made an effort 
to reform the most damaging features of neoliberalism within its economy in an 
attempt to preserve consent for it. According to Chodor, at least at the time of 
writing, Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution could be viewed as a potentially 
counter-hegemonic project that was attempting to construct a Bolivarian ‘collective 
will’.  For Chodor (2015), the Bolivarian collective will (prior to 2017) could be 
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viewed as ‘’an alternative emancipatory culture based on solidarity, social justice, 
democracy and protagonism that enables revolutionary praxis’’ (Chodor, 2015 p. 
93). However, given the severity of the Venezuelan situation currently, its attempt 
to construct a Bolivarian ‘collective will’ is failing. Furthermore, Chodor (2014) has 
argued, in contrast to orthodox analyses, which the difference between the ‘lefts’ 
should not be thought of in dichotomous terms, divided between good and bad 
leftism and reformist or revolutionary leftism. Instead, the difference ‘’needs to be 
understood dialectically, in terms of the potentials for radical transformations that 
arise out of their interaction’’ (Chodor 2014, p.278).  These differences are most 
apparent at the regional level, where ‘Pink Tide’ governments, are constructing a 
common sense. This common sense can be characterized by its emphasis on 
regional unity, autonomy, and aspirations to both strengthen democracy and 
search for alternative development strategies. While at the time of writing, 
Chodor’s optimistic thesis was widely supported, it is evident given the recent 
events that have unfolded particularly in Brazil and even Ecuador that Chodor’s 
thesis is, to a very large extent, out-dated. Recent political events, which have and 
continue to reshape the Latin American region, cannot be understood by such a 
rigid and narrow concept such as the ‘Pink Tide’.  The idea that even two lefts exist 
is an untenable statement given the complexity, and uniquely different historical, 
social, and cultural developments of each Latin American state. Of course, historical 
events, cultural synergies and similar political pathways have allowed states to 
form close ties to one another which have resulted in allegiances, trade agreements, 
and regional bloc formations, however the relations that exist, particularly between 
left-leaning states should be viewed for what they are, a loose alignment amongst 
politically similar states based on shared principles and commonalities. These 
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shared principles have often resulted in the implementation of similar policies - 
often favouring development models that are redistributive and people-focused - 
yet the level and the degree to which each state has implemented such policies vary 
to such a large extent, the use of a blanket term such the ‘Pink Tide’ to describe the 
Latin American left as a whole does not reflect the reality within and amongst left-
leaning states. With that said, political motivated regional alignments do exist.  The 
construction of which, as ALBA illustrates, is based on an ideologically similar 
disposition, the degree of which each ALBA member state shares this anti-
neoliberal disposition varies between ALBA members. Nevertheless, ALBA’s 
creation and development were born out of resistance to the FTAA; its creation was 
made possible by the existence of a shared belief amongst left-leaning states that a 
regional bloc based on regional autonomy would be more beneficial than the 
alternative.  Regardless of the uncertain future of the Latin American left, at a 
regional level the construction of a ‘common sense’ which can be characterized by 
its emphasis on regional unity, autonomy and aspirations to both strengthen 
democracy and search for alternative development strategies is likely to remain, as 
the region’s quest for autonomy is unlikely to fade.    
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has specifically looked at the rise of the contemporary left. It has 
suggested that the failure of neoliberalism to consolidate the necessary social 
forces for its stabilization has led to the rise of the left. It has suggested that this 
shift in political ideology has become a form of counter-hegemonic resistance in 
parts of the region. This chapter has also investigated the rise of Hugo Chávez in 
Venezuela and looked at his idea of twenty-first-century socialism. It has paid 
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specific attention to the ways in which the ideology has gain momentum across the 
region. It has suggested that Chávez’s alternative strategy for autonomy and 
development through twenty-first-century socialism has inspired and influenced 
many other leftist governments to move beyond neoliberalism, which has resulted 
in a variety of individual and collective attempts to construct counter-hegemonic 
alternatives to neoliberalism and US imperialism.  
Following on from this, the chapter has also looked at how and in what ways the 
left has led to the construction of a new era of regional dynamics, which has and 
continues to develop alternative models of regional integration within Latin 
America. This chapter has also suggested that leftist policies and principles such as 
the redistribution of wealth, social development initiatives, autonomy and 
advancing alternative development strategies have all been expressed through 
regional integration projects. It has suggested that with the left turn, regional 
integration projects have begun to be framed around solidarity and the 
consolidation of shared approaches, while at the same time it has brought to the 
forefront of its agenda the issues of social inequality as well as offering alternative 
paths to great autonomy from the US. It has also pointed out that with this leftist 
turn, open regional projects such as Mercosur began to align itself with leftist 
principles. This chapter has also cited the creation of ALBA and the development of 
UNASUR as examples of this leftist shift. Additionally, it was suggested that the 
emergence of both ALBA and UNASUR, as leftist inspired regional integration 
projects, could be considered as part of the fourth wave of regionalism, in as much 
as they both represent a move away from a predominant focus on economic 
objectives and free trade. However, it has also suggested that with regards to 
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USASUR, although opposed to US hegemony, Brazil has become a sub-imperialist 
power within the regional project. It has suggested that because of this, the project 
can be seen as being rooted in the politics of above. By contrast, ALBA can be seen 
as an expression of regional integration from below and has become a symbol of 
hope for radical transformation that has emerged with the move left in Latin 
America as a whole.  
This chapter has also suggested that the success of the Bolivarian collective will as 
a form of resistance and contestation to neoliberalism has influenced many other 
leftist governments throughout the region. As a result, anti-neoliberal forms of 
governance have emerged with Latin America, producing a new political economy 
for development in the region, leading to the creation of alternative, regional 
approaches to neoliberalism in Latin America. The most notable of which is ALBA, 
which can be seen as a counter-hegemonic form of regionalism born out of 
resistance to the US-inspired FTAA. It has also suggested that the creation of ALBA 
represents a rising demand for regional autonomy by Latin American social 
movement, capital and governments. It has suggested that the support from social 
forces leading to its establishment should be understood as a crucial element that 
has further legitimized ALBA as a counter-hegemonic movement engaged in a war 
of position against the neoliberal historic bloc that it attempting to destabilize its 
legitimacy and consent.   
The chapter then turned its attention to the idea of the ‘Pink Tide’. It suggested that 
the retreat of the left is unquestionable given the recent events that have 
transpired over the last few years. Rather than investigating what this retreat 
means for the future of the left in the region, the chapter focused on contesting the 
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ideas put forth by the likes of Chodor (2014) and Castañeda (2006) both of which, 
albeit in different ways, use the concept ‘Pink Tide’ as a blanket term to describe 
the left as whole in Latin America. This chapter has suggested that to use such a 
term is futile. This chapter has suggested instead that left, in general, cannot be 
understood by such a rigid and harshly narrow concept such as the ‘Pink Tide’. It 
has argued that even the idea that even two lefts exist is too simplistic given the 
complexity and uniquely different historical, social, and cultural developments of 
each Latin American state. However, the chapter has suggested that historical 
events, cultural synergies and similar political pathways have allowed states to 
form close ties to one another which have resulted in allegiances, trade agreements, 
and regional bloc formations, but the relations that exist, particularly between left-
leaning states should be viewed for what they are, a loose alignment amongst 
politically similar states based on shared principles and commonalities. These 
shared principles have often resulted in the implementation of similar policies - 
often favouring development models that are redistributive and people-focused - 
yet the level and the degree to which each state has implemented such policies vary 
to such a large extent, the use of a blanket term such the ‘Pink Tide’ to describe the 
Latin American left as a whole does not reflect the reality within and amongst left-
leaning states. The chapter then suggested that political motivated regional 
alignments do exist.  The construction of which, as ALBA illustrates, is based on an 
ideologically similar disposition, although the degree of which each ALBA member 
state shares this anti-neoliberal disposition varies between ALBA members. 
Nevertheless, ALBA’s creation and development was born out of resistance to the 
FTAA, its creation was made possible by the existence of a shared belief amongst 
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left-leaning states that a regional bloc based on regional autonomy would be more 
beneficial than the alternative.  
The following chapter will specifically look at the organisational structure of ALBA 




















Chapter 5: The origins of ALBA 
5. 1 Introduction 
 
The factors and events, which led to the creation of ALBA, are numerous. In the 
previous chapter, an emphasis was placed on how the rise of the left in Latin 
America, starting with the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998, led to the development 
of a leftist inspired, more radical form of regionalism. Indeed as Emerson (2013) 
has pointed out, ALBA since its inception in 2004, is representative of this move 
towards a more leftist inspired form of regionalism which was partly cultivated by 
Chávez’s ambition for a united Latin America (Emerson, 2013). At the third Summit 
of Heads of State and Government of the Association of Caribbean States in 2001, 
President Hugo Chávez exclaimed, ‘’[E]ither we unite, or we drown. We shall thus 
choose the alternatives” (ALBA, 2004b p. 15). ALBA was the alternative he was 
explicitly referring to. In an interview with the Bolivarian News Agency in 2008, 
President Chávez stated that  “the ALBA is the alternative path to the neoliberal 
hegemony which is destroying the world” (ABN, 2008). Additionally, Bossi (2009) 
has suggested that ALBA’s primary objective is to “break away from capitalist logic” 
(Bossi, 2009).  According to Metsäranta  (2010), ALBA since its inception, ‘’has not 
only been put forward as an alternative to the Washington Consensus but more 
profoundly to all other possible forms of capitalism’’  (Metsäranta, 2010 p. 14). 
There is a large body of academic research that is of the opinion that while Chávez 
and Venezuela played an integral part in the creation and development of ALBA, 
neither Caracas nor Chávez can be seen as totalizing in its power to mould the 
regional bloc ( Steve, J. Stern in Joseph et al., 1998).  Emerson (2013) has suggested, 
‘’ALBA-TCP is not the product of Caracas redefining the interests of the region, with 
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its members thereby persuaded to lend their support to a new social order that 
subsumes them within a Venezuelan-authored worldview’’ (Emerson, 2013 p. 199). 
For Emerson (2013) it is essential to recognize ‘’a shared, inter-subjective 
dimension to the constructed nature of ALBA-TCP unity’’ (Emerson, 2013 p. 199) 
Rather than viewing unity as a forced product of Chávez, it should instead, 
according to Laclau (1992) be understood as the merging of a sequence of 
particular opinions around common themes, be it emancipation or more specific 
concerns over the perceived failure of neoliberal reforms (Laclau, 1992). In 
accordance with this perspective, Emerson (2013) has also suggested that ‘’rather 
than placing Chávez as a universal actor expressing the revolutionary essence of 
ALBA-TCP and the consequent concerns of its members, the diverse demands of 
Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador et al. are potentially held together by a common 
interest in emancipation’’ (Emerson, 2013 p. 199). Similar to Emerson (2013), 
Benjamin Arditi (2008) has suggested that the leftist governments of Latin America 
share an underlying aspiration to challenge the status quo (Arditi, 2008).  Thus, 
aspirations of unity for the region, should not be seen as being dependent on 
Chávez, rather it should be seen as ‘’a shared series of inter-subjective beliefs and a 
context – such as a desire to challenge the status quo – which places particular 
demands within a broader, common desire for change’’ (Emerson, 2013 p. 199).   
With that said, this chapter will begin by specifically, looking at the evolution of the 
ALBA from its creation to its present form. The first part of this chapter will focus 
on the specific events and factors, which led to its creation such as the Free Trade 
Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) and the Cuban-Venezuelan joint declaration of 
2004. It will then look at ALBA’s evolution with the addition of the Peoples Trade 
Treaty (TCP) in 2006 and its expansion with the addition of member states. The 
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latter part of the chapter will look at ALBA’s organisational structure, specifically it 
will look at the Presidential, the Political Council, the Economic Council, the Social 
Council and lastly the Social Movements Council and give a detailed account of each 
Council’s objectives and functions. From here, this chapter will look at ALBA 
projects in the areas of telecommunications, banking and finance, oil and lastly, 
social programmes.  
5.2 The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
 
 As we have learned from chapter four, since the 1970s Latin America has been at 
the epicentre of a neoliberal assault, that begun with Chile 1973. The neoliberal 
revolution started with the oppression of the left along with the suppression of 
popular organisations as well as the workers’ movements, the combination of 
which created an ideal situation for the late Milton Friedman and economists 
associated with the University of Chicago as well as intellectuals, transnational 
corporations and national governments to reconstruct Latin American economies 
along free-market lines-‘’through manufactured consent’’ (Kellogg, 2007 p. 188). 
According to Drake (2006), this manufacturing of consent in Latin America had two 
characteristics, the first being the oppression of national development strategies by 
a new regionalism, carried out under the second characteristic, that of the 
hegemony of US imperialism (Paul W. Drake in Hershberg et al., 2006). The 
primary institution for this form of new regionalism was to be the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) launched in 1994, which was ‘’widely viewed as a form of 
colonization by the US of South America’’ (Buckman, 2005 p. 76). After several 
failed attempts over a fourteen-year timeframe, the US announced its intentions to 
once again revive the FTAA at the Mar del Plata summit in 2005. For Emerson 
 118 
(2013), the FTAA promotion in Argentina was a final attempt by the US 
‘’institutionalise U.S. economic pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere’’ 
(Emerson, 2013 p. 194). According to Gamble and Payne (1996), the US-inspired 
FTAA intended to shape the region in a specific way that was aligned with US 
interests, ‘’the FTAA would entrench faith in export-led growth and the private 
sector, while also institutionalising market access for U.S. capital’’ (Gamble and 
Payne, 1996 p. 93). Furthermore, the attempted revival of the FTAA for many, 
revealed the broader U.S. fears about the creation of competing trading blocs 
internationally and an increasing sense of apprehension in the US ‘’over an 
increasingly independent region seeking economic links beyond the Western 
Hemisphere’’ (Emerson, 2013 p. 194). However, the Mar de Plata summit in 
Argentina was met with opposition and resistance particularly by left and centre of 
left Latin American governments and social movements. The most vocal of which 
was President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, who voiced his opinions on the FTAA at a 
parallel Summit of the Peoples, leading the participants of the Summit in a chant 
‘’FTAA go to hell’’ (Bolivar, 2008 p. 15). Four years earlier at the Summit of the 
Americas in Quebec, President Chávez had proposed and gained support for the 
creation of an alternative regional bloc initially known as ALBA. Which by the end 
of 2004, ALBA- originally created as a form of resistance to the FTAA, was 
formalized. According to José Briceño (2012), ALBA’s creation was representative 
of the Left’s resistance to US imperialism and acted as a form of contestation to the 
US-sponsored FTAA (José Briceño in Bourbon, 2012b).  Furthermore, ALBA not 
only represented a move by the Latin America left to develop a substitute for the 
FTAA but also it was seen as a mechanism to combat western-style economic 
integration with a new economic and political model known as twenty-first-
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century socialism (Rafael, 2005).  Indeed, while the initial creation of ALBA 
reflected the discourse of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Project, it also highlighted Chávez 
and the aspirations of the left to develop an alternative model for integration ‘’that 
would lead to the transformation of societies and the establishment of political, 
economic, and social alliances. The main objective would be the creation of the 
‘’Patria Grande’’ in Latin America and the Caribbean, based on independence, 
sovereignty and identity’’ (Bagley and Defort, 2015 p. 46).  For Emerson (2013) 
increasing resistance to US imperialism, highlighted by the failure of the FTAA was 
instrumental in the early development of ALBA as a unified integration project. 
This contestation enabled Chávez to ‘’juxtapose the U.S. against the Bolivarian 
project’’ (Emerson, 2013 p. 196) and gain support. Indeed as Bagley and Defort 
(2015) have suggested,  ALBA’s creation was ‘’Consistent with the changing nature 
of Latin American politics, the ‘alternative’ [has] rapidly morphed to reflect the 
realities of the region and its member countries into a flexible ideological alliance’’ 
(Bagley and Defort, 2015 p. 4). 
As highlighted in the introductory section of this chapter, while Chávez played an 
integral part in the creation and development of ALBA, he was not the sole 
instigator of the regional alliance. The next section will look at the Cuban-
Venezuelan joint declaration, which can be seen as the founding treaty of ALBA.  
5.3 The Cuban-Venezuelan joint declaration 
 
The Cuban-Venezuelan relationship can be divided into two phases.  The first phase, 
which was essentially bilateral, began with the election of Hugo Chávez in 1999 and 
lasted until 2004. According to Romero (2010), during the first phase, Cuban-
Venezuelan relations were based on the unification and defence of both countries’ 
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similar political and ideological commitments as well as a commercial and 
economic agreement to establish a common regional identity (Romero, 2010 p. 
107). The predominant objective of their relationship during this time were as 
follows; to obstruct the US embargo on Cuba, enhance the supply of Venezuelan oil 
to Cuba, aid the Cuban regime to overcome the economic crisis it was experiencing 
and finally to jointly bolster the global leftist movement. From a commercial and 
economic perspective, the countries’ relationship took an important turn with the 
implementation of the Integral Cooperation Agreement (ICA) in October 2000. The 
main objective of the ICA was to support the exchange of goods and services 
between the two countries under cooperative conditions. Under the agreement, 
both Cuba and Venezuela created a workable barter system, where Venezuela 
would sell oil to Cuba at a fixed, preferential price, in exchange Cuba would help the 
Venezuelan government to roll out its social programmes, predominantly in 
relation to healthcare programmes. According to Romero (2010) Cuba was only 
required to pay for half of the oil it had received within the first 90 days after 
purchase, the second part of the payment could be paid back over a 25-year 
timeframe (Romero, 2010). In exchange, Cuba sent more than 13,000 healthcare 
workers to Venezuela. The success of the ICA led to an increase in cooperation in 
the energy sector, a growth of Cuban participation in the Venezuelan state’s social 
missions and subsequently led to the promotion of bilateral agreements across 
Latin America.   
The second phase of the relationship began on the 14th of December 2004 and 
presently continues. This phase began with the Cuban-Venezuelan joint declaration 
signed in Havana, which was essentially an expanded regional version of the ICA.  
This expanded version of the ICA became known as the founding treaty of the 
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Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America, which in 2009 became 
known as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America – People’s Trade 
Agreement (ALBA-TCP).  The joint declaration or the preamble of the inaugural 
ALBA treaty expressed Cuba and Venezuela’s view on the FTAA. The joint 
declaration proclaimed,   
We emphasize that the Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) is 
the most complete expression of the appetites for domination over 
the region and that, if it enters into force, would constitute a 
deepening of neoliberalism and create unprecedented levels of 
dependency and subordination (ALBA, 2004a). 
The declaration goes on to assert that the FTAA’s main objective is to act as an 
instrument to ‘’deepen dependence and external domination’’ and suggests that the 
over the last 50 years Latin America has experienced severe economic hardship 
due to the external debt crisis, the implementation of neoliberal policies across the 
region, along with the ‘’proliferation of negotiations for the conclusion of free trade 
agreements of the same nature as the FTAA, create the bases that distinguish the 
panorama of subordination and backwardness that our region suffers today’’ 
(ALBA, 2004a). It is because of this belief that the joint declaration rejected whole-
heartedly the proposed FTAA and suggested that any move towards its 
implementation ‘’would lead only to the still greater disunity of the Latin American 
countries, greater poverty and despair of the majority sectors of our countries, the 
denationalization of the economies of the region and an absolute subordination to 
the dictates from the outside’’ (ALBA, 2004a). 
The joint declaration suggested that while Latin American integration is essential 
for the region’s development, as it is apparent that regional bloc formation is 
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evidently taking up dominant positions with the global economy, only integration 
based on a model of solidarity, cooperation, and the common will, will be able to 
meet the individual and regional needs and aspirations of Latin America. 
Furthermore, this form of an integration model will be complementary to national 
economies and to the region itself as it endeavour’s to preserve ‘’autonomy, 
sovereignty, and identity’’ (Estay, 2007 p. 43).  As affirmed in the joint declaration, 
ALBA, initially proposed by Chávez in 2001, is recognised as providing the ‘’guiding 
principles of a true Latin American and Caribbean integration, based on justice, and 
we commit ourselves to fighting together to make it a reality’’ (ALBA, 
2004a). Based on the ideologies of Bolivár and Martí, the joint declaration affirmed 
that the fundamental principle that guides ALBA is the aspiration to broaden 
solidarity amongst the people of Latin America and the Caribbean. Accordingly, 
Latin American solidarity will be sought ‘’without selfish nationalism or restrictive 
national policies that deny the goal of building a Great Homeland in Latin America, 
as dreamed by the heroes of our emancipatory struggles’’ (ALBA, 2004a).  
The joint declaration goes on to outline the ambition of ALBA- to transform Latin 
American society, ‘’making them more just, educated, participatory and supportive, 
and that, therefore, it is conceived as an integral process that ensures the 
elimination of social inequalities and fosters the quality of life and effective 
participation of peoples in the formation of their own destiny’’ (ALBA, 2004a).  At 
the second summit of 2004, which saw the birth of the application of ALBA, both 
governments affirmed their decision to take steps towards the integration process 
based on the principles outlined in the joint declaration.  The ALBA treaty also 
outlined important areas that the ALBA integration model would incorporate, i.e. 
health, communication, transportation and energy (Bagley and Defort, 2015 pp. 46-
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47).  Table one below contrasts and compares the differences in key areas between 
the proposed FTAA and ALBA.  
 
Table 1- as put forth in Joel D. Hirst's (2016) Guide to ALBA 
 
The above comparison highlights the sheer contrast between two proposed 
regional integration projects, particularly in relation to trade.  At the time of the 
signing of the joint declaration in 2004, which paved the way for the ALBA treaty, 
very few saw its potential, many saw it as a bilateral declaration between the two 
countries, as a means of reaffirming their joint beliefs and aspirations. According to 
Bossi (2007) however, if one looks at the successful developments of the Bolivarian 
social missions implemented in Venezuela and the ‘’internationalist experience’’ of 
Cuba, one could deduce that the joint declaration and the ALBA treaty had created a 
workable regional integration model, which offered a ‘’real alternative of solidarity 
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integration, beyond existing regional agreements or as a counterpart to the 
imperialist offer of FTAA or FTAs’’ (Bossi, 2007). 
Overall the creation of ALBA, although beginning life as a joint declaration between 
Cuba and Venezuela needs to be viewed, according to Girvan (2011), in the context 
of developments within the political economy of Latin America at that time. 
Specifically, mass disenchantment with the Washington Consensus, along with the 
rise of social movements opposed to neoliberalism, as well as the election of left 
and centre of left governments in several Latin American countries, can all be seen 
as contributing factor, breathing life into the ALBA integration model (Girvan, 
2011).  
The following section will look specifically at the evolution of ALBA, beginning with 
the added element of the Peoples’ Trade Treaty (TCP) in 2006. It will then look at 
its expansion of ALBA with the membership of firstly Bolivia in 2006, followed by 8 
other Latin American countries. 
5.4 The expansion of ALBA 
 
As outlined in the previous section, ALBA was initially established as a means to 
confront the FTAA, as represented at the time of its creation by a joint declaration 
between Cuba and Venezuela. The joint declaration not only voiced their 
opposition to the FTAA but also outlined plans for the establishment of an 
alternative regional integration model, known as ALBA. Coinciding with the early 
years of ALBA, Latin America witnessed a rise in left-leaning governments, which 
‘’shared the ALBA’s ideological approach’’ (Absell, 2012 p.1). It was the prominence 
of a shared ideological understanding of the importance of ALBA for the region that 
led to the expansion of ALBA through membership. In 2006, at the third ALBA 
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Summit, under the new leadership of Evo Morales and the Moves to Socialism 
(MAS) party, Bolivia became ALBA’s third member. Upon Bolivia's adhesion, the 
organisation’s title expanded to include the Peoples Trade Agreement (TCP) in 
Spanish Tratado de Comercio de los Puelos.  At the third Summit of ALBA, president 
Morales stated, 
Convinced of the need to promote true complementary and humane 
integration between our countries and our peoples, on behalf of the 
Government of the Republic of Bolivia, we wish to contribute to this 
process with the initiative of the trade treaties between the Peoples, 
Principles and conceptual bases of the Bolivarian Alternative for the 
Peoples of Our America (ALBA, 2006a). 
The addition of the TCP which is ‘’based on the idea of developing trade that 
benefits the people’’, expanded the scope of ALBA and additionally helped to 
further define the regional integration project as an alternative to the proposed 
trade agreements of the North “the free trade agreements which seek to increase 
the power and control of transnationals’ ” (ALBA, 2006b).  As Tahsin (2009) has 
pointed out, the principles of the Peoples Trade Agreement are based on   
‘’Complementarity, cooperation, and mutual collaboration that respect the welfare 
of nations’’ (Tahsin, 2009 p. 6). As stated in the Agreement for the application of 
ALBA-TCP, the TCP’s main objective has been to provide trade integration, that is 
complementary to national interests, ‘’for the benefit of society rather than markets 
or firms’’ (Tahsin, 2009 p. 6). This type of trade integration is carried out through a 
number of mechanisms most notably, through trade agreements ‘’negotiated on a 
case-by-case basis, allowing for flexibility of commitment according to country 
circumstances’’ (Tahsin, 2009 p. 6). Along with reciprocal credit arrangements as 
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stated under Article 8 of the ALBA-TCP agreement which facilitates ‘’the payments 
and collections corresponding to commercial and financial transactions between 
the countries [through] the banking institutions designated for this purpose by the 
Governments’’ (ALBA, 2006b).  But also compensated trade (through direct 
product exchanges) as stated under Article 9 of the agreement, which states that, 
‘’Governments may practice mechanisms for trade compensation of goods and 
services to the extent that this is mutually convenient to expand and deepen trade’’ 
(ALBA, 2006b).   
The TCP agreement also states that all foreign investment needs to be restructured 
as part of an effort to protect domestic industries. Every element of the TCP is 
opposed to neoliberal policies and western-style market mechanisms. Furthermore, 
as Tahsin (2009) has pointed out, under the TCP agreement, ‘’The main sectors of 
the economy should be determined by the state instead of market mechanisms’’ 
(Tahsin, 2009 p. 6). Overall, the addition of the TCP aided to further legitimised 
ALBA’s anti-neoliberal and US orientation.  
With the addition of Bolivia and the TCP to ALBA, membership to the regional 
project began to grow. Beginning with Nicaragua in 2007, under the direction of 
President Daniel Ortega, whose first official act as president was to sign up to the 
ALBA-TCP. In 2008, ALBA-TCP welcomed two new members, Honduras and 
Dominica. Although president Rafael Correa of Ecuador had shown an interest in 
joining ALBA-TCP in as early as 2007, the country remained an observer until 2009. 
In the same year, ALBA-TCP membership expanded again when both St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines and Antigua and Barbuda joined the project.  Haiti, Grenada, 
the Dominican Republic and Paraguay were all given observer status during 2009. 
According to Muhr (2011), the addition of these observer countries, shows that 
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ALBA-TCP has attracted a number of developing economies that ‘’that seek to 
transform their productive structure from the primary sector into a secondary 
sector’’ (Muhr, 2011 p. 104). Additionally, 2009 marked a turning point for the 
project, not only had membership grown to 9 members but also it began to evolve, 
taking on a new persona, in a sense. The movement which had initially been called 
the Bolivarian Alternative became the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA, 2006b) which 
reflects to some extent a reorientation of focus, with regards to the development of 
cooperation amongst member states. However, while the ‘alternative’ may have 
been dropped from the ALBA-TCP title it remained adamantly opposed to 
neoliberalism, its opposition of which, its foundation is built on. Although, external 
reactions to the merging alliance of the ALBA-TCP were initially non-existent, the 
US Senate of Armed Services Committee (USSASC) issued a statement in 2008, 
which implicitly referred to ALBA-TCP in its threat assessment.  As Backer and 
Molina (2010) have highlighted, the 2008 USSASC statement suggested that,  
Leaders in Bolivia, Nicaragua and –more tentatively– Ecuador, are 
pursuing agendas that emphasize ... economic nationalism at the 
expense of market-based approaches... Each of these governments, to 
varying degrees, has engaged in sharply anti-US rhetoric aligned 
with Venezuela and Cuba... and advocated for measures that directly 
clash with US initiatives (Backer and Molina, 2010 p. 106).  
In Honduras in January 2010, after a coup d’état that ousted President Manuel 
Zelaya, right-wing president Porfirio Loba, reflecting on the USSASC’s concerns 
officially withdrew from the ALBA-TCP. Loba’s decision to withdraw from ALBA-
TCP was not only driven by external pressure, most notably the US, but also it was 
driven by domestic opposition to the ALBA-TCP, particularly by members of the 
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business community and right-wing political parties (Absell, 2012). Despite 
Honduras’ withdrawal from the regional bloc, ALBA-TCP’s central objective to 
expand and diversify its partnerships yielded valuable relationships with countries 
such as China, India, Russia, Syria and Iran. However, as Bagley and Defort (2015) 
have noted, ‘’Despite the growth, ALBA represents only a small fraction of the Latin 
America and Caribbean region’s economic share, population and land mass’’ 
(Bagley and Defort, 2015 p. 2). Regardless, the development and evolution of 
ALBA-TCP represented an important development in relation to regional politics. 
Therefore, it is necessary to gain an understanding of how and in what ways 
ALBA’s alternative institutional framework and organisational structure were built 
and developed. 
5.5 ALBA’s organisational structure 
 
Before discussing the organisational structure of the ALBA-TCP, it is necessary to 
point out that academic literature on the subject in question is severely limited. Of 
the literature available on the ALBA-TCP, the institutional and organisational 
structure has only been discussed in very general terms; as a result, this section 
relies heavily on official ALBA-TCP documents, in order to give a thorough and in-
depth account of its institutional makeup and organisational structure.  
The ALBA-TCP’s creation of an institutional structure developed alongside its 
expansion of membership, but it officially began in 2009, with the VIII Summit of 
the ALBA-TCP, held in Havana Cuba. In the introduction of the VIII ALBA-TCP 
Summit document, ALBA-TCP defines itself as a regional integration platform for 
Latin America, one that 
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 Emphasizes solidarity, complementarity, justice and Cooperation, 
which has as its objective the transformation of Latin American 
societies, making them more just, educated, participatory and 
supportive, and which, therefore, is conceived as an integral process 
that ensures the elimination of social inequalities and fosters quality 
of life and effective participation of peoples in shaping their own 
destiny. It is also a political, economic, and social alliance in defence 
of independence, self-determination and the identity of the peoples 
that comprise it (ALBA, 2009). 
Based on the aforementioned political, economic and social alliance the ALBA-TCP 
is structured around five Councils: the Presidential Council, the Political Council, 
the Economic Council, the Social Council and the Council of Social Movements. In a 
hierarchic order, both the functioning and structure of the ALBA-TCP are explained 
below, with the aid of a diagram.  
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 Source: www.alba.tcp.org. 
At the top tier is the Presidential Council, which comprises of heads of state and 
member-country governments. The Presidential Council can be seen as the most 
powerful Council within the ALBA-TCP and is responsible for the highest level of 
decision-making and directs the political orientation within the alliance. Directly 
underneath the Presidential Council are the ministerial Councils, all of which 
operate on an equal platform. The Political Council is comprised of the ministers of 
foreign affairs from its member-states. The Council’s primary function is to act as 
an adviser to the Presidential Council with regards to various strategic political 
issues as well as presenting proposals to the Presidential Council on current 
international policy issues.  As outlined in the VIII ALBA-TCP summit, the Political 
Council’s functions comprise of the following; ‘’the issuance of declarations and 
decisions, definitions and discussions of agendas and strategies for political, 
economic and social consensus among ALBA-TCP members in different 
forums’’(ALBA, 2009). It is also responsible for directing and approving the work of 
the political commission and it is responsible for the permanent coordination of 
ALBA-TCP. Although each of the Ministerial Councils were developed to be equal in 
power, the other three Ministerial Councils are required to inform the Political 
Council on all aspects of their respective tasks and activities. Based on the 
information given, the Political Council can make suggestions with regards to the 
other Ministerial Council’s activities or respective tasks. The Council is responsible 
for evaluating and approving every draft document and agenda, proposed by both 
the permanent coordinator and the political commission, to be submitted to the 
Presidential Council. The Political Council’s function is also to ‘’Review and 
approval of proposals for the structure and functions of the ALBA-TCP bodies at all 
 131 
levels and the evaluation of proposals and decisions with a strategic political 
impact, emanating from the Economic Council, the Social Council and other bodies 
of ALBA –TCP’’ (ALBA, 2009).  The final function of the Political Council is to 
promote and roll out grand-national projects as directed by the Presidential 
Council as well as continuously evaluating the various grand-national projects’ 
effectiveness and viability.  
The Economic Council is comprised of the ministers selected by each member state. 
The Economic Council’s main duty is to work as a coordinator in relation to ALBA-
TCP projects and policies, specifically in relation to policies and projects that are 
centred on agro-food, industries, energy commercial, finance and technology. 
According to SELA (2013), the Economic Council’s primary duty is to structure an 
Economic Area of Shared Development of ALBA, which will be governed by the 
Peoples' Trade Treaty (TCP)’’ (SELA, 2013 p. 8). The Economic Council operates on 
two levels; the first being the ministerial level, its purpose is to coordinate and 
strategically design the economic and financial policies of each member country of 
the ALBA-TCP. The second level is the technical level.  According to the VIII ALBA-
TCP summit document, the purpose of the technical level is to prepare, proposals, 
studies and/or formulate projects ‘’prior to the implementation of economic 
policies common to the member countries of ALBA – TCP’’ at the request of the 
Ministerial level (ALBA, 2009). The main functions of the Economic Council 
according to the VIII ALBA-TCP declaration are as follows; to design specific 
strategies to enhance, expand and direct intraregional trade, to act as an evaluation 
and monitoring body in relation to ALBA-TCP’s grand national production projects, 
to develop an integrated financial system in relation to the economic zone of 
shared development. Lastly, the Economic Council is also responsible for 
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standardizing the various rules governing the ‘’organization of economic activity 
within the area’’ as well as ensuring the functioning of the Regional Monetary 
Council, the Bank of ALBA and all other economic institutions of ALBA-TCP (ALBA, 
2009).  
The Social Council is composed of ministers that work directly in relation to social 
areas in their home countries. In general, these ministers seek to provide oversight 
for any programmes related to culture, employment, education and health.  
According to the VIII ALBA-TCP summit document, the Social Council’s main 
function is to implement, develop and follow-up on the implementation of the 
ALBA-TCP social programmes.  Working groups in such areas as sport, culture, 
housing, education, health and employment as well as the committee on women 
and equal opportunity work fall under the umbrella of the Social Council.  Among 
the other functions of the Social Council are ‘’Define strategies and plan the social 
policy of ALBA-TCP. Establish priorities for the execution of the programmes, 
according to the urgencies of the member countries’’ (ALBA, 2009).  
Along with promoting the implementation of Grand-National Projects as well as 
evaluating the efficiency of the Grand-National Social Projects in areas under its 
jurisdiction. In relation to the Committee of Women and Equal Opportunities, the 
Social Council’s function here is to create a ‘’viable and proactive space for the 
women of our peoples’’ (ALBA, 2009). This is done in an attempt to promote the 
gender mainstreaming within all ALBA-TCP initiatives.    
Lastly, the Social Movements Council, can be considered as an instrument that 
facilitates both integration and direct social participation within ALBA-TCP. This 
particular Council developed out of the various meetings between Chávez and local 
and regional social and popular movements. According to Absell (2012), the Social 
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Movement Council is comprised of delegates from various social movements that 
operate out of each member country, as well as non-member country social 
movements that identify with the ALBA-TCP objectives (Absell, 2012 p. 3). The 
Social Movement Council is also composed of a number of committees, whose 
purpose is to examine specific issues such as grand-national projects in relation to 
social movement input. These groups fall under the direction of the Permanent 
Coordination of the ALBA-TCP (Secretaría Ejecutiva) which coordinates the 
organization's “cooperation and integration activities” (Absell, 2012 p. 3). The 
Council’s main functions, according to the VIII ALBA-TCP Summit declaration, are 
as follows,  
The Council presents to the Council of Presidents, all proposals, projects, and 
declarations as well as all other initiatives of the social movements. Another 
function is to ‘’Receive, evaluate and channel, at the same time that it proposes, 
programs of collaboration of the social movements of countries whose 
governments are not members of ALBA-TCP’’ (ALBA, 2009). It is also responsible 
for strengthening the mobilization and participation of social movement working 
out of each member country in relation to ALBA projects.   
 
According to Muhr (2012), the Council of Social Movements can be viewed as a 
mechanism that ‘’organizes constituent power in a direct democratic structure’’ 
(Muhr, 2012 pp. 223). Muhr (2012) also suggests that as the Council of Social 
Movements works directly with the Council of Presidents, the Council is often seen 
as a type of mediator between the ‘’organised society and the formal state-led bloc’’ 
(Muhr, 2012 p. 234). It represents, in a sense, a mechanism for cohesion between 
specific social forces and the various member-state governments.  
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The following section will look specifically at the grand-national projects, which 
have been implemented through the ALBA-TCP. It will specifically focus on grand-
national projects in relation to telecommunications, banking and finance, oil and 
lastly, social programmes.  
5.6 Understanding ALBA’s Grand-National concept, Grand-National Companies and 
Projects 
 
As we have seen in the aforementioned sections, within the ALBA-TCP’s ideological, 
organisational and institutional structure, primary emphasis has been placed on 
the construction of an alternative to neoliberalism. For ALBA member states, 
particularly Venezuela and Cuba, at the beginning of ALBA’s establishment, the 
FTAA was seen as an expression as a harmful consequence of neoliberalism, and as 
a result ALBA-TCP aspired to construct an alternative option  ‘’capable of orienting 
the economic and political relations of the Latin American and Caribbean republics’’ 
(ALBA, 2008).  The regional integration model views itself a strategic political 
alliance, which is based on a drive to refocus the economic relations of its member-
states but also for the region as a whole. In this sense, it sees itself as a regional 
movement that has broken away from classical economists’ view of integration and 
international cooperation. As stated in the VI ALBA Summit declaration (2008), 
The ALBA, as a strategic political alliance, has the fundamental 
historical purpose of uniting the capacities and strengths of the 
countries that integrate it, in the perspective of producing the 
structural transformations and the system of relations necessary to 
achieve the integral development required for continuity of our 
existence as sovereign and just nations (ALBA, 2008). 
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The Grand-National concept, which is an underlying feature of the ALBA project, 
can be considered, essentially, a political concept but incorporates many other 
aspects. The concept is based on several fundamental elements. Firstly, it is based 
on the Bolivarian vision of creating a union out of Latin America and Caribbean 
republics. Essentially it is driven by the desire to establish or form ‘’a great nation’’ 
(ALBA, 2008). Similarities can be drawn between the Grand-National concept and 
the idea of the ‘mega-state’, in as much as both define ‘’joint lines of common 
political action between States that share the same vision of the exercise of 
National and Regional Sovereignty, developing and deploying each one's own social 
identity and political, without this implying at the moment the construction of 
supranational structures’’ (ALBA, 2008). The concept of Grand National also has its 
roots in a socio-economic foundation. The development strategies employed by 
each ALBA member state seeks to meet and satisfy the social needs of the majority, 
while not limiting themselves to the local level. As the VI ALBA Summit declaration 
(2008) notes, the concept of Grand-National essentially ‘’seeks to overcome 
national barriers to strengthen local capacities by merging them into a whole to be 
able to face the challenges of the world reality’’ (ALBA, 2008). Lastly, the Grand-
National concept is grounded within an ideological context, which can be 
considered as a set of shared beliefs by ALBA member-states, in relation to a 
critical stance on neoliberalism, an emphasis placed on sustainable development 
and social justice, sovereignty, and self-determination, as well as developing a 
regional bloc that has the capacity to produce sovereign regional policies. 
The Grand-National concept which emphasises the unification of Latin America has 
quite literally been transferred into strategy since the V ALBA summit in 2007. At 
the core of ALBA-TCP’s institutional framework lies the concept of Grand-National 
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Projects (GNPs), GNPs are made up of a group of pan-national organisations and 
Grand-National Companies (GNCs), which according to Absell (2012), role is to 
‘’address technical aspects of regional integration such as building infrastructure, 
training and communication’’ (Absell, 2012 p. 3).  The Grand-National concept was 
integrated into the ALBA-TCP project through bi and multi-state grand-national 
projects and through grand-national companies, both of which, according to Muhr 
(2010), constitute ‘’counter-hegemonic responses to MNCs/TNCs’’ (Muhr in 
Schuerkens, 2010 p. 121).  As articulated with the VI ALBA Summit (2008) 
neoliberal hegemony has given rise to transnational companies (TNCs) and 
multinational corporations (MNCs), which have become the articulating agent of 
the world economy, and as a result has led to a crisis of the nation state. Relatedly, 
the VI ALBA Summit (2008) has highlighted that because of this pattern of 
transnational accumulation, the role of the state as a ‘’development-inducing agent’’ 
has been devalued and as a result the market has replaced the state’s role. ALBA’s 
concept of GNCs emerged in opposition to TNCs, according to the VI ALBA Summit 
declaration, the economic dynamics of GNCs are purposely designed to favour ‘’the 
production of goods and services for the satisfaction of human needs, guaranteeing 
their continuity and breaking with the logic of reproduction and accumulation of 
capital’’ (ALBA, 2008). 
GNCs, in an attempt to assure their sustainability and the shared objectives, are 
designed in such a way that the goods and services produced are in general, the 
result of a mixed or combined exchange schemes between member states.  As a 
result, the development and objectives of GNCs are developed in such a way that 
they are in harmony with ALBA’s overall ambition for a united Latin American. 
Each GNC acts fundamentally, as an economic instrument that attempts to create 
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and develop a wide area or network of fair and free trade between ALBA member 
states and Latin America as a whole. In contrast to TNCs and MNCs, productive 
integration is at the core of GNCs design, as a result, every GNC is required to take 
into account the need for complementary economic initiatives between nations in 
all areas that are considered fundamental for economic and social development.  
First and foremost, the production output of each GNC is to primarily satisfy its 
demand in the intra-ALBA market, in an attempt to create a sustainable fair-trade 
area. Production surpluses can only then be positioned in the international markets. 
In line with ALBA’s core objectives, GNCs are guided and operate under the ALBA 
principles of solidarity, cooperation, complementarity, promoting decent working 
conditions and equitable redistribution of wealth as well as reciprocity and 
harmonious coexistence between nature and man by ‘’rationally exploiting natural 
resources and implementing environmentally sustainable projects’’ (ALBA, 2008). 
Furthermore, in contrast to MNCs and TNCs, GNCs although they are able to 
associate and form relationships with companies within the private sector, for the 
development of certain activities, they are ‘’the absolute property of the States’’ 
(ALBA, 2008). 
Grand-National Projects can be considered essentially, social projects that are 
implemented between two or more ALBA member-states.  These state-run projects 
are carried out by GNCs. According to Bagley and Defort (2015), there are currently 
12 GNPs ‘’various stages of development (most with corresponding companies)’’ 
(Bagley and Defort, 2015 pp. 4-6). 
The production dynamics of GNPs, according to Schuerkens (2010), are orientated 
towards goods and services that ‘’satisfy human needs within the emergent ALBA 
markets, which are defined as a ‘fair trade zone’ ‘’ (Schuerkens, 2010, p.121). 
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Additionally, Troudi and Monedero (2007), see GNPs as being complementary to 
the regional projecting chains, which are comprised of mixed enterprises as well as 
social production enterprises. Social production enterprises, according to Troudi 
and Monedero, can be seen as the ‘’economic vanguard of 21st century socialism as 
they prioritize non-capitalist forms of socio-economic organization’’ (Troudi, 2007 
p. 121).  As outlined at the VI ALBA Summit (2008), GNPs operate within a variety 
of areas, from political, economic, social, scientific, industrial and cultural to any 
other area that can be integrated into the ‘’grand-national dialectic’’ (ALBA, 2008). 
However not every GNP can become a GNC, but every GNC must be the product of a 
GNP, ‘’by which it must guide its development’’ (ALBA, 2008).  In relation to GNPs 
that operate within social and cultural areas, according to the VI ALBA summit, 
they are easily implemented as they are based on already existing structures and 
capacities that are evident within ALBA member states, as a result, social and 
cultural GNP are relatively inexpensive and resource friendly. All GNPs can be 
distinguished as they are built and developed around the principles and aims of 
ALBA, that are, according to the VI ALBA Summit (2008), ‘’validated by the member 
countries and whose execution involves two or more countries, for the benefit of 
the great social majorities’’ (ALBA, 2008).  While the success of GNPs has been 
mixed at best, ALBA through these projects have been able to make some 
advancements, especially in relation to social development programmes. There are 
twelve operational GNPs, which are at various stages of development and operate 
to various degrees of success. Instead of looking specifically at projects, this 
research will focus more broadly on the general areas in which GNPs and GNCs 
operate within, thus aiming to give an account of how they are articulated at a 
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regional level. Illustrated below is a compiled table, which articulates either the 
areas in which ALBA seeks to or has implemented its various GNPs. 
Table 2 V Summit of the ALBA-TCP. Tintorero, Venezuela, 28th-29th April 2007 
GRANNACION PROJECTS 
 
ALBA - EDUCATION 
We need to make education the main strength of the transformations that we are producing in 
our nations, in order to strengthen the historical awareness about the union of the Latin 
American peoples. 
The Presidents discussed and approved by consensus the following ALBA Grand-National 
projects in the area of education: 
PROJECTS 
Grand-National Plan for the development of the literacy mission of the member countries of 
ALBA and in others in Latin America and the Caribbean, with the integration of the experiences 
obtained in Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia. 
Plan of university formation that prioritize the careers of social medicine, social work, among 
others. 
Common program of social formation for productive work. 
It was agreed to forward this approval to the ALBA Social Commission 
 
ALBA - CULTURE 
Cultural identity provides us with a solid ground for integration and the union of peoples. It is the 
starting point of everything we want and can do. In our case it is one of the greatest advantages 
that we have in front of a world so diverse and heterogeneous. 
The Presidents discussed and approved by consensus the following ALBA Grand-National 




Alba Cultural Fund for: joint production and distribution of films, co-production Grand-National 
of radio and television spaces, Latin American edition and distribution of books and publications, 
creation of networks of shared libraries. 
Opening of six Casas del Alba: in Havana, La Paz, Quito, Caracas, Managua and Port-au-Prince. 
It was agreed to forward this approval to the ALBA Social Commission 
ALBA - FAIR TRADE - TCP 
To achieve this goal, it is essential to articulate all initiatives in the productive field in a 
comprehensive economic complementation plan. 
The Presidents discussed and approved by consensus the following ALBA Grand-National 
projects in the area of fair trade:  
 
PROJECTS 
Creation of a Grand-National company of industrial supplies of ALBA whose object will be the 
commercialization of inputs, equipment and machinery for the industry. 
Creation of a Grand-National company of Imports and Exports of the ALBA. 
Creation of the ALBA Stores that will constitute a network for the storage and marketing of 
finished goods of ALBA member countries. 
Creation of the ALBA International Fair. 
Creation of the Grand-National Training Centre for the design and execution of research projects, 
technological innovation, technical assistance and training to improve the capacity and 
productive quality of our countries. 
It was agreed to forward this approval to the ALBA Economic Commission 
ALBA - FINANCIERO 
Certainly, all the advances in the field of economic independence, with their derivations in food 
production, expansion of production, economic growth and fair trade, are connected to the 
financial strengths. 
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The Presidents discussed and approved by consensus the following ALBA Grand-National 




Creation of the Economic Fund for Cooperative and Productive Investment of ALBA. 
Venezuela commits an initial contribution of 250 million dollars 
Issue of ALBA Bond, up to one billion USD. It was agreed to forward this approval to the ALBA 
Investment and Finance Committee 
ALBA - FOOD 
The ALBA is obliged to guarantee the food of our Peoples in sufficient quality and quantity. The 
achievement of this objective constitutes the litmus test of the set of structuring 
projects. Achieving shared self-sufficiency in food production and distribution, ensuring food 
security must be at the heart of long-term strategic plans. 
The Presidents discussed and approved by consensus the following ALBA Grand-National 
projects in the area of food: 
PROJECTS 
Creation of the "Food Bank", to guarantee the supply. 
Creation of a company Grand-National of production Agroalimentaria. 
It was agreed to forward this approval to the ALBA Investment and Finance Committee 
 
ALBA - HEALTH 
The ALBA project in health is one of the most powerful weapons of social justice to demonstrate 
in practice the human superiority of the new policies and relations generated from ALBA. 
The Presidents discussed and approved by consensus the following ALBA Grand-National 
projects in the area of health: 
PROJECTS 
Grand-National Plan for the development of the Health Mission of the ALBA countries that will 
lead the plans at their different levels and optimize the investment and resources for the 
recovery and implementation of public health systems of universal access in all our countries. As 
well as the supply and instruments for research, development for the use of the biodiversity 
resource of our region. 
It was agreed to forward this approval to the ALBA Social Commission 
ALBA - TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Our project should aim at a wide and extensive use of this tool, especially for the battle of ideas, 
which in the field of education and ideo-political formation we are fighting. 
The Presidents discussed and approved by consensus the following ALBA Grand-National 
projects in the area of telecommunications: 
PROJECTS 
Create a Grand-National telecommunications company. 
It was agreed to forward this approval to the ALBA Economic Commission 
ALBA - TRANSPORT 
The Presidents discussed and approved by consensus the following ALBA Grand-National 
projects in the area of transport: 
PROJECTS 
Air transport: 
Encourage the creation of a " Grand-National " corporation of state airlines that associate routes 
and equipment without losing their autonomy. It could assume the denomination of ALSUR (Alas 
del Sur or ALBA South) that establishes the routes Caracas - Managua - La Paz - Quito - Havana - 
Port - au - Prince. 
To foster the creation of a " Grand-National " company for the maintenance and construction of 
aircraft.  
Marine transport: 
In order to facilitate exchanges between the ALBA countries and their allies, it is necessary to 
transform TransALBA or create a new " Grand-National " shipping company in the South, for the 
transport of cargo and passengers, to design routes and to have appropriate equipment for 
maritime communication Between them. 
Incorporate the rest of the ALBA countries to the initiative of the joint ventures already 
constituted. 
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Design and enable the routes for fluvial communication between the countries of the South. 
Ground transportation: 
Develop a terrestrial communication plan for the ALBA vision Region, alternative to that 
promoted by multilateral organizations.  
To promote the creation of a Grand-National company for the development of infrastructure in 
the Region.  
It was agreed to forward this approval to the ALBA Economic Commission 
ALBA - TOURISM 
The Presidents discussed and approved by consensus the following ALBA Grand-National 
projects in the area of tourism: 
PROJECTS 
Elaboration of the Macro Plan of Social Tourism. 
Declaration of the Tourist University of ALBA 
It was agreed to forward this approval to the ALBA Economic Commission 
ALBA - MINING 
The Presidents discussed and approved by consensus the following ALBA Grand-National 
projects in the mining area: 
PROJECTS 
Creation of a Grand-National company of cooperation, research and development in the mining 
geological area. 
Creation of a Grand-National company for the development of the aluminium industry. 
Creation of a Grand-National company for the development of the cement industries for the ALBA 
countries. 
Creation of a Grand-National company for the management of forests, production and 
commercialization of products of the wood industry. 
It was agreed to forward this approval to the ALBA Economic Commission 
 
ALBA - INDUSTRIAL 
It is necessary to make a great alliance between the heavy and light industries, creating Gran-
National Companies to strengthen industrial sovereignty in our continent. 
The Presidents discussed and approved by consensus the following ALBA Grand-National 
projects in the industrial area: 
PROJECTS 
Creation of the Grand-National Company of Articles and Goods of Stainless Steel. 
Development of White Label products for ALBA and Latin American countries with the 
cooperation of allied countries (Beliorusia, Iran, China) 
It was agreed to forward this approval to the ALBA Economic Commission 
ALBA - ENERGY 
It is necessary to make a great alliance between the national energy companies in order to 
achieve the objectives of the Energy Treaty of ALBA, for this 
A large National Energy company will be created, which will cover the areas of oil, gas, refining, 
petrochemicals, development of transport infrastructure, storage, distribution, electricity, 
alternative energy and maritime transport. 
Based on what was expressed in terms of unity, the presidents discussed and approved by 
consensus the following ALBA Grand-National projects in the energy area: 
PROJECTS 
BOLIVIA 
Distribution of fuel through the flag of fifteen (15) service stations in the amount of USD 4.7 MM 
Construction of two (2) natural gas liquid extraction plants: 
A.- Plant located in the north of the country in Santa Cruz with a capacity of 200 MMPCD and an 
investment of USD 70 MM. 
B.- Located in the south of the country with a capacity of 300 MMPCD and an estimated 
investment of USD 100 MM. 
Project for the thermal generation (diesel) of electric power with a capacity of 40 MW, with an 
estimated cost of USD 30 MM. 
Project for the improvement of efficiency in the use of electric energy by replacing inefficient 
equipment with energy saving equipment with an estimated investment of USD 5 MM. 
Asphalt production plant with a capacity of 10 MBD and an estimated investment of USD 150 
MM. 
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Project for the exploration and exploitation in four gas fields in Bolivia with an estimated 
investment for the initial phase of USD 620 MM. 
 
CUBA 
Remodelling and commissioning of the Cienfuegos refinery with a refining capacity of 65 MBD 
and with an estimated investment for the initial phase of USD 83 MM. 
Construction of an LNG regasification plant with a capacity of 100 MPCD and an estimated 
investment of USD 8 MM. 
 
NICARAGUA 
Refining plant of 150 MBD and with an estimated investment of USD 3550 MM. 
Project for thermal generation (diesel) of electric power with a capacity of 120 MW (60 MW 
diesel 60 MW fuel oil), with an estimated cost of USD 89 MM. 
 
HAITI 
Construction of an LNG regasification plant with a capacity of 50 MPCD and an estimated 
investment of USD 4 MM. 
Project for the generation of fuel oil of electrical power with a capacity of 60 MW, with an 
estimated cost of USD 56 MM. 
Project for the visualization, conceptualization and construction of a 10 MBD refinery with an 
estimated investment of USD 80 MM. 
 





   In order to give a detailed account of the operational capacity of GNPs and GNCs, 
if it firstly necessary to look at the New Regional Financial Architecture (NRFA) 
that ALBA has developed in order to not only facilitate its various grand-national 
projects and companies but also limit its member states dependence on both 
international financial institutions (IFIs) as well as the US.  January 2008 marks the 
birth of the Bank of ALBA, with the signing of the Constitutive Act. Its creation, 
according to VI ALBA Summit declaration (2008) signifies a definitive step towards 
the construction of a new financial architecture, which it deems necessary in order 
to establish ‘’a solid foundation for the productive projects to make them viable and 
sustainable over time’’ (ALBA, 2008).  The Bank of ALBA, in contrast to the 
international financial institutions, such as the IMF and WB, operates on the 
consensus of its member states and does not impose loan conditions. As Hart-
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Landsberg (2009a) has outlined, ’The Banks stated aim is to boost industrial and 
agricultural production among its members, support social projects as well as 
multilateral cooperation agreements among its members, particularly in the field of 
energy’’ (Hart-Landsberg, 2009, p. 6). Both GNPs and GNCs are major recipients of 
the ALBA Bank. As Califano (2014) has noted, the Bank of ALBA is driven by a 
commitment towards “The promotion, strengthening, and development of micro, 
small, and medium production, and of associative economies, with the purpose of 
empowering its capacities so as to ensuring, among other objectives, 
food sovereignty and security” (Califano, 2014, p. 138). 
The overall aim of the Bank of ALBA, as Tahsin (2009) has noted, it to make loans 
available to ALBA member-states, in an attempt to enable ALBA countries to 
undertake development programmes, in the areas of infrastructure, education, 
health, as well as social and cultural programmes, without any conditions attached 
to the loans (Tahsin 2009 ). Up until 2012, the Bank’s reserves were predominately 
supplied by Venezuela, however at the XI ALBA Summit in 2012, ALBA member 
countries agreed to contribute 1% of their international reserves into the bank, in 
order to fund the various development projects. Along with the Bank of ALBA, 
member states but specifically driven by Venezuela, created a regional trade 
currency, known as SUCRE (Sistema Unico de Compensacion Regional) in 2009. 
The electronic currency’s specific purpose is to facilitate trade and exchanges 
between member states. The aim of the SUCRE is also to circumvent the US dollar, 
in an attempt to strengthen the regional bloc in relation to trade through the 
eventual float of the SUCRE which will be based on a basket of member states’ 
currency reserves (Bagley and Defort, 2015 p. 6). 
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It is important to note however, that Venezuela’s contribution to the various ALBA 
development projects (GNPs and GNCs) goes beyond the financial backing of the 
Bank of ALBA and its central role in the establishment and development of the 
SUCRE. Financial support for the various GNPs has also been allocated through 
Petro-Caribe and the Petro-Caribe fund, which is in short, an energy agreement, 
established in 2005, between Venezuela and Central American and Caribbean 
nations. Although, as Bagley and Defort (2015) note, Petro-Caribe is not an ALBA 
initiated development project, ‘’it serves as a gateway organisation to ALBA’’ 
(Bagley and Defort, 2015 p. 6). They are, in short, separate entities that have some 
overlap with member-states. Drawing from the success of Petro-Caribe, the 
Venezuelan government has expressed its desire to establish an economic zone 
between ALBA-TCP and Petro-Caribe, the objectives of which would be to advance 
investment, trade (using the SUCRE), and tourism between member-states through 
the creation of various GNPs (Masud, 2013). Furthermore, ALBA, since the V ALBA 
summit (2007) has initiated the ALBA energy treaty. The V declaration outlines 
ALBA member states commitment to form a regional alliance between ALBA 
member states in order to achieve the objectives of the Energy treaty of ALBA. Out 
of this shared commitment a GNC known as PetroALBA was established - a regional 
oil company comparable to Petro-Caribe. The aim of the GNC is to provide a cheap 
and guaranteed energy supply to member states.  Since the V ALBA Summit 
declaration specific PetroALBA GNPs were initiated in Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia and 
Haiti. 
In the field of telecommunications, TeleSur (ALBAs international new channel) can 
be considered one of ALBA’s most successful GNP. It was established in 2005 as a 
‘’counterweight to CNN’’ (Masud, 2013). The Spanish language regional news outlet, 
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in recent years, has gained an international audience, with its broadcasts reaching 
beyond Latin America and the Caribbean to parts of Europe and Africa (Masud, 
2013). More broadly, ALBA, in an attempt to bolster its telecommunication project 
as a whole it has, according to Bagley and Defort (2015) run a fibre-optic cable 
between Cuba and Venezuela, it has run wire services for the facilitation of news, 
interviews and documentaries throughout member states. It has also purchased a 
Chinese satellite, which has aided its various TV stations, including TeleSur, in its 
ability to broadcast across the region and internationally (Bagley and Defort, 2015 
pp. 4-6). 
In relation to social GNPs, Masud (2013) has noted, that the Bank of ALBA has 
invested an estimated $170 million into its social programmes. These grand-
national projects range from cultural research and art exhibitions to elementary 
school education programmes and scholarships in Nicaragua. Dominica and Bolivia, 
along with healthcare access initiatives (Masud, 2013). In relation to its educational 
programme, which can be considered one of ALBA’s most successful GNPs, ALBA 
built on Cuba’s literacy initiative, Sí, Se Puede (Yes we can), and has reduced 
illiteracy across the region (Bagley and Defort, 2015). Nicaragua, the financial 
support of the Bank of ALBA, has successfully implemented the ‘’Programa Hambre 
Cero’’ (Zero Hunger Programme) which aims to reduce national acute malnutrition 
by up to 4% (Bagley and Defort, 2015). 
In relation to health, according to Masud (2013), ALBA’s free access to healthcare 
GNPs has facilitated millions of consultations, operations and visits by Cuban 
trained community health workers across its member states. The most successful 
project, Mission Miracle, which began in 2004, as a project between Cuba and 
Venezuela, offers healthcare to low-income patients with eye problems. According 
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to the ALBA-PTA management report from 2004 to 2014, Mission Miracle has had a 
total of 3,482,361 patients, which have undergone surgery to improve or recover 
their sight (ALBA-PTA, 2014). 
It is important to note, however, according to Bagley and Defort (2015), some of 
ALBAs GNPs have been severely limited due to mismanagement, such as ALBA 
agriculture and others exist only in name (Bagley and Defort, 2015). While this 
issue is important to highlight, it does not however, fall under the remit of this 
chapter’s overall objective. Rather the success and failures, as well as the inner 
workings of ALBA will be addressed in the following chapter.  
5.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has focused specifically on the factors and events that led to the 
creation of ALBA through a historical narrative. It has suggested that its creation is 
representative of a move towards a more leftist inspired form of regionalism 
brought about by the rise of left. It has suggested that since its inception, ALBA has 
been put forward as an alternative to not only the Washington Consensus but to all 
other forms of capitalism. It has argued, however, that while a large body of 
research is of the opinion that Chávez and Venezuela as a whole has played an 
integral part in the creation and development of ALBA, this chapter has suggested 
that neither Caracas nor Chávez can or should be seen as a totalizing in its power to 
mould the regional bloc. It has argued that rather than seeing ALBA as a forced 
product of Chávez, ALBA should be understood as the merging of a sequence of 
particular opinions around common themes- emancipation from neoliberalism and 
aspirations to challenge the status quo. The chapter then moved on to specifically 
look at the evolution of ALBA, tracing its development from its creation to present 
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form. It began by looking at how the neoliberal assault on Latin America which 
began with Chile in 1973 instigated a series of events, such as the oppression of the 
left, the suppression of popular organisations as well as the workers’ movements, 
leading to the reconstruction of Latin American economies along free-market lines, 
through manufacturing consent. It has also suggested that this manufacturing of 
consent within the region had two main characteristics, the first one being the 
oppression of the national development strategy by a new form of regionalism 
which was carried out by the second characteristic, that of US hegemony. This 
chapter has suggested that the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which was 
initially launched in 1994, can be seen as a form of neoliberalism. It has proposed 
that the US-inspired FTAA intended to reshape the region in a specific way that was 
aligned with US interests. This chapter has argued that it was out of resistance to 
this form of new regionalism that ALBA was created. It has also suggested that 
ALBA’s creation is representative of the lefts resistance to US imperialism as well as 
a form of contestation against the US-sponsored FTAA but also represents not only 
a move by the left to develop a substitute for the FTAA but also ALBA can be seen 
as a mechanism to combat western-style economic integration, replacing it with a 
new political and economic model know as twenty-first-century socialism, that 
aims to transform Latin American societies through establishing new political, 
economic and social alliances. The main objective of which would be the creation of 
the ‘patria grande’ in the Latin American and the Caribbean region based on 
independence, sovereignty and identity. 
The chapter then went on to look at the Cuban-Venezuelan joint declaration, which 
is seen as the preamble of the inaugural ALBA treaty. It has suggested that the joint 
declaration as well as the apparent impending establishment of the FTAA that not 
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only led to the creation of ALBA but also inspired the foundational principles that 
the ALBA treaty is built on. Principles centred around aspirations to broaden 
solidarity among Latin American, aspirations centred on transforming Latin 
American society through education, participation and through the elimination of 
social inequalities. This chapter has also suggested that both the experiences of 
Venezuela with its success in its Bolivarian social missions and Cuba’s 
‘internationalist’ experience led to a shared belief that a workable regional 
integration model that offered a ‘’real alternative of solidarity and integration 
beyond the existing regional agreements and as a counterpart to the imperialist 
offer of the FTAA’’ (Bossi 2007). However, it has also suggested that while the 
creation of ALBA began with the joint declaration between the two countries, its 
emergence should be viewed in the context of the developments within the political 
economy Latin America at that time. It cites mass disenchantment, the rise of social 
movements opposed to neoliberalism as well as the election of left and centre left 
governments in several Latin American countries as contributing factors, which led 
to the creation and development of ALBA.  
The chapter then went on to discuss the expansion and development of ALBA since 
its creation. It has suggested that the rise in prominence of a shared ideological 
understanding of the importance of ALBA for the region led to its expansion 
through membership. It has suggested that the newly elected left-leaning 
government who shared in this belief began to join the regional movement 
beginning with Bolivia under Morales in 2006. From there the chapter points out 
that with the Bolivian adhesion to the alliance, the regional project began to further 
develop its integration model through the adoption of the ‘’People Trade 
Agreement’’ or TCP. This addition served to refine the integration project and for 
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the first time it had begun to develop beyond mere commitment, it offered an 
alternative trading mechanism to the proposed trade agreement of the North. The 
chapter then went on the outline the TCP’s main objective, which was to provide a 
distinct form of trade integration that is complementary to the national interests of 
participating members as well as the region, as opposed to market-driven forms of 
trade. Membership to ALBA began to increase with the addition to the TCP and by 
2009 the regional project had grown to 9 members. The chapter highlighted that 
2009 marked a turning point for the movement as ALBA began to evolve again, 
reorienting its focus in relation to the development of cooperation amongst its 
member states but also through the establishment of International Relations with 
countries such as China, India, Russia, Syria and Iran, the combination of which 
further legitimized ALBA as a Latin American regional movement. 
The chapter then went on to look at the organisational and institutional structure 
of ALBA.  It has highlighted that the institutional structure of ALBA developed 
alongside its membership expansion. It then went on to look at ALBA’s 
organisational structure given a detailed account of its makeup. It looks specifically 
are the role and functions of the Presidential Council, the Political Council, the 
Economic Council, the Social Council and lastly the Council of Social Movements. 
From there, the chapter gave an in-depth account of ALBA’s Grand-National 
concepts, which led to the creation of its Grand-National Companies (GNCs) and 
Grand-National Projects (GNPs). It has suggested the ALBA’s Grand-National 
concept is essentially a political concept but incorporated many other elements. 
Primarily, it is based on the Bolivarian vision of a Latin American union. Within an 
ideological context, the concept is grounded in what can be seen as a set of shared 
beliefs by ALBA member states, with regards to a critical stance in relation to 
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neoliberalism, as well as an emphasis placed on sustainable development, social 
justice, sovereignty, self-determination as well as developing a regional bloc that 
has the capacity to produce sovereign regional policies. Then chapter then went on 
to look at ALBA’s development of GNCs, which were created in opposition to MNCs 
and TNCs. It has suggested that the establishment of GNCs can be considered a 
counter-hegemonic response to neoliberalism.  It has also suggested that GNCs are 
purposefully designed to favour the production of goods and services for the 
satisfaction of human needs as opposed to being profit-driven. It has also 
highlighted that each GNC acts fundamentally as an economic instrument that 
attempts to create and develop a wide area or network of fair trade between ALBA 
member states. The chapter then goes on to discuss GNPs, which it considers to be 
essentially social projects. It outlines the general dynamics of the projects and its 
orientation towards goods and services that satisfy human needs within the 
emergent ALBA markets.  Before giving a detailed account of the operational 
capacity of both GNCs and GNPs, the chapter focuses on the NRFA that ALBA has 
created with the establishment of the Bank of ALBA.  Its creation has two purposes, 
to firstly fund GNPs and GNCs but also it was created as a way to reduce its 
member-states reliance on International Financial Institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) and the US. It then 
went on to compare and contrast the Bank of ALBA with the IFIs, suggesting that 
one of the main differences to be that the Bank of ALBA does not impose loan 
conditions on its member-state and it also operated on the consensus of its 
members. The chapter then turned its attention to ALBA’s expansion of its NRFA 
with the creation of SUCRE, its regional trading currency which was created to help 
to facilitate trade and exchange between member-states but was also created in an 
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attempt to circumvent the US Dollar. The chapter then goes on to focus on 
Venezuela’s role with regards to financial support of the various GNPs and GNCs. It 
suggests that often its role and financial support of GNPs is often vital as is the case 
with Petro ALBA, whose success is completely dependent on Venezuelan oil.  The 
chapter then looked at various GNPs in other fields such as TeleSur within the 
telecommunication sector, which has gained international recognition in recent 
years, as well as ALBA’s educational projects, which can be considered one of its 
most successful GNPs. It has also highlighted, that there are severe limitations and 
inactiveness with regards to some GNPs and cited serve mismanagement as the 
cause of its failure as is the case with ALBA Agriculture. Overall the chapter gave a 
historical overview of ALBA from its creation to its present form in an attempt to 
understand its evolution and the specific ways in which it has developed as a form 
of resistance.  
The following chapter will look to examine the success and failures of ALBA in an 
attempt to determine if the regional movement can been be seen as a successful 
counter-hegemonic form of regionalism. It will specifically look at Venezuela’s role 
within the organisation and determine if the success or failure of the regional 















Chapter 6: Inside ALBA 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, focus was primarily placed on the evolution of the ALBA, 
tracing its early developments to its current form. It cited specific historic factors 
such as the proposed implementation of the US-inspired FTAA as the primary 
catalyst, which led to the Latin American Lefts’ resistance to this form of open 
regionalism. This in turn, eventually led to the creation of ALBA. Furthermore, the 
last chapter has suggested that the creation of ALBA should be seen as a 
mechanism, which was developed to combat western-style economic integration. It 
also discussed the expansion and development of ALBA since its creation. It 
suggested that the rise in prominence of a shared ideological understanding of the 
importance of ALBA for the region led to its expansion through membership. It has 
looked at the expansion and development of ALBA since its initial creation in 2004 
and the evolution of the integration model through the adoption of the ‘’People 
Trade Agreement’’ or TCP. It was implied that this addition served to refine the 
integration project and for the first time it had begun to develop beyond mere 
commitment, it offered an alternative trading mechanism to the proposed trade 
agreement of the North.  The purpose of this chapter is to specifically look at 
whether ALBA can be seen as a viable counter-hegemonic project, which seeks to 
challenge US-inspired neo-liberalism. Additionally, this chapter seeks to determine 
the extent that the Alliance has acted as a mechanism of support for small states. In 
order to fulfil this objective, the chapter will specifically look at where and in what 
ways a gap exists between ABLA’s aspirations and the reality of the project on the 
ground.  
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6.2 ALBA: aspirations versus reality? 
 
According to the late Hugo Chávez, “the ALBA is the alternative path to the 
neoliberal hegemony which is destroying the world” (ABN, 2008). For Bossi (2009), 
ALBA’s principal objective is to “break away from capitalist logic” (Bossi, 2009). 
From Metsäranta’s (2010) perspective, ALBA since its establishment,  ‘’has not only 
been put forward as an alternative to the Washington Consensus but more 
profoundly to all other possible forms of capitalism’’(Metsäranta, 2010 p. 14). 
For Dr. Philbert Aaron, the Dominican ambassador to Venezuela and national 
coordinator of ALBA, ALBA represents a yearning of the Latin American people, to 
make the region their own. It represents, according to Dr. Aaron’s interview (2017), 
an attempt by the region to ‘’peel away the colonial ties’’ and reclaim the regional 
space. As indicated above, ALBA, since its establishment in 2004, has been put forth 
as an ideological regional alliance, an emancipatory project, an alternative regional 
grouping, a form of resistance, and finally a counter-hegemonic regional movement. 
The purpose of this section is to investigate whether ALBA has been able to move 
beyond an ideological alliance to produce a reality of change, in any tangible sense.  
It will also determine whether the emancipatory project, has been successful in its 
endeavour to greatly reduce US involvement within the region.  
With any attempt to analyse the success and failures of the Alliance, it is necessary 
to look at ALBA’s development in two distinct phases, from 2004-2005, which 
looks specifically at ALBA as an alternative, and from 2005 to its present form, 
which looks at its evolution, expansion and institutional and structural 
development. It will also look at how the Alliance has been impacted more recently 
by the death of Hugo Chávez and how the increasingly volatile situation in 
Venezuela has affected it. By breaking down ALBA’s development and evolution 
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into two distinct phases it becomes possible to evaluate its effectiveness in relation 
to its stated objectives and goals, within a particular timeframe, as well as 
analysing problems that have arisen which have hindered the Alliance’s ability to 
implement specific objectives.  
In previous chapters, specific factors and events that led to the emergence of the 
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (in 2006 ALBA changed its name to the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America) have been discussed in detail.  
Beginning in the 1990s, a wave of neoliberal oppositional forces emerged across 
Latin America starting with protests in the Chilean referendum on Pinochet’s 
presidency.  Later that year, the implementation of neoliberal reforms in Venezuela 
brought a wave of protests and social unrest due to the repressive nature of the 
reforms rolled out. In the early part of the 1990s, the Sao Paulo forum meetings, 
which acted as a platform for leftist parties and movements, marked the beginning 
of oppositional forces working together, at a regional level, demanding an 
alternative to neoliberalism.  During the same period, as Cusack (2018) notes, the 
Zapatista movement in Mexico ‘’chose the date of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement’s entry into force (NAFTA, 1 January 1994) for its violent eruption into 
the regional consciousness’’ (Cusack, 2018b p. 2). Four years later, the opposition 
found an electable candidate in Hugo Chávez, who in 1998 became Venezuela’s 
president. Subsequent leftist victories in Bolivia in 2005 and Ecuador in 2006 
marked a turning point for politics in Latin America. The idea of a ‘pink tide’ or ‘left 
turn’ was born and further sensationalized with the leftward shifts in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay along with many states within Central America.  
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With the rise of left-leaning governments across Latin American, the construction 
of leftist inspired forms of regionalism began to develop against the backdrop of 
the US proposed, neoliberal inspired FTAA.  
Although it must be noted, that the FTAA was supported by many Latin American 
states, particularly by states with strong ties to the US. Regardless, with the support 
of left and centre of left governments, regional projects began to be framed around 
ideas of solidarity and the consolidation of shared approaches, bringing to the 
forefront issues of social inequality along with offering alternative paths of greater 
autonomy from the US. An example of this can be seen with the emergence of ALBA. 
Under the direction of Chávez and Castro, the autonomous regional project was 
created in an attempt to act as a form of resistance to the US-inspired FTAA. 
According to Emerson (2013), the FTAA promotion at the Mar de Plata summit in 
2005 was a final attempt by the US to ‘’institutionalise U.S. economic pre-eminence 
in the Western Hemisphere’’ (Emerson, 2013 p. 194). Furthermore, Gamble and 
Payne (1996) have suggested, that the FTAA intended to reshape Latin America in 
such a way that the region would be aligned with US interests, ‘’the FTAA would 
entrench faith in export-led growth and the private sector, while also 
institutionalising market access for U.S. capital’’ (Gamble and Payne, 1996 p. 93). 
Additionally, the attempted revival of the FTAA, revealed the broader U.S. fears 
about the creation of competing trading blocs internationally and an increasing 
sense of apprehension in the US ‘’over an increasingly independent region seeking 
economic links beyond the Western Hemisphere’’ (Emerson, 2013 p. 194). 
However, the Mar de Plata summit was met with opposition and resistance 
particularly by left-leaning Latin American governments and social movements. 
The most vocal of which was President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. Four years 
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previously, at the Summit of the Americas in Quebec, President Chávez had 
proposed and gained support for the creation of an alternative regional bloc; ALBA, 
which by the end of 2004, was formalized. 
According to José Briceño in Bourbon’s edited book (2012), ALBA’s creation, 
essentially represented the Latin American left’s resistance to US imperialism, as 
well as acting as a form of contestation to the US-sponsored FTAA (Briceño in 
Bourbon, 2012b). ALBA, in this light, not only represented a move by the Latin 
American left to develop a substitute for the FTAA but can also be seen as a 
mechanism, which attempted to combat western-style economic integration with 
the development of an alternative model for integration ‘’that would lead to the 
transformation of societies and the establishment of political, economic, and social 
alliances. The main objective would be the creation of the ‘’Patria Grande’’ in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, based on independence, sovereignty and identity’’ 
(Bagley and Defort, 2015 p. 46). With the above considered, to what extent has 
ALBA been successful in relation to its stated aims and objectives during the 2004-
2005 timeframe?  If one views ALBA as a counter-hegemonic form of regionalism, 
whose main objective was to derail the proposed FTAA, then the Alternative was 
indeed successful. However, with its principal goal achieved, ALBA began to expand 
in relation to membership, initiatives and ambition. Over the next seven years, 
ALBA attempted to move beyond its ideological foundation, morphing into an 
Alliance (The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America) and establishing 
itself as a viable regional scheme –at least for the left -, which could offer its 
members an alternative path towards development. From 2005 onwards, the 
Alliance gained momentum with the accession of Bolivia and Ecuador, along with 
Nicaragua and Eastern Caribbean states. In relation to initiatives, ALBA began to 
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roll out some of its early Venezuelan-Cuban social programmes to new members, 
such as Misión Milagro- providing free eye operations -, Yo sí puedo - which offered 
literacy training - and Misión José Gregorio Hernández  - which conducted surveys 
on the disability needs of any particular member state. The combination of which, 
played well with the general populations of recipient states, thus further 
legitimized recipient member states accession to ALBA. However, many of its social 
programmes in recent years have ceased to exist or at the very least have become 
less of a priority. Since 2012, after the death of Chávez and the subsequent 
economic instability which Venezuela has experienced since it has become 
apparent that there has been no roll-out of any new social programmes. 
Furthermore, it is evident that there has been no new official declarations or 
official ALBA progress reports on existing social programmes that were created 
prior to 2012. This suggests that either the various programmes have been 
dramatically curtailed or more than likely they are no longer operational. Due to a 
severe lack of public progress reports on ALBA’s various social initiatives currently, 
it is impossible to know whether or not the initiatives are still in operation. With 
the above considered, it has become increasingly apparent that ALBA’s social 
programmes are entirely dependent on Venezuela’s ability to finance them. With 
the current economic instability and political insecurity that Venezuela has 
experienced since 2012, it seems that ALBA and its social programmes have taken a 
back seat. With that said, ALBA’s ambitious expansion since 2005, should be 
considered the most impressive aspect of the regional project. It set about 
developing a new financial architecture in the region. Through the creation of an 
economic zone of shared development, the Alliance established a number of key 
initiatives in the hope that the specific combination would lead to the permanent 
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establishment of a new financial architecture for the region, which could operate 
independently from the US. The establishment of the Peoples Trade Treaty (TCP) 
(2006), the creation of the Bank of ALBA (2008), the development of the SUCRE 
(2008), and the development of Grand National Enterprises (2009), can all be 
considered as key ALBA initiatives that sought to bring about an ambitious 
economic zone of shared development. The following section will analyse the 
success and failures of the aforementioned initiatives in an attempt to establish the 
extent that ALBA has been successful in creating a feasible regional project. 
With the accession of Bolivia in 2006, came the creation and incorporation of the 
Peoples Trade Agreement (TCP). Its primary objective has been to standardize and 
regulate investment and trade amongst ALBA member states, in an attempt to 
dramatically reduce inequality between and within member states. The TCP 
essentially provides an avenue for trade integration, that is complementary to 
member states’ national interests, ‘’for the benefit of society rather than markets or 
firms’’ (Tahsin, 2009 p. 6).  It operates through a number of mechanisms, but 
primarily via trade agreements ‘’negotiated on a case-by-case basis, allowing for 
flexibility of commitment according to country circumstances’’ (Tahsin, 2009 p. 6). 
It also establishes reciprocal credit arrangements, that facilitates ‘’the payments 
and collections corresponding to commercial and financial transactions between 
the countries [through] the banking institutions designated for this purpose by the 
Governments’’ (ALBA, 2006b). In addition to facilitating compensated trade 
(through direct product exchanges) between member-states, the TCP also obliges 
all foreign investment to be restructured in an effort to protect the domestic 
industries of the member states. According to Tahsin (2009), under the TCP 
declaration  ‘’The main sectors of the economy should be determined by the state 
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instead of market mechanisms’’ (Tahsin, 2009 p. 6). Overall the structure and 
guidelines set out in the TCP declaration (2006) are framed around opposition to 
western-style market mechanisms and neoliberal policies. Its addition has 
essentially served to further legitimize ALBA’s anti-neoliberal and anti-US 
orientation (ALBA, 2006b). Although the TCP is a defining element of ALBA’s 
identity and serves as an institutional framework for facilitating ALBA’s transition 
from an ideological alliance to an alliance capable of producing real change for its 
member states, it has not produced any radical transformation in relation to how 
member states trade amongst each other. As Cusack (2015) has previously argued, 
despite official declarations and opportunities to implement the TCP, it is evident 
that the institutional framework continues to be based on pre-existing bilateral and 
regional agreements (Cusack, 2015). As a result, there has been no radical shift 
towards a new or revolutionary institutional trading framework. Furthermore, as 
Absell (2018) has noted, due to similarities in specialization, geographic distance, 
and demand structure, ALBA member states are not natural trading partners and 
without an institutional framework that is well thought out, and without a viable 
mechanism that can actually be implemented, no significant gains which are 
associated with integration, are likely to become a reality (Absell, 2018). What is 
more, it has become apparent that the TCP, twelve years on, has failed to move 
beyond declaration and agreement form, as a result it has not produced any 
measurable or conclusive results, which has led this work to conclude that the TCP 
overall, exists only as an aspirational rather than an operational institutional 
framework for ALBA.   
The ALBA Bank was founded in 2008. Its creation, according to VI ALBA Summit 
declaration (2008) signifies a definitive step towards the construction of a new 
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financial architecture, which it deems necessary in order to establish ‘’a solid 
foundation for the productive projects to make them viable and sustainable over 
time’’ (ALBA, 2008). The ALBA Bank, in contrast to international financial 
institutions (IFIs), operates on the consensus of its member states and does not 
impose loan conditions. The main objective of the ALBA Bank is to enhance 
agricultural and industrial production, support social projects along with 
facilitating multilateral cooperation agreements, particularly in relation to the 
energy sector, amongst ALBA member states (Hart-Landsberg, 2009b). 
Furthermore, as noted by Califano (2014), the ALBA Bank is driven by a 
commitment towards “The promotion, strengthening, and development of micro, 
small, and medium production, and of associative economies, with the purpose of 
empowering its capacities so as to ensuring, among other objectives, 
food sovereignty and security” (Califano, 2014 p. 138).In essence, the ALBA Bank 
was created to act as an anti- western regional development bank that provides 
loans with no conditionalities to member states. However, there is little genuinely 
regional about the bank. The ALBA bank is solely run and financed through the 
Venezuelan state’s Banco del Tesoro.  Although at the XI ALBA summit (2012), 
ALBA members agreed to begin to make a 1% contribution of their international 
reserves to the bank, in an attempt to sustain and expand it, this agreement has yet 
to be implemented. Furthermore, although the Bank over the past decade has had 
major success in relation to funding development initiatives in various member 
states, insufficient funding overall has hindered its development (Benzi, 2016). 
Since 2012, it has become increasingly apparent that the Bank’s future is uncertain, 
given the current state of Venezuela’s economic affairs, it seems likely that 
Venezuela’s ability to continue to bankroll loans for member states will soon come 
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to an end. Moreover, with alternative proposals for more inclusive development 
banks gaining traction within the region –Bank of the South – the ALBA Bank’s 
unique allure seems to be fading, especially if one considers its competitors 
openness to incorporate other trading partners (both right and left) from the 
region.  
During the third summit of ALBA (2008) the Sistema Unitario de Compensación 
Regional de Pagos or the SUCRE was created. The SUCRE was adopted by some 
ALBA member states and acted as a regional payment clearing system and virtual 
currency that aimed to incentivise trade activity between member states, save 
foreign exchange and decrease member states dependence on the US dollar. ALBA’s 
motivation for the SUCRE’s creation and implementation was primarily driven by 
its ideological counter-hegemonic ambition to create an alternative to the US dollar 
in regional trade. The SUCRE’s appeal amongst member states coincided with the 
height of the global economic crisis and in 2009 the SUCRE agreement was 
officially implemented by Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba and Ecuador. Although the 
SUCRE constitutes only one of the numerous trade agreements and mechanisms 
between ALBA member states, it represents one of ALBA’s most concrete 
institutional achievements. Beyond ALBA’s ideological trade objectives, the 
SUCRE’s specific ambitions are   
 To strengthen the monetary and financial sovereignty and 
independence of our people, to implement a new regional financial 
architecture that lessons external vulnerability and structural 
asymmetries of our economies, to boost the region’s productive 
capacity and to promote trade between countries in the Alliance (CMR, 
2011 p. 8). 
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The language used in the aforementioned reflects, in a sense, the impact and effect 
that the financial crisis had on the ALBA member states and in Latin America in 
general. Both ALBA’s and subsequently the SUCRE’s emphasis on the promotion of 
intra-regional trade, largely sought to address its regional socioeconomic issues 
that were heightened by the global crisis. According to Cusack (2015), the epochal 
2008 shift prompted ALBA states to pursue a partial delinking from the 
increasingly unpredictable international economy, moving beyond its Peoples 
Trade Agreement (Cusack, 2015). Within the SUCRE’s first two years, the value of 
intra-regional trade grew at an exponential rate. According to Pearce (2018), it 
went from $ 8 million in 2010 to more than 20 times that in 2011 ($172,905, 344). 
The following year, the trade conducted via SUCRE once again grew substantially to 
just over $1 billion (Pearce, 2018). For Pearce (2018) the significance of the 
aforementioned SUCRE trading figures are far from inconsequential and represent 
a promising challenge to ‘’the dollar’s privileged position in regional exchange’’ 
(Pearce, 2018 p. 76). Although the dollar has not been entirely circumvented with 
the use of the SUCRE, as it does use the currency to balance accounts biannually, 
the SUCRE’s intention is for ‘’participating nations to become less dependent on the 
dollar in the medium to long term, thus weakening US economic hegemony in Latin 
America and the Caribbean’’ (Pearce, 2018 p. 76). With that being said, it is 
important to note, that there have been as little as twenty transactions that have 
taken place via the SUCRE without Venezuelan direct involvement. The majority of 
transactions that have occurred via the SUCRE have been highly concentrated on 
trade between Venezuela and Ecuador. The trade figures particularly have been 
overwhelmingly dominated by Venezuela’s propensity to import Ecuadorian 
foodstuffs.  According to the Central Bank of Ecuador’s 2014 and 2015 reports, in 
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the first year of trading - 2010 - 60.7 per cent of all SUCRE transactions were 
between Venezuela and Ecuador, in 2013, SUCRE transactions between the two 
countries had reached a peak of 96 per cent. The following year, trade interactions 
involving the two countries reduced to 84.62 per cent, the value of which had 
dropped dramatically - halving to $497 million. In 2015, the value of SUCRE 
transaction fell again by a third to $345 million (Banco Central de Ecuador, 2014; 
2015). The above figures, raises two important questions, firstly why has the 
SUCRE mechanism not been used more widely amongst member states, and 
secondly why did the number and value of SUCRE transactions fall dramatically 
from 2013 onwards? With regards to the first issue, to put it simply the SUCRE 
mechanism was designed under the assumption that ALBA states involved possess 
goods that are needed by potential partners. This is simply not the case, therefore 
in reality the capacity of trade between members is limited by the competitive 
nature of individual economies, which in the case of ALBA member states generally 
produce commodities rather than consumer goods desired by other member states. 
Pearce (2018) has also noted, that the goods produced in ALBA states that are 
available for export, may also be restricted by other commitments to pre-existing 
regional and international trade agreements (Pearce, 2018). Furthermore, Cusack 
(2015) has also pointed out, that ALBA’s effort to encourage an increase in trade 
between member states has primarily focused on the People’s Trade Agreement 
(TCP), which although implemented, has not resulted in any significant increase or 
diversified trade between ALBA states effectively (Cusack, 2015). With regards to 
the second issue, the dramatic fall of SUCRE transactions and value since 2013, is 
not a result of a failure of the SUCRE system, rather it represents a reduction of 
total trade between Venezuela and Ecuador. Overall trade between the two 
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countries (Ecuadorian exports to Venezuela) represents ninety per cent of all 
SUCRE transactions, both the political insecurity Venezuela, resulting from the 
death of Hugo Chávez and its economic instability, which is a result of both a fall in 
global oil prices and its implementation of a poor and incoherent economic policy, 
all of which can be seen as factors, according to Pearce (2018), that are 
‘’responsible not only for stalling the system’s institutionalization, but also for this 
reduction in imports’’ (Pearce, 2018 p. 76). It is important to note, that the SUCRE 
purposely operates in opposition to neoliberal trading patterns, therefore, to 
assume that its use must experience growth year by year in order to be considered 
a successful mechanism, ‘’is to repeat the neoliberal myth of ever-increasing 
growth, yet if the pattern of recent years continues then trade via the system will 
quickly dwindle to nothing’’ (Pearce, 2018 p. 86). Although the SUCRE system 
represents an inclusive mechanism, which offers an avenue to support both small 
and medium-size enterprises that wish to enter into the regional market, larger 
private firms have dominant in the usage of the SUCRE. It a sense this was 
inevitable, as participating ALBA states domestic economies have remained largely 
capitalist despite their ideological disposition towards socialism.  Overall the faith 
of the SUCRE is undeniably tied to the political economy of Venezuela, which since 
2012/2013, has become extremely polarized, volatile and highly dependent on 
activities in the global commodity markets.  
GNEs can be seen as the final initiative that was established as part of ALBA’s push 
towards creating the economic zone of shared development. Created as part of 
ALBA’s ideological vision, according to Lubbock (2018), GNEs were ‘’conceived as 
the material manifestation of 21st-century socialism’s primary vehicle from 
combating capitalist relations of production’’ (Lubbock, 2018 p. 181). GNEs or 
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transnational state joint ventures were established in 2009 (although the GNE 
concept didn’t become a workable initiative until 2012) and are essentially mixed 
state enterprises, which emerged in opposition to development models that focus 
predominately on transnational corporations (TNCs) and open regionalism. 
Fundamentally, GNEs are state enterprises comprised of two or more ALBA 
member states that share ownership and focus on intra-ALBA trade. ALBA’s aim 
was to establish GNE’s in key sectors of member state societies in the hope that the 
enterprises would enhance productive capacity but also act as a mechanism for 
organizing production at a regional level (Aponte-Garca, 2011). Although from an 
ideological perspective, GNE’s represent a revolutionary ALBA initiative, that have 
the capacity to enhance trade and economic development within the ALBA space, in 
reality however, ‘’only some grand-national enterprises got off the ground while 
others floundered’’ (Cusack, 2018b p. 3).  As Aponte-Garcia (2011) notes, the 
success rate of a GNE is completely dependent on its association with the 
Venezuela economy but more specifically with the Venezuelan oil industry 
(Aponte-Garca, 2011). Considering the current economic and political fragility of 
Venezuela, it becomes troublingly apparent that the future of ALBA’s GNE’s is likely 
to be non-existent if the downward spiral of Venezuela continues.  
Overall the aforementioned has suggested that ALBA’s ambitions and ideological 
underpinnings, which have shaped and guided the regional alliance since its 
creation in 2004, have not entirely translated into tangible results. Although it must 
be noted, that ALBA as an Alternative (2004- 2005) ambition did in fact become a 
reality with the failure of the FTAA. However, ALBA as an Alliance (2005 - to 
present) while achieving some success with various social programmes in the early 
years has failed in its ideological drive towards creating a Patria Grande within 
 166 
Latin America. Essentially this failure is the result of ALBA’s inability to remain 
internally coherent and united with regards to governance and institutional 
structure. ALBA’s ambition with regards to creating a new regional financial 
architecture, although innovative and initially revolutionary, has only highlighted 
its inability to implement and follow through on its agreements. Although there are 
many reasons why ALBA’s various initiatives have failed to bring about the changes 
that the Alliance envisaged, fundamentally the Venezuelan economy lies at the 
centre. Every aspect of ALBA’s ambitious development of a new financial 
architecture for the region has been facilitated, funded and utilised primarily by 
Venezuela. Although participating member states have benefited from the various 
initiatives implemented under ALBA’s economic zone for shared development, it 
has become apparent that the various projects future as a whole is completely 
dependent on Venezuela’s ability to continue to finance them. Given the economic 
instability that Venezuela has experienced since 2012, the future of ALBA’s 
economic zone for shared development is uncertain. 
The following section will specifically look at ALBA’s relationship to Venezuela and 
determine whether the Alliance should be seen primarily as a form of Venezuela’s 
foreign policy. 
6.3 ALBA as a form of Venezuela’s foreign policy 
 
This section seeks to determine the extent that Venezuelan foreign policy has 
influenced ALBA. Given the current economic and political upheavals that the 
Maduro government is experiencing, this section’s primary objective is to 
determine how the deterioration of ALBA’s primary financial backer has affected 
the project’s ability to function and progress. In order to answer this question, this 
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work first discusses how Venezuela’s foreign policy has changed over time. It 
specifically examines the transition from the Chávez era to the Maduro era and 
determines the extent that its influence is in decline. It also explores how the 
influence of Venezuela within the alliance has affected its ability to attract more 
member-states as well as assesses the role that Petro-diplomacy has played within 
the Alliance.   
The predominant argument within academic literature on ALBA asserts that the 
regional integration bloc is used as a political tool for Venezuelan foreign policy 
(Cusack, 2018b ; De la Fuente 2011; Dominguez 2014; Jácome 2011). Since 
becoming a petro-state in the 1920s and a democracy in 1957 Venezuela, has had a 
very active and successful foreign policy. One of the reasons for Venezuela’s ability 
to pursue foreign policy objectives successfully has been its investment and 
innovations in diplomacy. To understand Venezuela’s influential and pioneering 
model in foreign policy, it is necessary to look at the various roles it has sought to 
pursue over the years as an international actor. Indeed, by the 1960s, Venezuela 
assumed a variety of identities, namely a western identity (as it self-identified with 
the exclusive club of western democracies), a Caribbean identity (which allowed it 
to closely align itself with Greater and Lesser Antilles), an Andean identity 
(committing itself to the advancement of its neighbours to the west), a third world 
identity (devoted to developing links with post-colonial regimes) and finally an 
integrationalist identity (committed to creating a union of Latin American nations, 
through ALBA and other endeavours). According to Dominguez (2014) Venezuela’s 
active pursuit of a multifaceted identity can be seen as an attempt to create and 
develop strong ties with various groups and regions (Dominguez, 2014). According 
to De la Fuente (2011), ALBA acts as the cornerstone of Bolivarian Venezuela’s 
 168 
foreign policy. He suggests that ALBA is the means by which Venezuela is 
attempting to situate itself as the ‘’leader of the anti-U.S. ideological agenda in Latin 
America and the Caribbean’’ (De la Fuente, 2011 p. 3). This desire to create an anti-
US ideological alliance has existed since the time of Simon Bolivar; however, it was 
not until the rise of Hugo Chávez that it started to gain momentum. The rise of the 
Left in Latin America in the 2000s and the evident aversion to the proposed FTAA 
culminated into the creation of an anti-US alternative regional project originally 
known as the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA). 
Although co-founded by Chávez and Castro, Venezuela has primarily been the 
driving force behind the regional integration bloc. Its economic weight and to a 
large extent the popularity of Chávez amongst the Latin American left, created the 
necessary links to make ALBA membership attractive.  From a critical perspective, 
its very creation exemplifies Chávez’s compulsion to establish a collective to 
counter the US. Building on the various identities Venezuela has developed since 
the 1960s, Chávez was able to gain support for ALBA membership from a variety of 
left-leaning states within the region and well as social movements operating across 
the region. Revenue generated by Venezuela’s considerable oil reserves allowed it 
to provide substantial economic assistance to both member and observer states 
and, through this, ALBA gained momentum. Working through ALBA, Venezuela has 
both pledged and given billions of dollars to ALBA member and observer member 
states in the form of economic assistance, ranging from preferential oil prices to a 
variety of Latin American economies via Petro-ALBA, to financing an array of social 
development projects across member states, via the ALBA fund. According to De la 
Fuente (2011), these various forms of economic assistance, carried out through 
ALBA, have enabled Venezuela to construct ‘’an alliance of support towards its 
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foreign policy positions, or at a minimum censor opposing viewpoints’’ (De la 
Fuente, 2011 p. 3). 
Even prior to Chavez, Venezuela has had a tradition of acquiring political capital in 
exchange for economic aid. It is well documented that Venezuela used its oil wealth 
during the 1970s to pursue a foreign policy agenda designed to propel the state 
into a leadership role within the region. This was evident under President Carlos 
Andrés Perez (1974-1979) with Venezuela’s role in helping to create OPEC, which 
in turn, allowed Venezuela to increase its influence both regionally and 
internationally after the 1973 and 1979 oil crises. In addition, the San José Oil 
Agreement (1980) has also been cited as an agreement that was created in order to 
enhance Venezuelan influence in the region. Under the agreement, both Venezuela 
and Mexico supplied cheap oil to eleven Caribbean countries, along with financing 
and technical expertise for infrastructure projects. Similarities can be drawn from 
the San José Oil agreement, Petrocaribe as well as Petro-ALBA, as each ‘’defines 
itself as an element of Venezuela’s foreign policy which seeks to displace 
multinationals from the region and create a focal point for development within the 
framework of a geopolitical position’’ (Jácome, 2011 p. 5). According to Jácome 
(2011), with the aforementioned taken into account, each oil based development 
initiative has sought to transform Central and South America as well as the 
Caribbean into an integrated negotiating bloc along with Venezuela, whose purpose 
within the bloc has been to act as a bridge for developing ‘’strategic alliances 
between this bloc’s members and China, Russia, and other friendly countries’’ 
(Jácome, 2011 p. 5). Venezuela does not dispute that it has an anti-imperialist 
foreign policy agenda; this is evident in the Venezuelan constitution of 1999 along 
with featuring in two successive national development plans (2001, 2007).  As 
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Muhr (2010) notes, the 1999 constitution as well as the successive national 
development plans obliged the Venezuelan government to pursue  
Latin American and Caribbean integration guided by the normative 
imperatives of solidarity, peaceful cooperation between equal states, 
complementarity and social justice, in the form of a community of 
nations with a common foreign and defence policy, for regional 
sovereignty, the democratization of the international society, and the 
construction of a multi-polar world order to achieve an international 
equilibrium (Muhr, 2010 p. 613).   
Strategies for achieving this goal, according to Muhr (2010), include over-turning 
the conventional concentration of power that exists within international 
organisations through “concerted action by the developing countries” (Muhr, 2010), 
redefining the objectives and ambitions of Mercosur, promoting ‘’protagonist 
participatory democracy’’ at the global level (Muhr, 2010 p. 613).  According to De 
la Fuente (2011), Venezuela’s development agenda has been activated at a regional 
level via ALBA. He suggests that Venezuela uses ALBA primarily as a political 
instrument that ‘’forms part of a concerted strategic effort to counter U.S. influence 
in the region’’ (De la Fuente, 2011 pp. 4-5). Unquestionably a strong ideological 
alliance has been constructed through ALBA, one that promotes solidarity, 
autonomous development, equality and sovereignty. With this considered, how has 
Venezuela’s strong presence within ALBA affected the regional bloc? In order to 
answer this question Venezuela’s impact on ALBA needs to be looked at in two 
phases. The first phase will look at the influence of Chávez within ALBA and the 
wider Latin American region (2004- 2013). The second will specifically look at 
ALBA in the post-Chávez era (2013- presently). As already stated above, one of the 
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main draws for membership of ALBA has been ideological. The stated objectives 
and aims of ALBA have been evidently appealing to left-leaning states across the 
region. Likewise, Venezuela’s vast oil wealth and generosity to member states, has 
slowly but surely allowed the integration bloc to grow from two members in 2004 
to eleven in 2014. However, considering the positive gains from membership, why 
has ALBA been unable to attract more countries to join? Although there may be 
several reasons for ALBA’s inability to expand, one of the most compelling 
arguments suggests that, contrary to the belief that Chávez and his ideological 
position acted as a lure for membership, his dominant role within ALBA and his 
vocal rejection of the Latin American right may have had the opposite effect. The 
2006 Peruvian presidential campaign illustrates this argument, when Chávez 
backed left-leaning candidate Ollanta Humala was defeated by right-leaning 
candidate Alan Garcia. In part, Garcia’s campaign gained popularity amongst the 
masses when he framed Chávez’s support of the opposition as a form of 
intervention. Chávez’s support of Humala directly had a negative effect on the 
outcome of the election but his involvement in the Peruvian elections also lead to 
increasing tensions between himself and President Garcia. This was evident in 
Garcia’s lack of attendance at the 2007 energy summit held in Venezuela. Instead of 
attending, Garcia began to form an alternative coalition of Latin American states 
who all share a common dislike for Chávez-backed projects and instead favour 
initiatives that promote trade liberalization.  Dabéne (2018) has suggested that ‘’As 
a consequence, the sub-continent grew increasingly polarized between a group of 
countries keen to sign free trade agreements with the United States (Chile, Peru, 
Colombia) and those belonging to ALBA (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador)’’ (Dabéne, 
2018 p. 43). Likewise, in the 2006 Mexican presidential election, Chávez played an 
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active role. During the election, right-leaning candidate, Felipe Calderón, branded 
his leftist opponent, Lopez Obrador,  ‘’as an imitator and friend of Chávez, as 
intolerant and unstable as his supposed tutor’’ (Dabéne, 2018 pp. 44-45). In the 
years that followed, ideological proximity to both ALBA and Chávez was used to 
vilify many leftist candidates and, in some cases, it was used to destabilize elected 
presidents, as was the case with Honduran president Manuel Zelaya. According to 
Dabène (2018), in 2009 President Zelaya was ousted because Honduras became a 
member of ALBA. Although the official motive for his ousting was his attempted re-
write of the constitution, which allowed for multiple re-elections, according to 
Dabène (2018), his political affiliation with the left and particularly in relation to 
both Chávez and ALBA ‘’threatened many powerful interests in his country’’ 
(Dabéne, 2018 p. 45). However, close affiliation with both Chávez and ALBA was 
not always unwelcomed. In Bolivia, ALBA’s cooperation schemes and redistributive 
policies were embraced, particularly in underdeveloped areas and ‘’local politicians 
were keen to appear in press reports with Cuban doctors’’ (Dabéne, 2018 p. 45).     
Although the aforementioned has suggested Chávez’s active political support for 
left-leaning politicians very often acted as a detrimental factor, causing many to 
lose elections, his activism also had a positive effect in both Ecuador and Bolivia. 
Here, what I draw from this, is that support from Chávez, had more of a positive 
outcome if the degree of left (radical left) within a particular country was more 
aligned with Venezuela.  
Politics aside, how else can one explain ALBA’s inability to attract bigger countries 
within the region? For many countries, the risks outweighed the benefits. ALBA is 
anti-imperialist by nature, regardless of its merits and offer of cheap subsidized oil; 
therefore, to become a member equates to choosing a side.  Thus, for larger, 
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wealthier countries, joining ALBA meant closing yourself off to the possibility of 
new trade deals with the US. Although it must be said that this draw back did not 
affect many Caribbean countries from joining the regional bloc, Dabène (2018) has 
suggested that their involvement in ALBA was largely due to their interest in the 
Petrocaribe agreement, which offered cheap oil imports from Venezuela (Dabéne, 
2018). However, of the eighteen members of Petrocaribe only six are members of 
ALBA. In an interview conducted by Dabène (2018) with President Leonal 
Fernández of the Dominican Republic, he states, contrary to expectation of his-
petro diplomacy, Chávez did not pressurize non-ALBA members to join ALBA with 
the use of cheap oil in exchange for political support.  According to President 
Fernández, Chávez knew that some Caribbean states could not and would not put 
at risk their relations with the US by joining such an anti-imperialist Bloc. The non-
political nature of Petrocaribe made joining ALBA irrelevant for many Caribbean 
states as Chávez offered cheap oil imports through this program at no political cost 
to the recipient. To an extent, the very existence of Petrocaribe has weakened 
ALBA’s capacity to attract new-member states. The Honduras’ case exemplifies this. 
After the coup, Honduras left both Petrocaribe and ALBA ‘’as a display of political 
rejection of Bolivarianism’’(Dabéne, 2018 p. 45). However, in 2012, the country re-
joined Petrocaribe but not ALBA. This demonstrates that, firstly, the two alliances 
are separate entities and, secondly, Petrocaribe’s non-political nature makes it 
more enticing for oil-deprived countries.  With that said, the ideological 
foundations that ALBA is built on, has made joining the alternative regional 
integration bloc attractive to some Latin American countries. As Kellogg (2007) has 
suggested, ALBA ‘’has become synonymous with the radical reforms underway in 
Venezuela and a symbol of the hopes for radical transformation that have emerged 
 174 
with the move Left in Latin America as a whole’’ (Kellogg, 2007 p. 200). Although, it 
is important to note, that the political ideology between member-states varies to a 
degree, depending on whether they reside left, centre of left or far left, reflects how 
active a particular member state is within ALBA. ALBA allows for this; being a 
member does not necessarily mean you need vocally reject or sever ties with the 
US or any other open regionalist project you may be a part of.  Regardless of 
Chávez’s history of political activism within the region, upholding sovereignty and 
non-intervention is a defining element of ALBA’s overall objectives. These non-
invasive goals coupled with ALBA’s unique approach to integration and 
development undoubtedly made joining attractive at least for some. Furthermore, 
Venezuela’s centrality to ALBA is in no way unique or surprising. Within Latin 
America, other competing regional blocs, most notably Mercosur and UNASUR, 
have very similar power structures. In the UNASUR case, Brazil plays a dominant 
role and with the Mercosur case, both Brazil and Argentina generally oversee the 
bloc’s activities. The point is here, that, in general, wealthier member-states within 
a regional bloc formation tend to direct or at the very least, financially back the 
activities of said regional bloc. Although ALBA’s aspirations and the way it has 
attempted to integrate has made it a unique regional bloc, Venezuela’s position 
within the project is not. However, March 2013 marked a turning point for 
Venezuela and its role within ALBA. The deterioration of Chávez’s health and 
eventual death had an enormous impact on the political dynamics of Venezuela and 
on ALBA, both politically and economically. Domestically, since Chávez’s death, 
cracks began to appear across the economic sphere in Venezuela, cash-flow 
problems stemming from a volatile and over-valued currency and high inflation 
had a knock-on effect on imports, investment commitments both domestically and 
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abroad and public services domestically. Politically speaking, the loss of 
Venezuela’s charismatic leader, even with Chávez handpicking Nicolas Maduro as 
his successor, has made maintaining political power increasingly difficult 
considering the rise of an increasingly violent opposition. This coupled with the 
collapse of oil prices in late 2014 and a poor economic performance all round, has 
even further exacerbated the Maduro government’s stability and political future. 
Consequently, ALBA is no longer a priority for the Venezuela government, whose 
domestic issues have become increasingly more volatile over the last few years. 
Puente (2018) has gone so far as to suggest that, ‘’The Venezuelan oil basket has 
since bottomed out its lowest price since 2003 –averaging $35.15 per barrel in 
2016 – deepening the country’s economic and political crisis and jeopardizing the 
resources that have underwritten much of ALBA’s progress to date’’ (Puente, 2018 
p. 195).  Interestingly, there is no evidence to suggest that Venezuela’s economic 
downturn is the result of falling oil prices, rather the Bolivarian state’s poor 
performance in terms of shortages, economic activity and inflation began in early 
2014 when the price for oil was still high - $88.4. Puente (2018) has suggested that 
Venezuela’s economic deterioration was brought about by a very poor and 
incoherent economic policy, which in turn, caused a hard reduction in production 
factors, despite the relatively high oil prices. Venezuela’s disjointed economic 
policy ‘’was characterized by an inflexible foreign exchange strategy, the 
subsequent appreciation of the exchange rate, the resulting boom in imports at the 
cost of local trade capacity, a climate of hyper regulation, price controls, systematic 
expropriations and more’’ (Puente, 2018 p. 201). This domestic situation, coupled 
with Venezuela’s external debt, has exacerbated the country’s ability to stay afloat. 
Domestically it has resulted in a double crisis, both economic and political. What is 
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more, the continuation of this downward spiral of economic instability and political 
uncertainty has and will continue to have a negative impact on ALBA and all its 
initiatives. As already discussed, Venezuela has bankrolled all of ALBA’s projects. 
Although it is impossible to determine the exact amount of money Venezuela has 
provided for various ALBA projects, Hirst (2011) has suggested that government 
statistics on preferential oil sales alone put Venezuelan contributions at over $20 
billon (Hirst, 2011). Given the current situation in Venezuela and its unlikely 
turnaround under the current government, it seems very unlikely that Venezuela 
will be able to continue to provide the lion’s share of aid for ALBA.  In an interview 
conducted with Mr. Alfonso D’Santiago, the head of the economic division at the 
Venezuelan embassy in London, he states that, while ALBA’s successes are still 
evident ‘’the financial weight of projects is not distributed equally. Venezuela 
contributes the most. Some have said too much’’ (D’Santiago 2017).  He goes on to 
suggest that, if the regional integration project is to progress, ‘’other countries will 
have to step up and help more to finance ALBA projects’’ (D’Santiago 2017). This 
interview was conducted in 2017 prior to the current crisis. With this considered 
Cusack (2018) has suggested that no other ALBA member state ‘’has the weight nor 
the will to prevent its stagnation’’ (Cusack, 2018b p. 5). Cusack (2018) goes on to 
explain that, of the larger ALBA member states – Cuba, Ecuador and Bolivia – none 
seem too concerned with ALBA’s future. He suggests that Cuba is more concerned 
with strengthening ties with the US, while both Ecuador and Bolivia, who have both 
suffered from an oil price shock as well as a mounting opposition in their 
respective countries, have turned their attention to Mercosur. Interestingly, in a 
preliminary telephone interview conducted with the Ecuadorian embassy in 
London in late 2017 (prior to the current crisis), when I asked a communications 
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advisor what Ecuador’s position on ALBA was, he stated that, ‘’ALBA was not a 
priority for Ecuador, we are more concerned with the bigger regional projects, like 
Mercosur’’ (Anonymous 2017). Ecuador’s disinterest in ALBA became even more 
apparent with the election of Lenin Moreno, who subsequently withdrew from the 
regional bloc in 2018. 
Surprisingly, there have been some positive gains in relation to membership in 
recent years. The Eastern Caribbean countries Grenada, St Lucia and St Kitts and 
Nevis have all become full ALBA members. The following section will specifically 
look at the Caribbean’s role in ALBA. It will mainly focus on why some states within 
that region have joined ALBA irrespective of their membership to Petrocaribe. It 
will also look at their respective roles within ALBA and determine the level of 
agreement and compliance with ALBA’s overall objectives. 
6.4 Understanding the Caribbean’s place within ALBA 
 
Considering that one-third of ALBA member states are made up of Caribbean 
microstates - Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines and Grenada - analyses of these states participation in ALBA has been 
largely neglected. All too often, ALBA’s dominant and more ‘influential’ states, such 
as Venezuela and Cuba, have taken centre stage with regards to an in-depth 
analysis of the bloc. As Cusack (2018) has pointed out, of the academic research 
carried out on ALBA, “Eastern Caribbean participation is presumed variously to be 
unimportant, analogous, coerced, or instrumental, yet few in-depth studies 
focusing on the states involved provide significant correctives to all of these 
assumptions’’ (Cusack, 2018c p. 115). He suggests that the underlying problem 
with existing research on the Caribbean, particularly the Anglophone Caribbean 
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role within ALBA, is that the roots and results of its membership structure have 
been assumed more often than analysed. The natural focus of the majority of 
literature conducted on the Alliance has tended to focus on big themes - anti-
neoliberal, counter-hegemonic, post-liberal regionalism - centred on the larger of 
the ALBA member states or the Alliance as a whole, and as a result the Caribbean 
member-states’ place within ALBA has been all too often overlooked and under-
researched or assumed as passive subjects of Venezuelan foreign policy objectives. 
However, considering, as Norman Girvan (2011) has suggested, that the 
development of relations between several Caribbean states and Venezuelan-
centred ALBA and Petrocaribe “is one of the most significant recent developments 
in regional affairs’’ (Girvan, 2011 p. 157), an analysis of the Caribbean’s role within 
ALBA is important. With this in mind, the focus of this section will be to assess the 
Caribbean microstates’ place within ALBA. This section will also determine the 
extent that their inclusion in ALBA is ideologically based, as some of the Caribbean 
member states are prominent tax havens, which in essence completely contradicts 
ALBA as a socialist project.  It begins by explaining why some Caribbean states 
decided to join ALBA. It then examines the extent that Caribbean accession to ALBA 
is financially and to some extent politically strategic. Finally, it will conclude with 
an investigation into the level of ideological compatibility between Caribbean 
member states and ALBA’s overall objectives.  
The emergence of ALBA and Petrocaribe in Latin America has coincided with 
several other important regional developments, namely, the rise of Brazil as a 
regional hegemon via UNASUR, and the creation and development of new Southern 
agreements and institutions. Both Kellogg (2007) and Girvan (2011) have 
suggested that these trends, along with the creation of the Bank of the South, 
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UNASUR, as well as other Latin American based initiatives reflect a rise in Southern 
influence and economic weight. Furthermore, according to Fridell (2015) “The 
traditional hegemony of the United States, the World Bank, and the IMF, has been 
diminished in recent years by these trends’’ (Fridell, 2015 p. 219). With these 
recent developments in Latin America considered, Fridell (2015) has suggested 
that while traditional North-South non-reciprocal trade and commitment to  
“special and differential treatment” have diminished, Caribbean states have 
increasingly become engaged in a number of new South-South projects (Fridell, 
2015). One of the most significant has been the Caribbean’s involvement in both 
ALBA, which was launched in 2004, and Petrocaribe, which was launched in 2005, 
by Venezuela, which gives eighteen Caribbean states preferential oil sales. For 
Norman Girvan (2011), the creation and development of both projects should be 
seen as part of a much larger “process marked by a relative decline in U.S. power 
and the emergence of new geo-economic poles of influence” (Girvan, 2011 p. 218). 
With the aforementioned considered, what factors specifically have led some 
Caribbean states to join ALBA? As already mentioned, Venezuelan centred 
Petrocaribe has provided an energy lifeline for the Caribbean. Of considerable 
importance, becoming members of Petrocaribe means that Caribbean states have 
not needed to join ALBA in order to gain preferential access to Venezuelan oil. So 
why is one third of ALBA member states made up of Caribbean microstates? It is in 
the opinion of this work that the driving force behind Caribbean accession to ALBA 
is purposely instrumental, given the structural and financial constraints that that 
are closely associated with small island economies, ALBA, via concessional financial 
assistance, in the form of loans and grants, offers participating Caribbean 
governments’ both fiscal and policy leeway, allowing them to direct funding into 
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areas where they themselves deem necessary. In a 2017 interview conducted with 
Venezuelan ambassador for Antigua and Barbuda, Carlos Amador Perez Silva, he 
points out, “Right now, it is interesting because there are more Caribbean states in 
ALBA than Latin American members. It seems the ALBA has had an important 
repercussion in the Caribbean’’ (Silva 2017). Although in agreement with Silva, that 
ALBA has had an important impact on the Caribbean, this work finds that the 
importance of ALBA in the Caribbean is primarily driven by its non-interference 
objective, which has in turn, allowed its Caribbean member states to explore 
alternative avenues to develop without the traditional external supervision. 
However, the ALBA/Caribbean relationship works both ways.  In an interview 
conducted in 2017 with Dr Philbert Aaron, the Dominican ambassador to 
Venezuelan and the national coordinator of ALBA, he suggested that ALBA first and 
foremost is an ‘’organisation of solidarity for the region’’ which aligns two areas 
under one organisation. He stated that, historically the region was broken up by 
colonialism and ALBA has sought to improve ties between Latin America and the 
Caribbean by breaking down barriers (Aaron 2017). While this work does not 
dispute ALBA’s inclusionary intensions, it does however view the Alliance’s 
expansion into the Caribbean as strategic.  By expanding into the Caribbean, the 
Alliance has been able to enhance its foothold in the region. Strengthening an 
alliance that has the capacity to challenge the status quo while simultaneously 
building a non-invasive relationship with the Caribbean, allowing ALBA to softly 
undermine the US’s position within the region. 
To some extent, the Caribbean member states that have joined ALBA share 
Venezuela’s counter-hegemonic objective of reducing the United States’ degree of 
influence over their internal affairs.  Fridell (2015) has suggested, that rather than 
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continuing to be used as ‘pawns of hemispheric geopolitics or aid beneficiaries’, the 
Caribbean member states of ALBA should be considered “As willing partners in a 
consciously asymmetric south-south arrangement that provides them with fiscal 
and policy leeway to explore development alternatives of their own choosing’’ 
(Fridell, 2015 p. 221).  Petrocaribe was initiated a year after ALBA emerged. Rather 
than serving as an alternative to ALBA, Petrocaribe can be seen as a means to 
support some of ALBA’s ideological objectives by reducing the participating states’ 
dependence on the American economy. It can also be seen as a monumental South-
South initiative, which allows eighteen Caribbean states to purchase oil from 
Venezuela under the terms of preferential credit and low interest rate loans. In an 
interview conducted with Marcos Garcia (2017) the first secretary at the 
Venezuelan embassy in London, he stated, that Petrocaribe was born out of 
necessity. The Caribbean microstates “were without any kind of resources to deal 
with international cooperation in the energy sector so ALBA developed a project at 
that level (Petrocaribe)’’ (Garcia, 2017), in an attempt to propagate these small 
island economies via development initiatives brought about through Petrocaribe. 
Furthermore, he stated, that Petrocaribe is unique as it is an initiative that does not 
negatively affect the interests of any state within the region, rather it helps 
‘’Caribbean countries to solve a huge problem they were facing’’ (Garcia 2017). 
According to Garcia, Petrocaribe provided an avenue by which the Caribbean we 
able to use the agreement as a mechanism to buffer external oil price shocks and 
direct funds towards development projects.  
The initiative can also be seen as a dominant source of concessional loans and 
grants, which are often used to finance a wide variety of development initiatives 
and projects directed at providing technical assistance as well as economic and 
 182 
social infrastructure. Combined with funds from ALBA, according to Fridell (2015) 
“the two have become among the largest source of concessional financing in the 
Caribbean’’ (Fridell, 2015 p. 221). Furthermore, as Girvan (2011) has suggested, 
the combination of the two initiatives for the Caribbean should be seen as highly 
significant, especially if one considers the Petrocaribe/ALBA funds largely lack the 
demands and requirements closely associated with official development assistance 
from traditional donors such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the US as well as the EU, all of whom, generally require stringent neoliberal 
adjustments (Girvan, 2011). 
In contrast to traditional development assistance, Petrocaribe/ALBA financial 
assistance actively seeks to avoid direct intervention in all member states’ 
domestic policy and political priorities.  In direct contrast to the often-rigid 
conditions generally associated with free trade agreements (FTAs), both ALBA and 
Petrocaribe agreements are intentionally designed to foster loose bilateral and or 
multilateral commitments, which is unsurprisingly an attractive element for 
membership. As Fridell (2015) has suggested, both initiatives are flexible in nature, 
which has allowed member states to decide on the terms of arrangements on a 
case-by-case basis, ‘’and frequently pay attention to “special and differential 
treatment” considering both members political and economic capacities’’ (Fridell, 
2015 p. 221).     
In the same light, Girvan (2011) has suggested, that ALBA and Petrocaribe’s 
flexibility has meant that neither agreement legally binds member states under 
international treaty law nor do they formally conflict with any other regional or 
international commitments, such as those associated with CARICOM (the Caribbean 
Community) membership (Girvan, 2011).  While it is evident that Petrocaribe has 
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been beneficial for many Caribbean states, it is in the opinion of this work that the 
initiative served as a strategic gateway project for ALBA. The non-political nature 
of Petrocaribe and the financial and development gains it offers, has resulted in an 
unconventional alliance between eighteen Caribbean states, that fall on both left 
and right of the political spectrum and Venezuela- a radical leftist state.  Prior to 
Petrocaribe’s establishment in 2005, no Caribbean state was a member of ALBA, 
however one third of ALBA is now made up of Caribbean microstates. Just as ALBA 
has used Petrocaribe to build and strengthen relationships in the Caribbean, at the 
expense of the US, the Caribbean micro-states have strategically placed themselves 
in a position where they can benefit from Petrocaribe and in some cases, both 
initiatives, without binding themselves to an ideology that has the potential of 
damaging relations with the US and other western nations and institutions.  
However, it is important to note that neither the positive attributes nor benefits 
obtained through membership of ALBA and/or Petrocaribe can liberate the 
Caribbean microstates from the challenges associated with having vulnerable 
economies or the need to operate in a global economy that is dominated by vastly 
more powerful states. According to Kapoor (2008), these dominant states – both 
North and South – often present non-reciprocal financial assistance as free ‘gifts’; 
however, these free ‘gifts’ consistently increase the coercive power of the donor 
and often involve indirect forms of repayment or obligation which frequently, 
within the global arena, involves an array of economic and diplomatic concessions 
(Kapoor, 2008). In line with Kapoor’s (2008) argument, the Caribbean member 
states of ALBA and Petrocaribe invariably enhance the influence of Venezuela along 
with other ALBA member states over them. However, Fridell (2015) has 
interestingly suggested that, while Kapoor’s (2008) argument is valid, the intent of 
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Venezuela’s ideological assertiveness and role within ALBA and Petrocaribe plays 
out in a somewhat different way: 
Alongside international cooperation, ALBA members have their own 
statecraft needs centrally in mind, which include the desire to build 
and strengthen alliances with Southern governments on the basis of 
common interests, encourage the emergence of a “multipolar” world 
with enhanced political clout for Southern blocs, confront deeply-
entrenched economic and technological dependence on the North, 
and stymie attempts by the US and other imperial powers to isolate 
them economically and politically (Fridell, 2015 pp. 222-223).  
While the merits of the Alliance’s objectives to build and strengthen the Southern 
bloc’s position within the global economy is noteworthy, the Caribbean’s role with 
regards to this ambition is minimal at best, especially if one considers Venezuela’s 
ideological centrality to ALBA.  The Caribbean’s minimal engagement can also be 
explained, at least to some extent, by a lack of ideological alignment. Antigua and 
Barbuda can be used as a prime example here, as it is a tax haven, in this way its 
membership is contradictory to the Alliance as an ideological project, as it goes 
against ALBA ideological underpinnings as a socialist project. Nevertheless, despite 
the evident power imbalances that exist between ALBA and Petrocaribe members, 
it would be incorrect to view the Caribbean microstates as having ‘no geostrategic 
cards to play’. Although many have noted that the Caribbean states often fall into 
the category of ‘vulnerable’, Fridell (2015) has suggested that these small island 
economies can and should be seen as “highly resilient, adapting strategies that can 
“resist” and “reshape” wider structural forces through careful foreign and domestic 
policy choices’’ (Fridell, 2015 p. 223). According to Cooper (2013), in relation to 
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ALBA, Caribbean member states have been able to draw on their long history of 
leveraging the main features of the Westphalian system in their favour, thus 
capitalizing on international norms which assigns one vote and one seat to a single 
sovereign states (Cooper, 2013). Hence, while the combined population of the 
Caribbean member states of ALBA only represents 0.6% of the overall population 
of ALBA member states, the Caribbean constitutes one third of ALBA membership 
overall. According to Fridell (2015), as a result of becoming members of ALBA, the 
participating Caribbean states have been given an important political chip, which 
has allowed the microstates to increase their leverage over the larger members, 
which in turn, ensures the free flow of financial assistance in return for 
participation, to some extent, the “Caribbean members must now be kept content 
to avoid a major diplomatic embarrassment should one decide or threaten to pull 
out’’(Fridell, 2015 p. 224).    
Another important aspect of Caribbean membership of ALBA that must be 
considered when attempting to understand its dynamics, is the attractive 
alternative ALBA offers to members. Although the Alliance cannot ultimately offset 
the geostrategic interests of its Caribbean member states, it does offer ‘alternative 
visions’ of how unequal inter-state relations can be managed in a more 
economically and politically balanced and more socially efficient way (Fridell, 
2015).  In this way, ALBA can be seen as one of the most distinctly unique and 
conscious alternatives to FTAs. FTAs are generally framed around objectives that 
promote privatization, deregulation and reciprocal liberalisation, whereas ALBA, 
according to Girvan (2011) is framed around the prioritisation of social goals 
through cooperation, in an attempt to meet basic needs of member states, in areas 
such as education and health care, while simultaneously acknowledging the 
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necessity of non-reciprocal trading agreements between asymmetrical partners via 
concessional financing and preferential trade (Girvan, 2011). Furthermore, Paul 
Kellogg (2007) has pointed out,  “where traditional trade deals use language like 
‘comparative advantage,’ ALBA instead argues, ‘the political, social, economic and 
legal asymmetries of both countries have been taken into account” (Kellogg, 2007 p. 
201). In this way ALBA’s distinct alternative has allowed for its Caribbean member 
states’ individual needs to be addressed. National development plans are 
prioritized and financed through this non-reciprocity mechanism, allowing 
Caribbean member-state governments to allocate resources to development 
initiatives where they deem necessary. In comparison, ALBA, in this way, explicitly 
symbolizes a political advancement over the previous EU-Caribbean preferential 
agreement, which offered Caribbean states only a consultative role within the EU 
financed project. ALBA has created the necessary environment, which has allowed 
for greater autonomy of its Caribbean member states. Non-reciprocal treatment 
under ALBA, does not equate to unequal political status, as all members regardless 
of size, have officially the same status in relation to governing Social, Economic and 
Political Councils within the Alliance. However, this supposed status equality that 
exists within the various ALBA Councils does not erase the very real geopolitical 
inequalities that exist between the Caribbean microstates and the larger wealthier 
South American member states of ALBA, particularly Venezuela, the primary 
funder of all ALBA projects within the Caribbean. Regardless, inequality between 
member states within regional integration bloc is not unique to ALBA. What makes 
ALBA different is that several projects that have been initiated under ALBA have 
been designed in such a way that cooperation and the objective of strengthening 
South-South relations have been prioritized over competition, “even in areas where 
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market dynamics themselves would otherwise impose competitive behaviour’’ 
(Fridell, 2015 p. 224). One such example is an ALBA initiated coffee enterprise, 
which involved Venezuela and Dominica. In 2009, Venezuela via ALBA financed a 
coffee processing plant in Dominica in an attempt to help offset the island’s failing 
banana industry. Although Venezuela at that time was intensifying its efforts to 
promote its own coffee in regional markets, it encouraged and financed - via ALBA - 
Dominica’s coffee industry, with the stated intention of developing a joint venture 
under ALBA’s GNP targeted at the Latin American market.  
Although the project is still in its infancy and is certainly no panacea for 
development, as it evidently encourages dependence on unstable commodity 
markets, ALBA has offered Dominica and its failing banana industry a lifeline, an 
avenue by which has given Dominican farmers a more solid and stable market. 
Furthermore, because ALBA has financed a processing plant on the island, it means 
Dominica will be able to roast the beans on site, typically this stage of production is 
reserved for Northern-based companies (Fridell, 2015). 
According to Lebowitz (2006), ALBA has attempted to facilitate the prioritisation of 
human development alongside economic growth - this is evident with its active 
support for such things as public infrastructure, education and health as necessary 
elements for facilitating long-term economic and social development (Lebowitz, 
2006). Under the guidance of Prime Minister Ralph Gonzalves, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines (SVG) has pursued a social democratic model, which has enhanced 
public spending in an attempt to tackle the ongoing effects of the global recession, 
high unemployment and a failing banana industry (Payne, 2006). According to 
Fridell (2015), in an attempt to tackle the aforementioned issues the SVG 
government has promoted construction and service jobs along with developing 
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numerous significant social programs, such as the construction of hundreds of low-
income houses and offering support for public employees to buy their own homes 
or distributing free antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) across the wider community. The 
government has also pursued an extensive public education initiative, spending in 
the region of $1.5 billion over a ten year timeframe (2001-2011) to expand schools 
and teacher training which has resulted, according to Fridell (2015) in universal 
secondary education on the island and a rise in primary school teachers with a 
university degree from four in 2001 to five hundred in 2011 (Fridell, 2015). 
Although SVG’s social spending is in line with one of ALBA’s core objectives, the 
alliance cannot be seen as the prominent agent which led the island to pursue such 
social reforms. Rather, it must be noted that the social reforms carried out in SVG 
where “driven by their own internal political logic and social dynamics’’ (Fridell, 
2015 p. 227). Furthermore, it is evident that, since the 1960s, most of the 
Caribbean has pursued major public sector expansions. According to Bulmer-
Thomas (2012), although the pursuit of these projects has contributed to“deficit 
and debt crisis in many instances due to insufficient tax collection to cover new 
costs, [they] have led to major gains in education, health care, housing, social 
services, and infrastructure’’ (Bulmer-Thomas, 2012 p. 368).Globally, given their 
inherent vulnerability to international trade, small Caribbean islands, have an 
important history of pursuing unconventional economic strategies, such as offshore 
financial services as well as lobbying for preferential trade agreements such as 
those offered by both Petrocaribe and ALBA (Cooper, 2013). Recently, many 
Eastern Caribbean islands, after several years of neoliberal austerity have 
demonstrated what Anthony Payne (2006) has suggested, “a renewed interest in 
rethinking national development strategies” (Payne, 2006 p. 27). 
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It is the collective development and renewal of new social democratic governments 
across the Caribbean, governments with a revived dirigisme vision of state action 
that has laid the foundation for ALBA to emerge and not the other way around. For 
Caribbean microstates, the Alliance fundamentally provides additional policy space 
for small economies in the Eastern Caribbean that has allowed their individual 
economies to pursue unconventional state projects. The alliance has also served a 
lifeline for Caribbean member states, in the form of diplomatic, economic and 
technical assistance, all of which has helped the various government efforts to 
“pursue countercyclical public spending and major investments in social and 
economic infrastructure in the context of a global economic recession and a real 
world economy offering little of the dynamic market-driven opportunities assumed 
to exist by the free trade package’’ (Fridell, 2015 pp. 227-228).  One of the most 
fundamental questions that arise when attempting to understand the Caribbean’s 
accession to ALBA is whether their membership signifies any real commitment to 
ALBA’s overall objective of creating a counter-hegemonic regional movement that 
can challenge both neoliberalism and US hegemony. It is in the opinion of this work, 
that the Caribbean member states of the Alliance do not share the same counter-
hegemonic disposition as their Latin American counter-parts, rather their 
commitment to the Alliance is more functionary, due to oil and the financial 
assistance attained through Petrocaribe and the ALBA fund for pro-poor 
development initiatives both of which aid in ensuring political popularity of the 
governments’ that roll out such initiatives with the help of ALBA funds. All too often 
the Alliance is seen as one unified body, whose members share the same ideological 
disposition and as a result the Caribbean’s ideological commitment to the Alliance 
is frequently assumed. Academic literature on ALBA has tended to favour analysis 
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of ALBA’s major, most vocal anti-neoliberal/US players –Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba – 
very few have chosen to carry out research specifically on ALBA’s Caribbean 
members. Norman Girvan (2010) and Asa Cusack (2018) make up the bulk of 
academics that have focused solely on attempting to understand the Caribbean’s 
accession to and role within ALBA.  This section will specifically focus on evaluating 
whether the Caribbean’s involvement in ALBA goes beyond the economic benefits 
closely associated with membership. It aims to determine the extent that ideology 
has played in solidifying the Caribbean’s place within the alliance.  
However, according to Cusack (2018) with any attempt to understand the Eastern 
Caribbean’s accession to ALBA in the 2000s, one must recognise the ideological 
restraints imposed by both the Caribbean region’s history and geography. This 
ideological constraint can be understood via two prominent viewpoints, which 
have been commonly expressed in the literature, “1) that vulnerability related to 
smallness leaves states desperate for resources from any source; and 2) that 
neoliberal globalisation enforced by US foreign policy had led to an ideological 
narrowing which militates against left-of-centre policies’’ (Cusack, 2018c p. 117). 
As Briguglio (1995) understands it, vulnerability associated with ‘smallness’, which 
is widely acknowledged within Caribbean centred academic literature, suggests 
that inward looking Caribbean micro states face specific constraints as small island 
developing states (SIDS), namely a very limited capacity for international influence, 
weak domestic finance, high transport costs, inefficient firms, limited natural 
resources, frequent natural disasters, small domestic markets, narrow export base, 
and a reliance on imports for consumption (Briguglio, 1995). All these factors make 
these Caribbean microstates extremely vulnerable to external shocks, commodity 
price fluctuations, and global demand. As Cusack (2018) points out, although in 
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general the literature on vulnerability and SIDs predominantly focuses on the 
economic effects, he suggests that there is a political correlation as well. He uses 
fiscal shortfall to illustrate his point, by pointing out that it often results in the 
erosion of public sector jobs which represents, in the case of the Caribbean, an 
unusually large proportion of employment overall. He goes on to suggest that with 
a decrease in investment both in relation to the private (predominately tourism) 
and the public (often infrastructure), the decline hits both “low-skilled 
employment’’ and the observable economic activity related to construction. 
“Irrespective of ideology, governments must balance the books to avoid politically 
lethal crises’’ (Cusack, 2018c p. 118). 
In relation to the second most common viewpoint, that of ideological narrowing, 
according to Cusack (2018), the US turn from communist ‘containment’ to ‘rollback’ 
in the 1980s under Regan “saw both carrot (the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 1982) 
and stick (structural adjustment) applied to any leftward shift’’ (Cusack, 2018c p. 
118). This US orchestrated strategy was so successful, according to Payne (1998), 
that the US managed to redesign “the agenda of Caribbean politics and economics 
to the point here, in almost every arena, it was able to lay down the parameters of 
what could be done and even what could be thought’’ (Payne, 1998 p. 210). In 1983, 
Marxist president Maurice Bishop of Grenada was removed from power; this US 
direct intervention illustrated the limits of tolerable ideology. According to Meeks 
(2014), the Soviet Union’s collapse along with Jamaica’s Prime Minister Michael 
Manley’s shift to the accommodation of international capital removed Jamaica’s 
various radical resistance models (Meeks, 2014). In addition to the above, rigid 
security centred governments, as well as domestic reforms imposed via 
international financial institutions, and a move from agriculture towards financial 
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services and tourism, allowed for the weakening of the union base of traditional 
labour parties (Meeks, 2014). The additional imposed neoliberal reforms resulted 
in the further reduction of fiscal revenue and only intensified the microstates’ 
vulnerability. The situation for the Caribbean was further exacerbated by the loss 
of the WTO’s preference regime for agricultural products (particularly bananas) as 
many Caribbean states, particularly the Eastern Caribbean were overly reliant on 
tariffs for tax revenues. However, where ALBA is concerned, there are significant 
caveats within the Caribbean region. Firstly, the physical smallness of the 
microstates, which is often associated with their vulnerability, has acted to amplify 
the political impact of initiatives in prioritized areas such as health, education and 
poverty reduction. Secondly, the ideological narrowing within the region should be 
considered as both externally imposed and relatively recent, rather than being seen 
as part of an internal shift, which independently developed over an extended 
period of time. As Cusack (2018) points out, many of those still involved in activism 
and politics at a senior level came up in the generation imbued in radicalism 
associated with the 1960s and 1970s. Although external restraints have 
increasingly restricted their policy options  
Neither ‘Comrade’ Ralph Gonsalves in St Vincent and the Grenadines 
nor veteran trade unionist Baldwin Spencer in Antigua and Barbuda, 
for example, has undergone any Damascene conversion. Rather, the 
array of structural factors tying their hands means that their true 
colours might only be glimpsed when circumstances allow fiscal 
room for maneuver (Cusack, 2018c p. 119).  
Although it is evident, particularly within the Eastern Caribbean, that 
vulnerabilities associated with smallness have tended to constrain the various 
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microstates’ development strategies, there is to an extent, a level of commonality 
between the policies rolled out by some governments wishing to join the Alliance 
and their Latin American partners in ALBA. According to Cusack (2018) with the 
cases of St Vincent and Grenadines, Dominica and Antigua and Barbuda’s accession 
to ALBA, there has been no indication of Venezuelan enforced socialism, be it 21st 
century or any other kind. Instead he suggests, that with these three cases, their 
respective left-leaning governments, regularly used foreign policy as their favoured 
mechanism for financing pro-poor development programmes “in a context of 
severe fiscal constraints, making state led, socially focused, solidaristic ALBA 
project a natural fit’’ (Cusack, 2018b p. 116). Such pro-poor development polices 
tend to rally support from the general population, which suggests that a roll out of 
such initiatives, although beneficial to the masses, can also be seen as being 
politically motivated, both from a domestic perspective and in relation to strategic 
foreign policy objectives as a means of gaining financial assistance from the alliance. 
With that being said, Cusack’s (2018) case study research on St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica has suggested that, with each case, 
the political accession of each left-leaning government came at a time when the 
Caribbean was being hit by deteriorating terms of trade, rising oil prices, and a 
‘post 9/11 war on tourism’. While it can be argued that there was indeed a retreat 
of US political influence within the region, which translated into a new degree of 
freedom of choice in International Relations, the economic conditions and severity 
meant that the level of political freedom remained, to a large extent, limited 
(Cusack, 2018b). The impact of this had a profound effect on the development 
strategies of each Eastern Caribbean state, and how they expressed their beliefs 
that underpinned them. In each case, instead of attempting to operate under a 
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totalizing ideology, each government focused on particular development priorities 
wherever conditions allowed them to do so. Nevertheless, the pursuit of such 
developmental priorities and pro-poor policies, even in the periphery of orthodox 
fiscal discipline, operated in conjunction with one of ALBA’s overall ambitions of 
creating equality amongst and within nations through pro-poor policies. 
Furthermore, as Cusack (2018) has pointed out, “Local visions of foreign policy as a 
means of supporting domestic development goals also chimed with the Alliance’s 
explicit allowance for special and differential treatment and central desire to 
strengthen a LAC pole in a newly multipolar world’’ (Cusack, 2018c p. 121). The 
conditionalities with receiving financial assistance for social development from 
ALBA funds are limited. In all three cases, the politically negotiated nature of their 
allocation meant that, in each case, the government was able to prioritize locally 
important issues such as infrastructure, healthcare and education. This local 
targeting, only amplified the disproportionality and visibility of these funds in a 
context of extreme smallness, this in turn gave ALBA an unusual degree of political 
impact, as it shored up incumbents’ support and ultimately led to opposition 
parties in Dominica and Antigua to row back on initial hostilities. It is important to 
note that, despite Venezuela’s alleged attempts to exert ideological influence across 
the region, the Caribbean ALBA member states, with the exception of Cuba, have 
not wholly supported or aligned themselves in a unified manner with the anti-
US/anti-imperialist sentiment promoted by Caracas. According to Jácome (2011), 
“They also have not echoed President Chávez’s militaristic approach to security and 
defence. In this respect, his main project for ALBA, namely the defence against 
imperialism and the need for a joint response to the threat of US aggression, has 
not resounded much among other countries’’ (Jácome, 2011 p. 4). At the 2009 7th 
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summit of ALBA, the ALBA Permanent Committee for Sovereignty and Defence was 
established. This committee had two central goals, 1- to define a Strategy for Joint 
Popular Defence and 2- to establish a School for Dignity and Sovereignty of Armed 
Forces. Although the latter was launched in Bolivia in 2011, it came at a cost. It 
became evident that cracks within the Alliance were beginning to appear with the 
creation of the ALBA defence school as many of the English-speaking Caribbean 
member states of ALBA aired their reservations about belonging to a regional 
security system. In part, the reservations expressed by the Alliance’s Caribbean 
member states signifies their unease with the possibility of destabilizing their 
relations with the US. Likewise, the proposed sovereignty and defence commitment, 
for many Caribbean member states, represented a blanket commitment that did 
not specifically deal with nor express an interest in tackling important areas that 
represent the main treats to Caribbean security, such as “organized crime, arms 
trafficking, drug trafficking, the effects of climate change, and HIV-AIDS’’, all of 
which, are not part of ALBA’s agenda (Jácome, 2011). 
While undoubtedly, membership of the Alliance has benefited the Caribbean, 
particularly in relation to financial assistance. Their involvement in the Alliance has 
not equated to a totalizing ideological commitment. Although ideological 
similarities are apparent to a small extent, the level commitment from Caribbean 
member states to ALBA’s overall objective in creating a counter-hegemonic 
regional movement to challenge the US and neoliberalism is non-existent. Rather, 
their alignment with the regional movement operates on a far more functionary 
platform. Access to ALBA funds, attained through membership has allowed the 
various Caribbean governments to roll out various development initiatives which 
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in turn plays well with voters and has helped alleviate some of the financial 
problems which have crippled the small island economies of the Caribbean. 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Overall this chapter has investigated the extent that ALBA has been able to move 
beyond an ideological alliance to produce a reality of change. In addition, it has 
sought to determine whether the emancipatory project, has been successful in its 
endeavour to reduce US involvement within the region.  It has concluded that with 
any attempt to analyse the success and failures of the Alliance, it is necessary to 
look at ALBA’s development in two distinct phases, from 2004-2005, which looks 
specifically at ALBA as an alternative, and from 2005 to its present form, which 
looks at its evolution, expansion and institutional and structural development.  It 
has concluded that ALBA cannot be seen as a viable counter-hegemonic project that 
seeks to challenge US-inspired neo-liberalism. Although it must be noted, that 
ALBA as an Alternative (2004- 2005) did in fact become a reality with the failure of 
the FTAA. ALBA as an Alliance (2005 - to present) however, while achieving some 
success with various social programmes in the early years has failed in its 
ideological drive towards creating a Patria Grande within Latin America. 
Essentially this failure is the result of ALBA’s inability to remain internally coherent 
and united with regards to governance and institutional structure. ALBA’s ambition 
with regards to creating a new regional financial architecture, although innovative 
and initially revolutionary, has only highlighted its inability to implement and 
follow through on its agreements. Although there are many reasons why ALBA’s 
various initiatives have failed to bring about the changes that the Alliance 
envisaged, fundamentally the Venezuelan economy lies at the centre. Every aspect 
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of ALBA’s grand development of a new financial architecture for the region has 
been facilitated, funded and utilised primarily by Venezuela. Although participating 
member states have benefited from the various initiatives implemented under 
ALBA’s economic zone for shared development, it has become apparent that the 
various projects future as a whole is completely dependent on Venezuela’s ability 
to continue to finance them. Given the economic instability that Venezuela has 
experienced since 2012, the future of ALBA’s economic zone for shared 
development is uncertain. 
The chapter then looked that the extent that Venezuelan foreign policy has 
influenced ALBA. It specifically wanted to determine how the deterioration of 
ALBA’s primary financial backer has affected the project’s ability to attracted 
members, considering the current economic and political upheavals that the 
Maduro government is presently experiencing. It suggested that since becoming a 
petro-state in the 1920s and a democracy in 1957, Venezuela has had a very active 
and successful foreign policy. Its ability to pursue foreign policy objectives 
successfully is a result of its active pursuit of a multifaceted identity, which has 
resulted in the development of strong ties with various groups and regions. This 
work has also suggested that ALBA has to a large extent become the cornerstone of 
Bolivarian Venezuela’s foreign policy and a means by which Venezuela is 
attempting to situate itself as the leader of the anti-U.S. ideological agenda in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. It has suggested that building on the various identities, 
Venezuela has developed since the 1960s, Chávez was able to gain support (backed 
by financial support) for ALBA membership from a variety of left-leaning states 
within the region and well as social movements operating across the region and 
construct an alliance of support towards its foreign policy positions, or at a 
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minimum censor opposing viewpoints. It then went on to determine how 
Venezuela’s strong presence within ALBA has affected the regional bloc. This was 
investigated in two phases, 2004-2013, which looked specifically at the influenced 
of Chávez within ALBA and the wider Latin American region (2004- 2013), and 
phase two, 2013 to present, which looked at ALBA in the Maduro era. This chapter 
has cited that the lack of membership expansion towards the end of the Chávez era 
can be explained by the charismatic leader dominance within ALBA, his vocal 
rejection of the Latin American right and his outspoken negative view on the US, 
which all contributed to a polarized Latin America. On one side you had a group of 
countries eager to sigh sign free trade agreements with the US and on the other you 
had those belonging to ALBA. Furthermore, Chávez’s active political support for 
left-leaning politicians very often acted as a detrimental factor, causing many to 
lose elections. It has also suggested that a lack of ALBA expansion can be explained 
by its strong ideological overtones, which meant in many instances, that the larger 
wealthier Latin American states as well as the smaller Caribbean economies were 
put in a position where they had to choose between closing themselves off to the 
possibility of new trade deals with the US or ALBA membership.  The chapter went 
on to look at how Chávez’s death impacted ALBA.  It looks at how domestically the 
loss of its charismatic leader coupled with political instability and economic 
uncertainty has underwritten much of ALBA’s progress to date. It also suggested 
that given the current financial constraints that the Maduro government finds itself 
in, it is unlikely that Venezuela will be able to continue to bank roll ALBA and its 
various initiatives nor will it be able to influence the direction of the regional 
project.   
Lastly this chapter attempted to understand the Caribbean’s place within ALBA. 
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It suggested that while undoubtedly; membership of the Alliance has benefited the 
Caribbean, particularly in relation to financial assistance. Their involvement in the 
Alliance has not equated to a totalizing ideological commitment. It was determined 
that although ideological similarities are apparent to a small extent, the level of 
commitment from Caribbean member states to ALBA’s overall objective in creating 
a counter-hegemonic regional movement to challenge the US and neoliberalism is 
non-existent. Rather, their alignment with the regional movement operates on a far 
more functionary platform.  It determined that the overarching reason for 
Caribbean accession to ALBA can be explained by its access to ALBA funds, attained 
through membership, which allowed the various Caribbean governments to roll out 
numerous development initiatives which in turn plays well with voters and has 
helped alleviate some of the financial problems which have crippled the small 













Chapter 7: Understanding ALBA’s demise and potential future 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Through the lens of critical International Political Economy (critical IPE), drawing 
on the work of Gramsci and Cox, this thesis sets out specifically, to determine the 
extent that ALBA can be viewed as a counter-hegemonic form of resistance that is 
engaged in a war of position against open regionalism, US hegemony and, by 
extension, neoliberalism.  According to Cox, a war of position is built on the 
principle of dialectics in critical theory, which opens up the revolutionary 
possibility through the development of a rival structure within the hegemonic 
super-structure “by seeking out” the counter-structures “possible bases of support 
and elements of cohesion” (Cox, 1981 p. 144).  In other words, a war of position 
allows for the natural erosion of consensual legitimacy that a current order has, 
while simultaneously building up a basis of consent for a new alternative society. 
With this considered, ALBA as a regional project represents this development of a 
rival structure, which since its creation, has attempted to erode the consensual 
legitimacy of the current US hegemony and neoliberal world order. Fitting with 
neo-Gramscian critical theory, ALBA in its early years evidently represented a 
pattern of development that corresponded with Cox’s understanding of a counter-
hegemonic movement engaged in a war of position, as its initial development 
involved an orchestrated attempt to restructure society from below. As already 
noted in chapter two, within a counter-hegemonic movement, a war of position 
attempts to critique the common sense but also seeks to go beyond this critique 
rather than re-embed it. He suggests that this is done by critical education that 
endeavours to move beyond the common sense’s ideological underpinnings to 
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reconstruct a collective will. The resulting reconstruction of the collective will 
enable a common ground on which a counter-hegemonic historic bloc can be 
established.  While ALBA falls short of a counter-hegemonic historic bloc, it was 
representative, at least in its early years, as a prime example of a counter-
hegemonic movement engaged in a war of position against the neoliberal historic 
bloc, which attempted to destabilize the US hegemonic super structure’s legitimacy 
and consent.  This was evident in ALBA’s first year, as it successfully engaged in a 
‘war of position’ against US hegemony when it defeated the proposed FTAA.  This 
triumphant moment allowed ALBA to gain consent amongst member states and 
prospective members as well as amongst the masses.  
ALBA’s development since then however, has not equated to the same kind of 
resistance it was once heralded for. Rather ALBA’s momentum and support has 
consistently deteriorated. While it is evident that ALBA attempted to implement 
the necessary building blocks - a new financial architecture via an ALBA Bank, a 
regional virtual currency via the SUCRE and an intra-ALBA trading system, along 
with Grand National programs and social programs - it has fallen short of 
maintaining the necessary conditions that could of potentially led to the creation of 
a viable rival structure. Understanding the extent that ALBA has failed to achieve its 
primary objective, both from a theoretical perspective and from a practical stance 
consists of three important elements. Firstly, it is necessary to investigate ALBA as 
a form of counter-hegemony with regards to the extent of its effectiveness and its 
potentialities or lack thereof; secondly, it will look at ALBA’s dysfunctional 
governance structure and incoherence and subsequent de-legitimisation, and 
lastly, it will look at various regional transformations, which have culminated in the 
demise of ALBA. 
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7.2 ALBA as a form of counter-hegemony/resistance: effectiveness and potentialities 
 
As illustrated in chapter three extensively, regionalism represents a strategy used 
by states or state/society complexes, to influence the very nature of the world 
order in pursuit of achieving their economic goals (Söderbaum and Shaw, 2004). In 
accordance with this understanding, ALBA’s form of regionalism was purposely 
designed to challenge both the neoliberal world order and US hegemony, however 
ALBA’s specific type of regionalism (counter-hegemonic/anti-neoliberal in nature), 
represents a move away from traditional economic integration that focuses on 
enhancing free trade and access to global markets. Instead, ALBA has pursued a 
more political focus, one that emphasizes its intent to fully gain autonomy from 
outside forces, in the hope that the region as a whole, can regulate its own political 
agenda without external influence (Burges, 2016) . 
In this way, ALBA’s specific form of regionalism represents a unique regional space, 
one which can be defined by shared territory as well as a space that has been 
shaped by history, common interests and culture along with its people’s needs and 
potentialities.  When the aforementioned is taken into consideration according to 
Muhr (2010), ALBA represents ‘’the only genuinely regionalist project in the 
construction of a LAC region’’ (Muhr, 2010 p. 613) 
In chapter three of this work, ALBA’s specific form of regionalism has been 
extensively discussed. It has put forth the idea that the creation of ALBA should, to 
an extent, be a reinvention of regionalism, one that has broken away from the 
neoliberal orthodoxy and has established itself as a counter-hegemonic regional 
movement. What makes ALBA counter-hegemonic by nature, according to Artaraz 
(2018), can be characterised firstly by its ideological rejection of the neoliberal 
wave of development within the region and its ambition to move beyond it, by 
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attempting to lay a foundation for the construction of societies that reflect and 
embrace a new set of values. Secondly, through this ambitious project, ALBA 
attempted to develop support and bring together like-minded actors such as left-
leaning governments and more importantly organised society. Lastly, in search of 
viable alternatives, ALBA attempts to utilise alternative and traditional forms of 
knowledge, in an effort to construct its preferred future (Artaraz, 2018). While it is 
well documented that ALBA views itself as a counter-hegemonic form of resistance, 
in reality, ‘observable ALBA’ paints a different picture.  From its anti- US/neoliberal 
initiatives to its alternative institutional structure, ALBA in practical reality is 
dysfunctional, irregular and to a large extent chaotic.  According to Cusack (2019) 
on the surface, ALBA operates ‘’via a kind of ‘brand governance’, whereby pre-
existing initiatives, improvised, and fully institutionalised initiatives and 
governance arrangements are depicted as a unitary integration scheme’’ (Cusack, 
2019 p. 27). However, behind this ‘brand’ façade, ALBA’s internal workings tell a 
different story, one of a highly unpredictable and unstable group of projects, whose 
very existence and future is almost completely dependent on its funder, Venezuela.  
While it is true to say that ALBA’s very existence, construction as an alternative 
path to development and regionalism represents a counter-hegemonic response to 
the crippling dominating forces of neoliberalism and the US, it is in the opinion of 
this work that ALBA lacks internal structure and commitment from its member 
states to be able to operate as a viable alternative regional movement for the region, 
let alone its member states.  
One of the most prominent features that portray ALBA’s counter-hegemonic nature 
is its economic zone of shared development. Within this economic zone a new 
regional financial architecture was rolled out. Initiatives such as the TCP (People’s 
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Trade Agreement), the ALBA Bank, SUCRE (Sistema Unitario de Compensación 
Regional de Pagos), and GNC’s (Grand National Companies) were all established in 
an effort to thwart member states reliance on both the US and neoliberalism as a 
whole. While, in an earlier section of this chapter, a detailed account of each of 
these initiatives has been given, this section focuses on determining the extent that 
the creation of the Alliance’s economic zone of shared development has 
successfully challenged neoliberalism and US hegemony? 
The TCP’s (2006), primary objective is to support complementary, state-guided fair 
trade and integration based on solidarity within Latin America. Essentially the TCP 
is a framework of principles which have been devised to encourage and support 
state-led, complementary as well as cooperative integration in both bilateral and 
multilateral investment and trade agreements between ALBA member-states. The 
TCP was intentionally designed to facilitate and bolster endogenous development, 
as well as support multi polarity, reduce intraregional inequalities, and empower 
the poor and the marginalized, all of which contribute to legitimizing left-inspired 
agendas and governments. The initiative was created as a response to the failure of 
the neoliberal model, which is based on principles of privatization, deregulation 
and the arbitrary opening of markets. In direct contrast to neoliberalism, the TCP 
promotes solidarity, complementarity, reciprocity, cooperation and sovereignty. 
The incorporation of these key objectives falls outside the remit of traditional 
neoliberal integration programmes that are advanced by the North.  
At its core, the TCP represents a Latin American centred alternative trade and 
investment model that is based on the internal needs of participating member 
states. Its very existence represents a form of resistance against the dominant 
neoliberal economic model, which is promoted by the global North. Although the 
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TCP can be considered counter-hegemonic, in as much as it operates as an 
alternative trade and investment integration scheme, to what extent has it 
undermined US hegemony or neoliberalism overall? Although ideologically 
speaking, the TCP meets all the criteria for acting as an agent of resistance to both 
US hegemony and neoliberalism, in reality however; the initiative has failed to 
move beyond an ideological ambition. Its existence although initially ground-
breaking, has not produced any conclusive or even measurable results, as it has 
failed to be implemented. Its existence remains entirely in the realm of declarations 
and official agreements.  As Cusack (2019) notes, ‘’in reality attempts to concretise 
the TCP in both multi and bilateral forms only consumed scarce human and 
material resources without producing any new agreement’’. He goes on to suggest 
that ‘’background and conditions relating to structural and historical legacies 
proved restrictive, in part because their influence was not properly anticipated’’ 
(Cusack, 2019 p. 20). Additionally, legal issues arising between other regional and 
international organisations as well as institutions constrained the TCP negotiators’ 
capacity to move beyond the existing standards in any innovative or revolutionary 
sense. The combination of which, resulted in the TCP’s inability to get off the 
ground. Twelve years on it is evident, that the trade and investment scheme has 
failed to act or operate in any measurable way, as a form of resistance to 
neoliberalism and US hegemony. Furthermore, it has become increasingly apparent 
that TCP has ultimately only succeeded in raising the transaction cost that it had 
intended to lower. Instead of promoting trust between member-states, in 
agreement with Cusack (2019) ‘’the lesson for most countries was instead that any 
joint venture with Venezuela would be fraught and potentially futile, given the 
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incoherence and irregularity of their engagement of international initiatives’’ 
(Cusack, 2019 p. 105). 
 The Bank of ALBA acts in direct opposition to IFIs, offers loans without 
conditionalities under fair terms with little to no interest rates. In essence this 
represents a form of resistance to neoliberal and to US hegemony as it offers 
member-states an avenue to develop outside the remit of the IFIs. It has produced 
tangible results particularly with small ALBA member states. But it seems to be 
regressing with the economic downturn of the Venezuelan economy. The bank’s 
over-reliance on Venezuela as its primary funder means its ability to perform its 
primary function as well its likely sustainability is unlikely to continue. Therefore, 
while the bank is at its core a form of resistance, its inadequate funding mechanism 
and its staunch anti-profit-making stance along with its intrinsic link to the 
Venezuelan economy makes its likelihood of survival extremely grim.  
The purpose of SUCRE as already explained in a previous chapter, is to simplify 
intra-ALBA trade while reducing the role of the US dollar as an intermediary 
currency vehicle. Through this mechanism, both member-state importers and 
exporters can carry out transactions in local currency with ease. This, in turn, 
reduces states’ foreign exchange expenditure as well as diminishing transaction 
costs for businesses. Additionally, the use of the SUCRE allows firms operating 
within the ALBA zone to gain a competitive edge over its non-ALBA competitors, 
which enhances autonomy by supporting intra-ALBA trade over external trade. In 
theory, the SUCRE should promote cooperative regionalism and reinforce 
endogenous development legitimizing and reinforcing ALBA as an engine for 
resistance. However, what is observable with the SUCRE paints a vastly different 
picture. Despite its well-thought out design, the SUCRE has strengthened and 
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reinforced corruption and conflict as much as trade and production. Instead of the 
SUCRE being used as an inclusive currency mechanism by member-states to reduce 
transaction costs, fewer than twenty transactions have taken place through the 
mechanism without Venezuelan direct participation. The majority of transactions 
that have occurred have been highly concentrated on trade between Venezuela and 
Ecuador, 90 per cent of which has consisted of Venezuela importing Ecuadorian 
foodstuffs. Not only does the above explicitly reveal that instead of being used as 
mechanisms which further integrates ALBA member states and its specific form of 
regionalism, the SUCRE has predominately been used as a political tool by the 
Venezuelan government, to secure political support of the masses at home. Having 
a constant stream of Ecuadorian food imports has meant that the Venezuelan 
government is less reliant of hostile local elites and their companies. In this way, 
the SUCRE represents the weaponisation and politicisation of imports that serves 
to keep the Maduro government in power while simultaneously reducing the 
Venezuelan oppositional elites’ ability to gain any strategic foothold politically.  
Although from an ideological perspective, Grand National Enterprises (GNEs) 
represent joint state ventures that enhance both productive capacity in relation to 
intra-ALBA trade and regional integration within the ALBA space, in reality 
however, very few have ’become operational. Since the GNEs introduction into the 
ALBA Framework in 2007, only 3 GNEs have become operational, Furthermore, of 
the three operational GNEs that did get off the ground, it is impossible to measure 
or even monitor any real progress they may of made because every kind of bilateral 
joint state venture have been branded as ‘’grand national’’ with official 
acknowledgment or permission. This issue arose because grand nationals since its 
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inception have been under the control of ministries in related sectors within a 
national sphere, rather than by the ALBA Council’s system.  
What has been even more damaging to the operational ability of GNEs however, 
has been, as Aponte-García  (2011) notes their inescapable association with the 
Venezuelan economy, in particular the petro state’s oil industry (Aponte-Garca, 
2011). Dependence on the Venezuelan economy has meant that cash flow problems 
stemming from Venezuela’s dysfunctional currency regime have resulted in 
Venezuela’s inability to finance the projects. This in turn has affected ALBA as a 
regional integration initiative to be just that- regionally integrated. Furthermore, 
failure to deliver on financial promises has created a space for doubt, about ALBA’s 
ability to develop functional initiatives that can together act as a viable form of 
resistance against US hegemony and neoliberalism.  
7.3 Incoherence and de-legitimisation 
 
One of the main problems, which undoubtedly affected ALBA’s ability to become a 
viable regional project for the Latin American region, can be explained by ALBA’s 
internal incoherence. This incoherence has played out in numerous ways. From a 
governance perspective, when one draws a comparison between how ALBA works 
officially and how it works in reality, it becomes apparent according to Cusack 
(2018) that ‘’no one element has full knowledge or control of its extent or status’’ 
(Cusack, 2018a p. 227).  What is observable however, is that the internal 
governance structure of ALBA consists of volatile and unstable coalitions of officials, 
who convene at sporadic intervals depending on presidential interest. In particular, 
Venezuela’s unpredictable, unplanned and at times unethical involvement often 
proving defining. Furthermore, the executive secretariat – ALBA’s only 
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bureaucratic body – is evidently unmanageably overwhelmed that it has become 
impossible for it to provide any meaningful direction or oversight for the 
movement. As a consequence of the above, a lack of accountability brought about 
partly by an absence of concrete commitment by member states as well as partly 
by Venezuelan dominance has deepened both internal disorder and neglect. This 
lack of commitment by ALBA member states is observable with members’ lack or 
minimum participation in ALBA projects, but more specifically, with projects that 
don’t necessarily offer immediate gains to its participants, such as the SUCRE (90 
per cent of all transactions are between Venezuela and Ecuador). Internal 
incoherence is also observable through ALBA’s inactivity in relation to ALBA 
summits and official declarations, which in recent years have been sparse (the last 
ALBA summit took place in 2015). As Cusack (2018) has noted, although regional 
agreements are rarely implemented perfectly, with the case of ALBA ‘’its 
consistently grand plans to encompass virtually every domain of integration across 
the entire LAC region have jarred violently with its failure to integrate even narrow 
domains across a small membership’’ (Cusack, 2018a p.221). Undoubtedly the most 
important domain for ALBA integration has been economic.  Although it is evident 
that ALBA’s ground-breaking ideas and economic aspirations have played well 
amongst member-states as well as internationally, the same is true of its innovative 
failures… At the heart of many of these problems has been an inability to establish 
adequately functional – let alone demonstrably superior – alternatives to neoliberal 
institutions in societies they have long dominated (Cusack, 2018a p.221). The 
centrality of ALBA’s bottom-up economic and political inclusion discourse has 
increasingly and consistently deviated from reality on the ground, this in itself has 
had an extremely negative effect on ALBA’s credibility across the board  –this refers 
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to the lack of participation by the Council of Social Movements, as it has become 
increasingly apparent that their involvement in ALBA exist only on paper after 
2005. It is evident that there is an unmistakable gap between ALBA’s design and its 
implementation, which in the view of this work represents a severely dysfunctional 
governance structure. The severity of this gap has only increased with time and has 
led to major problems for the Alliance; most notably ALBA’s specific kind of 
governance has developed a reputation of not only impotence but, worse still, 
toxicity.  Although in theory, the Alliance’s ambition for the region can be 
considered revolutionary and counter-hegemonic in nature, ALBA’s alternative 
economic, political and social vision has not become a reality. With that being said, 
as Dr Philbert Aaron, the Dominican ambassador to Venezuela and national 
coordinator of ALBA, stated in an interview conducted in 2017, that it is important 
to acknowledge the diverse legal, economic and political dynamics of each member 
state which are all trying to work to form a better region together. He suggests that 
because of this, problems within the ALBA space have arisen. Particularly in 
relation to ALBA leadership and management, and adaptability (Aaron 2017). For 
Silva (2017) the Venezuelan ambassador to Antigua and Barbuda, ALBA’s inability 
to move beyond an ideological alliance is predominately the result of structural 
problems inherent within the project itself. He suggested, in an interview 
conducted in 2017, that the project’s structural organisation needed to be revisited 
in order for ALBA to remain relevant.  What it offered was new and revolutionary, 
but the current situation sees ALBA struggling to keep its various initiatives’ afloat. 
ALBA’s evolution since 2005 with its roll out of various grand schemes and 
initiatives, has failed to produce any meaningful or tangible results.        
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All of these observable problems, which have affected ALBA’s ability to function at 
an adequate level, can predominately be explained by Venezuela’s dominance 
within the project. This following section will specifically look at how Venezuela’s 
centrality to ALBA has and continues to affect the viability of the regional project.  
7.4 The Venezuelan crisis and ALBA 
 
 While having one state, as the primary financial backer for a regional project is not 
unusual, in the case of Venezuela, its dominance within ALBA is at such a high level, 
that their individual destinies have become intertwined. From an economic 
perspective, the petro-state’s reliance on oil exports has increasingly led to 
numerous problems for ALBA. Firstly, from an ideological perspective, Venezuela’s 
development model is extractivist in nature, this in itself goes against ALBA as a 
collective stance on climate change and specific member states (most notably 
Bolivia) position with regards to the right of nature. Secondly, the Alliance and 
Venezuela’s stability is intrinsically connected to extremely unstable oil prices, 
which are determined on the international markets. This volatile dependency 
became apparent with the 2015 dramatic fall in oil prices, which led the petro-state 
to dramatically reduce available funding and support for ALBA initiatives, leading 
in many cases to project stagnation. ALBA’s evident internal incoherence and 
external de-legitimisation has hampered the Alliance’s future potentialities.  
Considering the ideological inconsistencies that have begun to surface amongst 
member-states, along with the Alliance’s entanglement with the Venezuelan 
economy, it is inevitable that the future of ALBA will be determined by firstly, the 
Maduro government’s capacity to stay in power and secondly by Venezuela’s ability 
to stabilize its economic situation. Evidently, ALBA as a regional integration project 
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‘’has become synonymous with the radical reforms underway in Venezuela and a 
symbol of the hopes for radical transformation that have emerged with the move 
Left in Latin America as a whole’’(Kellogg, 2007 p. 200). While it is true to say that 
the development of ALBA coincided and reflected the radical developments of 
Venezuela in the mid-2000s, it is also fair to say that ALBA now has become 
synonymous with the abysmal political and economic situation that Venezuela is 
currently experiencing.  Their perspective destinies have become so intertwined 
that it has become impossible for the Alliance to become in any way detached from 
the petro state. Furthermore, instead of having a life of its own, it has become 
apparent that ALBA is a mere extension of the Bolivarian state.  With the above 
considered, understanding the internal failures of the Bolivarian state in relation to 
a Gramscian framework is paramount to understanding the current situation that 
ALBA now faces. In an article written by Pinar and Morton (2002), they examine 
potential state failures through a framework developed by Antonio Gramsci in 
relation to  “shifts or variations in hegemony which may reveal the limits of social 
order in organizing a reciprocal balance between force and consent,” (Pinar, 2002 
pp. 71-72).  From Gramsci’s perspective, hegemony or social and political 
dominance, is attained by a particular group that obtains the active consent of 
‘subaltern groups’ through both the exercise of ‘’intellectual and moral leadership’’ 
and via material concessions (Gramsci et al., 1971 p. 161). A hegemonic struggle on 
the other hand, can be understood as the emergence of oppositional groups that 
challenge both each other for leadership and the former dominant class.  According 
to López-Maya and Lander (2005) this hegemonic struggle was evident within 
Venezuela following the collapse of the Punto Fijo’s elite hegemony in 1989 (López 
M. and Lander, 2005). Here, rather than understanding Fijo’s elitist government’s 
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demise as a result of state failure, it represents the erosion of the social consensus 
that was underlying in that particular regime. 
Similarly, Venezuela is currently experiencing a hegemonic struggle under its 
present government. Just like the Fijo government’s demise, the Maduro 
government is facing a continuous and evidently relentless assault brought about 
by various oppositional forces. Although such oppositional forces are fractioned 
and disorganized, Maduro’s government has begun to unravel as the social 
consensus for Chavismo has begun to lose its legitimacy. This erosion of consensus, 
which has led to the current hegemonic struggle, has been brought about by several 
factors, most notably by Venezuela’s severe economic decline.  
Since 2015, in the absence of its figurehead, Venezuelan support for Chavismo has 
declined massively – with the opposition winning a majority in the 2015’s 
parliamentary elections. This coupled with heightened inflation, food shortages and 
the persistent rise in violent protests, has enormously reduced the Maduro 
government’s popularity. This decline could only be reversed if there was a 
dramatic spike in oil prices or the government introduced major economic reforms, 
specifically in relation to the currency regime. However, the Venezuelan 
government has made no attempt to address these detrimental economic issues to 
date. As a result as Cusack (2018) has pointed out leaves the Maduro government 
‘’reliant on the mobilizing power of the party and the state it controls, as well as on 
the continued incompetence of a fragmented, tone deaf, and inconsistent 
opposition’’ (Cusack, 2018a p. 226). However, as long as there exists a fountain of 
accessible discontent and resistance, the rise of a less inexperienced opposition will 
remain a substantial threat. Considering that currently the dominant parties of 
Venezuela’s opposition alliance view ALBA as a waste of Venezuelan resources, an 
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opposition presidency would more than likely cut funding to all ALBA initiatives or 
even permanently suspend funding entirely. It is evident that this twofold political 
and economic reliance on the ‘’continuation in power of one party in one key 
member state, thanks to the price of one volatile commodity, represents a grave 
failure to institutionalised meaningful participation from ALBA’s wider 
membership’’(Cusack, 2018d p. 226). 
7.5 Regional transformations culminating in the potential demise of ALBA. 
 
ALBA’s specific brand of ‘’post-neoliberal’’ regionalism, rather than being 
distinctive and transformative or in any way representative of a ‘post’ neoliberal 
model, evidently portrays a model on the brink of failing. While initially heralded as 
potentially a revolutionary model -representing of a shift away from open 
regionalism towards a new kind of people focused, bottom up regionalism, the 
project has fallen short. Seventeen years on, it has become apparent that ALBA’s 
brand of regionalism is not as revolutionary or even distinctive as once thought. 
ALBA slow deterioration, according to Malamud (2005), supports the idea that 
Latin American regionalism as essentially intergovernmental or interpresidential 
(Malamud, 2005). ALBA, while at a regional level, was initially substantiated; 
ultimately it undermined the idea of a distinctive wave of ‘post neoliberal’ Latin 
American regionalism. The ‘move away’ from open regionalism towards political 
concentration of autonomous, resurgent, developmentalist states, was nowhere 
more clearer than in ALBA, yet its failure to deliver on its early promises raises 
questions about the real impact and distinctiveness of its model of regionalism.  
Rather than creating a model that has the capacity to undermine or even 
potentially replace neoliberalism, with an alternative governance structure that 
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confronts and contests various neoliberal processes across various domain. In 
reality, its uneven implementation, Venezuelan centrism, and ‘’bottom-up’’ 
development model has ‘‘Inadvertently highlighted the ways in which alternative 
governance projects confront neoliberalising processes at various scales and in 
various domain and in the form of various actors’’ (Brenner, 2010). As Brenner et 
al (2010) have remarked, ALBA in this light, represents ‘variegated 
neoliberalisation’ rather than societal transformation or a revolutionary form of 
regionalism for Latin America (Brenner, 2010).  
Dr. Philbert Aaron, the Dominican ambassador to Venezuela and national 
coordinator of ALBA, has stated in an interview conducted in 2017, that the waning 
of ALBA, which it is experiencing presently, is a normal expression, a common 
occurrence within the evolution of movements. He has also argued that phases of 
growth followed by phases of stagnation are natural and commonplace amongst 
regional projects. However, his optimistic outlook on the development of ALBA as 
well as its future is misplaced. While Dr. Aaron is of the opinion that the current 
difficulties ALBA is experiencing are temporary hurdles and that through the 
support of the member states, the alliance in time, will adapt and continue to 
evolve. Given ALBA’s slow progress to date, and the severe problems that have 
hampered it, ALBA’s prospects look bleak. Furthermore, the Latin American region 
is going through somewhat of political transformation currently. The rise of the 
right in Argentina, Chile and Brazil has begun to reshape the Latin American 
political environment once again. After more than two-decades since the ‘pink tide’, 
Chávez’s Bolivarian revolution lives on in the hands of a handpicked successor, 
Nicolás Maduro. However very few would regard the Venezuelan diminishing 
economy and abysmal democratic institutions as an aspiring model.  Regionally, 
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discontent brought about by economic turmoil can be seen as a driving force for 
the turn right in Latin America.  The rise of the left coincided with one of the largest 
economic expansions in the region’s history. Principally, as a consequence of a 
slowdown of the Chinese economy, economic growth in Latin America began to 
diminish from 2012 onwards, leading to regional economic underperformance and 
with the case of Brazil, severe economic recession. This downturn led to a 
reduction in public spending, which consequently has resulted in the diminished 
popularity of the left. Leading in some instances to the right gaining power, as was 
the case in Brazil, Chile and Argentina and in other instances, a retreat of radical or 
far-left politics, as was the case with Ecuador. In the Ecuadorian case, Lenin 
Moreno’s moderate left stance boded well amongst the masses but severely 
hampered its relationship with former president Correa, along with Venezuela and 
ALBA.  This loss of solidarity with Venezuela but more specifically with ALBA has 
cumulated in Ecuador’s withdrawal from the regional project.  To understand 
Ecuador’s loss of solidarity with ALBA, it is necessary to firstly look at the changing 
nature of leftist politics within the state.   While Moreno was fully supported by 
Correa as his successor in 2017, his degree of left can be seen to a large extent, as 
moderate. Moreno’s active disassociation with ALBA and with the far or radical left 
more broadly, can be understood by three important aspects. Firstly, ALBA as a 
‘brand’ of regionalism has become fatally toxic. This is as a result of Venezuelan 
centralism to the regional project. Secondly, the shifting tide of politics in Latin 
America from left to right and from far left to moderate, represents a changing 
sentiment amongst the masses and within the wider international community, this 
in turn has informed the direction of governments’ projected ideology and political, 
regional and economic affiliations. For Ecuador, due to a repositioning of ideology, 
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membership of ALBA is no longer a viable option. Lastly, Latin America is a region 
like no other, in as much as regional organisations are plentiful. Essentially, their 
very existence can be seen as a product of a particular time and as a result, regional 
projects often become redundant with changes in state ideological positioning. Just 
as it was the case with CAN, Mercosur and to a large extent UNASUR, it seems that 
ALBA now has lost its shine.  ALBA’s specific brand of regionalism or indeed its 
leftist ideological core, while initially grew in popularity as it represented for many, 
a regional ideological alignment that could potentially restructure or revolutionize 
the regional space, is now seen by many, including some of its own member states 
as an obsolete and redundant project with very little to offer.  
Given ALBA’s slow progress to date, and the severe problems that have hampered 
it, ALBA’s prospects look bleak. Dabéne (2018) envisions three possible future 
scenarios in which ALBA is likely to evolve.  The first being dismantlement. 
However, for Dabène this future outcome should be considered the least likely, as it 
would run against Latin American tradition, as to date no Latin American regional 
integration project has ever been officially declared dead. For this to become a 
likely possibility ALBA would have to fully endorse and acknowledge that CELAC 
and/or UNASUR are now the most appropriate groupings to work with, but this 
possible scenario seems extremely unlikely, given the ideological underpinnings of 
ALBA. 
An ALBA reboot is the second possible future scenario put forth by Dabène (2018).  
He suggests that the signing of a new treaty or important declaration could possibly 
breathe new life into the Alliance and ‘’trigger a renewed activation with a renewed 
agenda’’ (Dabéne, 2018 p. 49). For Dabene (2018) the motive for this possible 
reboot could be a ‘’diplomatic offensive from the Pacific Alliance group, which is 
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always seeking to expand the reach of its free trade agreements’’ (Dabéne, 2018 p. 
49). However, this possibility also seems highly unlikely, as it is evident that 
opposition to free trade has waned in recent years.  While Bolivia and of course 
Venezuela remain strongly opposed to free trade, other ALBA member states, such 
Uruguay are in favour of free trade agreements. Additionally, the rise of the right in 
both Brazil and Argentina is likely to result in a merging between the Alliance of the 
Pacific and Mercosur. Furthermore, Venezuela’s internal economic and political 
problems have led to an evident lack of strong leadership within ALBA and with 
Cuba’s attention turned towards mending US relation, no other ALBA member 
states seems up to the task of leading the Alliance through this reboot (Cusack, 
2018a). 
The third and, in Dabène’s (2018) opinion, the most likely scenario for ALBA is 
stalemate and indifference. According to Philippe Schmitter (1970) in a seminal 
piece, he describes a ‘zone of indifference’ in which some regional integration 
movements have become confined. Within this zone of indifference, regional actors 
are tolerated within the broader region as long as they do not impose new costs 
(Schmitter, 1970). An example of this can be seen with the Andean Community, 
which has evidently been stuck in this lethargic state for quite a while. According to 
Dabéne (2018) ALBA is likely to follow suit. He suggests that given the fact that the 
Andean Community has been incapable of transitioning out of this ‘zone of 
indifference’ despite having a large regional bureaucracy, ‘’makes it even more 
likely that the Alliance, a poorly institutionalised grouping, will remain in deadlock’’ 
(Dabéne, 2018 p. 49). 
Furthermore, given the paralyzing effect that Venezuelan centrality has had on 
ALBA in recent years, an important question to consider when attempting to 
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determine ALBA’s potential future is whether the Alliance could function in the 
absence of Venezuela? Put very simply, without Venezuela, ALBA would cease to 
exist. Every aspect of every project that ALBA has rolled out involves Venezuela or 
Venezuelan financial support. For example, the SUCRE has served as a mechanism, 
which almost exclusively channels Ecuadorian exports to Venezuela. Despite its 
clear purpose and intricate design, the absence of Venezuela’s demand would more 
than likely lead to the SUCRE’s demise. Without Venezuelan investment, GNE’s 
would meet a similar faith. Considering that all GNEs to date have Venezuela as a 
principal partner, it seems extremely likely that the withdrawal of Venezuelan 
investment would be fatal to their operations.  Petrocaribe’s financial, commercial, 
and infrastructural aspects are all premised entirely on Venezuelan oil’s availability 
and profitability. It goes without saying that without Venezuelan support 
Petrocaribe would cease to exist, as the project is completely dependent on 
Venezuelan oil. But is Venezuela’s absence or even reduced involvement a 
possibility? According to Puente (2018) it is a likely possibility. The catastrophic 
effect of plummeting oil prices on the Venezuelan economy has raised serious 
doubts as to whether the petro states has the ability to act as ALBA’s financier in 
the future (Puente, 2018). For Cusack (2018) the contact discrediting of 
Bolivarianism by opposition forces within Venezuela has severely reduced the once 
captivating force of post-neoliberal ideas within the Alliance in general, which has 
in turn blunted ALBA’s radical edges (Cusack, 2018a). Furthermore, previously 
available Venezuelan funding for various ALBA initiatives is now required urgently 
within the Bolivarian state. Failure to redirect these funds back home would have 
catastrophic political consequences for the Maduro government. It is evident that 
since 2015, in the absence of its figurehead, Venezuelan support for Chavismo has 
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declined massively – with the opposition winning a majority in the 2015’s 
parliamentary elections. This coupled with the heightened inflation and food 
shortages has enormously reduced the Maduro government’s popularity. For 
Cusack (2018) this decline could only be reversed if there was a dramatic spike in 
oil prices or the government introduced major economic reforms, specifically in 
relation to the currency regime (Cusack, 2018a). However, the Venezuelan 
government has made no attempt to address these detrimental economic issues to 
date. As a result as Cusack (2018) has pointed out leaves the Maduro government 
‘’reliant on the mobilizing power of the party and the state it controls, as well as on 
the continued incompetence of a fragmented, tone deaf, and inconsistent 
opposition’’ (Cusack, 2018a p. 226). With that being said, as long as there exists a 
fountain of accessible discontent and resistance, the rise of a less inexperienced 
opposition will remain a substantial threat. Considering that currently the 
dominant parties of Venezuela’s opposition alliance view ALBA as a waste of 
Venezuelan resources, an opposition presidency would more than likely cut 
funding to all ALBA initiatives or even permanently suspend funding entirely. It is 
evident that this twofold political and economic reliance on the ‘’continuation in 
power of one party in one key member state, thanks to the price of one volatile 
commodity, represents a grave failure to institutionalised meaningful participation 
from ALBA’s wider membership’’(Cusack, 2018d p. 226). 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has situated ALBA, understanding its demise and potential future 
within a neo-Gramscian framework. It set out to determine the extent that ALBA 
can be viewed as a counter-hegemonic form of resistance that is engaged in a war 
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of position against open regionalism, US hegemony and, by extension, 
neoliberalism. It has suggested that ALBA in its early years evidently represented a 
pattern of development that corresponded with Cox’s understanding of a counter-
hegemonic movement engaged in a war of position, as its initial development 
involved an orchestrated attempt to restructure society from below. However, this 
chapter has determined that the regional project’s development since then 
however, has not equated to the same kind of resistance it was once heralded for. 
Rather ALBA’s momentum and support has consistently deteriorated, suggesting it 
has fallen short of maintaining the necessary conditions that could have potentially 
led to the creation of a viable rival structure. 
The chapter then looked at ALBA as a form of counter-hegemony/resistance, its 
effectiveness and potentialities.  It looked at ALBA’s specific form of regionalism 
and argued that while ALBA views itself as a counter-hegemonic form of resistance, 
in reality ‘observable ALBA’ paints a different picture.  From its anti- US/neoliberal 
initiatives to its alternative institutional structure, ALBA in practical reality is 
dysfunctional, irregular and to a large extent chaotic.  Chapter seven has argued 
that on the surface ALBA operates via a kind of brand governance, whereby the 
champions of ALBA depict the movement as a unitary integration scheme. However, 
the chapter has proposed that behind this ‘brand’ façade, ALBA’s internal workings 
represents a highly unpredictable and unstable group of projects, whose very 
existence and future is almost completely dependent on its funder, Venezuela.  
Although ALBA’s very existence, and construction as an alternative path to 
development and regionalism represents a counter-hegemonic response to the 
crippling dominating forces of neoliberalism and the US, chapter seven argued that 
ALBA’s complete lack of a functioning internal structure and commitment from its 
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member states has detrimentally affected its ability to operate as a viable 
alternative regional movement for the region.  
The chapter then looked at the extent that the creation of the Alliance’s economic 
zone of shared development has been successful in challenging neoliberalism and 
US hegemony. With regards to the TCP, chapter seven has argued that while 
ideologically speaking, the TCP meets all the criteria for acting as an agent of 
resistance to both US hegemony and neoliberalism, in reality however; the 
initiative has failed to move beyond its ideological ambition. Its existence, although 
initially ground-breaking, has not produced any conclusive or even measurable 
results as it has failed to be implemented. Additionally, legal issues arising between 
other regional and international organisations as well as institutions constrained 
the TCP negotiators’ capacity to move beyond the existing standards in any 
innovative or revolutionary sense. The combination of which, resulted in the TCP’s 
inability to get off the ground. Twelve years on as chapter seven points out, the 
trade and investment scheme has failed to act or operate in any measurable way, as 
a form of resistance to neoliberalism and US hegemony. In relation to the ALBA 
Bank, chapter seven has argued that its over-reliance on Venezuela as its primary 
funder has been a determining factor in relation to its ability to perform its primary 
function. It has suggested that while the bank is at its core a form of resistance, its 
inadequate funding mechanism and its staunch anti-profit-making stance along 
with its intrinsic link to the Venezuelan economy makes its likelihood of survival 
extremely grim. The SUCRE in theory the mechanism should promote cooperative 
regionalism and reinforce endogenous development, legitimizing and reinforcing 
ALBA as an engine for resistance. However, chapter seven has argued that what is 
observable with the SUCRE paints a vastly different picture. Instead of the SUCRE 
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being used as an inclusive currency mechanism by member-states to reduce 
transaction costs, fewer than twenty transactions have taken place through the 
mechanism without Venezuelan direct participation. Most transactions that have 
occurred have been highly concentrated on trade between Venezuela and Ecuador, 
90 per cent of which has consisted of Venezuela importing Ecuadorian foodstuffs. 
Not only does the above explicitly reveal that instead of being used as a mechanism 
which further integrates ALBA member states and its specific form of regionalism, 
the SUCRE has predominately been used as a political tool by the Venezuelan 
government, to secure political support of the masses at home. Having a constant 
stream of Ecuadorian food imports has meant that the Venezuelan government is 
less reliant of hostile local elites and their companies. In this way, the SUCRE 
represents the weaponisation and politicisation of imports served to keep the 
Maduro government in power while simultaneously reducing the Venezuelan 
oppositional elites’ ability to gain any strategic foothold politically. Chapter seven 
then suggested that while ideologically speaking GNEs represent joint state 
ventures that should enhance both productive capacity in relation to intra-ALBA 
trade and regional integration within the ALBA space, in reality however, very few 
have ’become operational. Since the GNEs introduction into the ALBA Framework 
in 2007, only 3 GNEs have become operational, and of those three operational 
GNEs, it is impossible to measure or even monitor any real progress they may have 
made because every kind of bilateral joint state venture have been branded as 
‘’grand national’’ with official acknowledgment or permission. What has been even 
more damaging to the operational ability of GNEs however, chapter seven has 
argued, has been GNEs inescapable association with the Venezuelan economy, in 
particular the petro state’s oil industry. Dependence on the Venezuelan economy 
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has meant that cash flow problems stemming from Venezuela’s dysfunctional 
currency regime has resulted in Venezuela’s inability to finance the projects. This in 
turn has affected ALBA as a regional integration initiative to be just that- regionally 
integrated. Furthermore, failure to deliver on financial promises has created a 
space for doubt, about ALBA’s ability to develop functional initiatives that can 
together act as a viable form of resistance against US hegemony and neoliberalism.  
From here, chapter seven looked at specific factors, which have affected ALBA’s 
ability to become a viable regional project for the Latin American region, factors 
such as internal incoherence and subsequent its de-legitimisation.  
From what is observable, chapter seven has argued, ALBA’s internal governance 
structure consists of volatile and unstable coalitions of officials, who convene at 
sporadic intervals depending on presidential interest. It has suggested that the 
executive secretariat – ALBA’s only bureaucratic body – is unmanageably 
overwhelmed that it has become impossible for it to provide any meaningful 
direction or oversight for the movement. As a consequence of the above, a lack of 
accountability brought about partly by an absence of concrete commitment by 
member states as well as partly by Venezuelan dominance, has deepened both 
internal disorder and neglect. This lack of commitment by ALBA member states, 
chapter seven has argued, is observable with members’ lack or minimum 
participation in ALBA projects, but more specifically, with projects that don’t 
necessarily offer immediate gains to its participants, such as the SUCRE (90 per 
cent of all transactions are between Venezuela and Ecuador). Chapter seven 
suggests that internal incoherence is also observable through ALBA’s inactivity in 
relation to ALBA summits and official declarations, which in recent years have been 
sparse (the last ALBA summit took place in 2015).  At the core of many of its 
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problems, chapter seven has argued, has been an inability to establish adequately 
functional – let alone demonstrably superior – alternatives to neoliberal 
institutions in societies they have long dominated.  Additionally, the centrality of 
ALBA’s bottom-up economic and political inclusion discourse has increasingly and 
consistently deviated from reality on the ground, this in itself has had an extremely 
negative effect on ALBA’s credibility across the board, specifically in relation to 
social movements, as it has become increasingly apparent that their involvement in 
ALBA exist only on paper after 2005. Furthermore, chapter seven has argued that 
there is an unmistakable gap between ALBA’s design and its implementation; this 
represents a severely dysfunctional governance structure. The severity of this gap 
has only increased with time and has led to major problems for the Alliance; most 
notably ALBA’s specific kind of governance has developed a reputation of not only 
impotence but, worse still, toxicity.  Chapter seven has argued that all these 
observable problems as mentioned above, which have affected ALBA’s ability to 
function at an adequate level, can predominately be explained by Venezuela’s 
dominance within the project. Chapter seven has argued that Venezuela’s 
dominance within ALBA is at such a high level that their respective destinies have 
become intertwined. From an economic perspective, the petro-state’s reliance on 
oil exports has increasingly led to numerous problems for ALBA. Firstly, from an 
ideological perspective, Venezuela’s development model is extractivist in nature; 
this in itself goes against ALBA as a collective stance on climate change and specific 
member states. Secondly, the Alliance and Venezuela’s stability is intrinsically 
connected to extremely unstable oil prices. This volatile dependency became 
apparent with the 2015 dramatic fall in oil prices, which led the petro-state to 
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dramatically reduce available funding and support for ALBA initiatives, leading in 
many cases to project stagnation. 
Chapter seven has argued that while it is true to say that the developments of ALBA 
coincided and reflected the radical developments of Venezuela in the mid-2000s, it 
is also fair to say that ALBA now has become synonymous with the abysmal 
political and economic situation that Venezuela is currently experiencing.  Their 
perspective destinies have become so intertwined that it has become impossible 
for the Alliance to become in any way detached from the petro state. Furthermore, 
with the above considered, chapter seven has argued that ALBA should be seen as a 
mere extension of the Bolivarian state. From neo-Gramsci’s perspective,  
Chapter seven has argued, Venezuela is currently experiencing a hegemonic 
struggle under its present government. Similarly, to the Fijo government’s demise, 
the Maduro government is facing a continuous and evidently relentless assault 
brought about by various oppositional forces. Although such oppositional forces 
are fractioned and disorganized, Maduro’s government has begun to unravel as the 
social consensus for Chavismo has begun to lose its legitimacy. This erosion of 
consensus, which has led to the current hegemonic struggle, has been brought 
about by several factors, most notably by Venezuela’s severe economic decline. One 
of which, as chapter seven has cited, has been a massive decrease in support of 
Chavismo since 2015. This decline in combination with heightened inflation, food 
shortages and the persistent rise in violent protests, has enormously reduced the 
Maduro government’s popularity. Chapter seven has argued that the current 
Venezuelan government has made no attempt to address these detrimental 
economic issues to date. As a result the Maduro government ‘’reliant on the 
mobilizing power of the party and the state it controls, as well as on the continued 
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incompetence of a fragmented, tone deaf, and inconsistent opposition’’ (Cusack, 
2018a p. 226). However, chapter seven has also argued that as long as there exists 
a fountain of accessible discontent and resistance, the rise of a less inexperienced 
opposition will remain a substantial threat. Lastly chapter seven has suggested that 
this twofold political and economic reliance on the ‘’continuation in power of one 
party in one key member state, thanks to the price of one volatile commodity, 
represents a grave failure to institutionalised meaningful participation from ALBA’s 
wider membership’’ (Cusack, 2018d p. 226). 
In the final section of chapter seven, ALBA’s specific brand of ‘post-neoliberal’ 
regionalism was explored. The chapter argued that ALBA, rather than being 
distinctive and transformative or in any way representative of a ‘post’ neoliberal 
model, it portrays a model on the brink of failing. It has argued that ALBA’s slow 
deterioration supports the idea that Latin American regionalism as essentially 
intergovernmental or interpresidential. It has suggested that while ALBA’s  ‘move 
away’ from open regionalism towards a political concentration of autonomous, 
resurgent, developmentalist states (Cusack, 2018a), its failure to deliver on its early 
promises raises questions about the real impact and distinctiveness of its model of 
regionalism.  
Rather than creating a model that has the capacity to undermine or even 
potentially replace open regionalism, with an alternative governance structure that 
confronts and contests various neoliberal processes across various domains. In 
reality, ALBA’S uneven implementation, Venezuelan centrism, and ‘’bottom-up’’ 
development model has hampered its developments and its future potential. 
Chapter seven has also argued that the Latin American region as a whole is going 
through somewhat of political transformation currently. The rise of the right in 
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Argentina, Chile and Brazil has begun to reshape the Latin American political 
environment. It has argued that the idea of the ‘pink tide’ and 
Chávez’s Bolivarian revolution lives on in the hands of a sole handpicked successor, 
Nicolás Maduro. Considering the state of Venezuelan affairs, its diminishing 
economy and abysmal democratic institutions, it is evident that it can no longer be 
seen as a poster boy for the left or as an aspiring model.  Regionally, chapter seven 
has argued, discontent brought about by economic turmoil has been a driving force 
for the turn right in Latin America. It has been suggested in chapter seven that this 
discontent is principally a consequence of a slowdown of economic growth in 
which began in 2012, leading to regional economic underperformance and with the 
case of Brazil, severe economic recession. This downturn led to a reduction in 
public spending, which as a consequence has resulted in the diminished popularity 
of the left. Leading in some instances to the right gaining power, as was the case in 
Brazil, Chile and Argentina and in other instances, a retreat of radical or far-left 
politics, as was the case with Ecuador. Chapter seven has argued that in the 
Ecuadorian case, Lenin Moreno’s moderate left stance boded well amongst the 
masses but severely hampered its relationship with former president Correa, along 
with Venezuela and ALBA.  This loss of solidarity with Venezuela but more 
specifically with ALBA has cumulated in Ecuador’s withdrawal from the regional 
project. This withdrawal signifies the changing nature of leftist politics in the 
region. Chapter seven has suggested that Moreno’s active disassociation with ALBA 
and with the far or radical left more broadly, can be understood by three important 
aspects. Firstly, ALBA as a ‘brand’ of regionalism has become fatally toxic. This is as 
a result of Venezuelan centralism to the regional project. Secondly, the shifting tide 
of politics in Latin America from left to right and from far-left to moderate, 
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represents a changing sentiment amongst the masses and within the wider 
international community, this in turn has informed the direction of governments’ 
projected ideology and political, regional and economic affiliations. For Ecuador, 
due to a repositioning of ideology, membership of ALBA is no longer a viable option. 
Lastly, Latin America is a region like no other, in as much as regional organisations 
are plentiful. Essentially, their very existence can be seen as a product of a 
particular time and as a result, regional projects often become redundant with 
changes in state ideological positioning. Just as it was the case with CAN, Mercosur 
and to a large extent UNASUR, it seems that ALBA now has lost its shine. ALBA’S 
specific brand of regionalism or indeed its leftist ideological core, while initially 
grew in popularity as it represented for many, a regional ideological alignment that 
could potentially restructure or revolutionize the regional space, is now, as chapter 
seven has argued, as an obsolete and redundant project with very little to offer.  
In the last part of chapter seven, an overview of three potential future scenarios in 
relation to the ALBA was outlined. The first being dismantlement. However, this 
future outcome as chapter seven has suggested is highly unlikely as it would run 
against Latin American tradition if one considers that no Latin American regional 
integration project, to date, has ever been officially declared dead. The second 
possibility is a reboot. Potentially, the signing of a new treaty or important 
declaration could possibly breathe new life into the Alliance and trigger a renewed 
activation. This reboot, according to chapter seven, could be motivated by a 
diplomatic offensive from the Pacific Alliance group for instance, which is always 
seeking to expand the reach of its free trade agreements. However, chapter seven 
has suggested that this possibility also seems highly unlikely, as opposition to free 
trade has waned in recent years. Furthermore, Venezuela’s internal economic and 
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political problems has led to an evident lack of strong leadership within ALBA and 
with Cuba’s attention turned towards mending US relation, no other ALBA member 
states seem up to the task of leading the Alliance through this reboot. 
The third and, the most likely scenario for ALBA as chapter seven has suggested is a 
stalemate and indifference. The chapter has argued that a ‘zone of indifference’, 
where regional actors are tolerated within the broader region as long as they do 
not impose new costs, seems the most likely future scenarios for ALBA. The chapter 
uses the example of the Andean Community to illustrate its point, and argued that if 
one considers how incapable the Andean Community’s has been at transitioning 
out of the this ‘zone of indifference’ despite having a large regional bureaucracy, it 
makes it even more likely that the Alliance, a poorly institutionalised grouping, will 












Chapter 8: Conclusion 
8.1 Summative conclusion 
 
Drawing on the work of Antonio Gramsci and the late Robert Cox, this thesis set out 
specifically, to determine the extent that ALBA can be viewed as a counter-
hegemonic form of resistance that is engaged in a war of position against open 
regionalism, US hegemony and, by extension, neoliberalism.  It examined ALBA 
through a historical narrative, assessing its progression from its early 
developments to its current form. This was carried out through a critical analysis, 
which allowed for a historical examination of the evolution of ALBA. By analysing 
ALBA in this way, this work was able to put a central focus on the regional 
movement’s demise in recent years, by evaluating Venezuelan centrality to the 
Alliance, and by situating ALBA within the wider context of an ever-changing 
political and regional landscape with the Latin American region as a whole. While 
the Alliance evidently in its early years represented a form of contestation, of 
resistance and to a large extent, a new form of regionalism that had the potential to 
transform the region, this thesis found that over time, the regional movement lost 
its momentum, its allure and failed to achieve any of its ideological aspirations in 
every tangle sense, all of which have led this thesis to the conclusion that ALBA is 
no longer a viable counter-hegemonic regional movement. The following sections 
of this chapter will present in detail a summary and contributions of this thesis. 
The limitations that it contains are discussed as well as recommendations for 





8.2 Summary and Contributions 
 
In chapter two of this thesis, the central focus was placed on situating ALBA within 
a Coxian approach to world order and hegemony.   Chapter two of this dissertation 
provided a literature review which predominately focused on assessing the work of 
key academics within the field of the contemporary International Political Economy. 
The central objective of this chapter was to assess the key features of the neo-
Gramscian/Coxian critical theory approach to the study of the contemporary 
International Political Economy. By drawing on the work of Gramsci, Gill, and Cox 
in particular, chapter two provided a strong theoretical basis, which allowed for 
ALBA to be situated within the aforementioned theoretical perspectives. The 
introduction of keys concepts such as counter-hegemony, war of position, and the 
idea of gaining consent were introduced in order to situate ALBA within this 
theoretical perspective and allowing this thesis to lay a solid theoretical foundation 
by which ALBA could begin to be critically analysed from.  
Chapter three of this thesis provided a second literature review, which aimed to 
facilitate an understanding of the current global trend towards regionalism. The 
chapter mainly focused on literature that uses Robert Cox’s notion of world order 
to explain the contemporary rise of regionalism. It then went on to use relevant 
academic literature that specifically looked at the relationship between regionalism 
and neoliberalism in order to determine how the rise of neoliberalism has affected 
and shaped open/new regionalism in the contemporary era. The chapter suggested 
that understood from a Coxian/neo-Gramscian world order perspective, open 
regionalism can be seen to facilitate and complement the practices of neoliberalism 
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very efficiently. As the creation, development, and purpose of regional bodies have 
been centred around enhancing more trade, increasing liberalisation and the 
enhancing harmonization in relation to regulation on investment (Worth, 2015). 
Furthermore, chapter three has suggested that with the above considered, open 
regionalism view within this light, can be seen to contributing to structural 
conditions of the prevailing order (Gamble and Payne, 1996).  From here, academic 
literature that focused on the evolution of Latin American regionalism and its 
relationship with neoliberalism was presented. It specifically looked at the 
evolution of regionalism within the region and introduced the concept of post-
hegemonic regionalism.  It suggested that a selection of academics have used this 
concept to understand a change in the way regional integration began to take place 
with the rise of the left in Latin America (Burges 2016). It has suggested that within 
this core academic circle, forms of contestation that began to emerge in the 2000s, 
most notably ALBA, which for many can be understood in this light. However, 
rather than viewing ABLA’s emergence as representative of this notion of post-
hegemonic regional, chapter three merely highlights the existence of support for 
understanding ALBA in this way. It suggested that while ALBA can undoubtedly be 
viewed as a form of contestation against open regionalism, it is yet to be 
determined whether it can be seen as fitting in with this wider a debatable 
understanding of ‘post-hegemonic regionalism’.  
Chapter four took the form of an empirical chapter on ALBA. It specifically looked 
at the rise of the contemporary left. It has suggested that the failure of 
neoliberalism to consolidate the necessary social forces for its stabilization, led to 
the rise of the left. It has suggested that this shift in political ideology laid a 
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foundation, which allowed for a form of counter-hegemonic resistance to begin. 
Chapter four investigated the rise of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and looked at his 
idea of twenty-first-century socialism. It suggested that Chávez’s alternative 
strategy for autonomy and development through twenty-first-century socialism 
inspired and influenced many other leftist governments to move beyond the ideas 
of neoliberalism, which in turn resulted in a variety of individual and collective 
attempts to construct counter-hegemonic alternatives to neoliberalism and US 
imperialism.  
Following on from this, the chapter looked at how and in what ways the left has led 
to the construction of a new era of regional dynamics, which has developed 
alternative models of regional integration within Latin America. Chapter four 
suggested that leftist policies and principles such as the redistribution of wealth, 
social development initiatives, autonomy and advancing alternative development 
strategies have all been expressed through regional integration projects. With the 
left turn, regional integration projects began to be framed around solidarity and the 
consolidation of shared approaches, while at the same time it has brought to the 
forefront of its agenda the issues of social inequality as well as offering alternative 
paths to great autonomy from the US. It was also pointed out that with this leftist 
turn, open regional projects such as Mercosur began to align itself with leftist 
principles. It has also cited the creation of ALBA and the development of UNASUR 
as examples of this leftist shift. Additionally, it was suggested that the emergence of 
both ALBA and UNASUR, as leftist inspired regional integration projects, could be 
considered as part of the fourth wave of regionalism, in as much as they both 
represent a move away from a predominant focus on economic objectives and free 
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trade. However, it was also suggested that with regards to USASUR, although 
opposed to US hegemony, Brazil has become a sub-imperialist power within the 
regional project. It was suggested that because of this, the project could be seen as 
being rooted in the politics of above. By contrast, ALBA at least in its early years, 
can be seen as an expression of regional integration from below and has become a 
symbol of hope for radical transformation that has emerged with the move left in 
Latin America as a whole.  
Following on from here, the chapter looked at the specific social forces that led to 
the establishment of the Bolivarian historic bloc in Venezuela and investigated how 
its establishment has influenced other leftist states within the region, and how the 
combination of both has led to the creation of ALBA. It has suggested that the 
Bolivarian revolution has attempted to construct a historic bloc that is 
representative of a resistance movement as well as forming an alternative to 
neoliberalism. It has suggested that the establishment of the Bolivarian collective 
will, at least initially, was successful because it was made up of a diverse alliance of 
subaltern social forces that incorporated a variety of marginalized groups and 
informal masses as well as the working class, the state and the military, all of which 
came together to form a heterogeneous alliance that forms the Bolivarian collective 
will, that is internally harmonious. The chapter has also suggested that the success 
of the Bolivarian collective will as a form or resistance and contestation to 
neoliberalism has influenced many other leftist governments throughout the region. 
As a result, anti-neoliberal forms of governance emerged with Latin America, 
producing a new political economy for development in the region, leading to the 
creation of alternative, regional approaches to neoliberalism in Latin America. The 
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most notable of which is ALBA. It suggested that the creation of ALBA represents a 
rising demand for regional autonomy by Latin American social movement, capital 
and governments. It has proposed that the support from social forces leading to its 
establishment should be understood as a crucial element that has further 
legitimized ALBA as a counter-hegemonic movement.   
Lastly, chapter four considered the ‘pink tide’ in the post-Chávez era. It has 
highlighted that economic decline and political instability has begun the shake the 
Latin America left. It has also highlighted the complexity of the pink tide as a term 
and has suggested that all too often it has been oversimplified in order to support 
the argument that left as a whole is in decline along with the argument that the 
various left-leaning movements should be looked at as a whole. Lastly it has 
suggested that although the future of ‘pink tide’ governments may be uncertain; 
their principles are likely to remain especially in relation to regional development 
strategies and projects as they still remain popular amongst the Latin America 
masses.  
Chapter five focused specifically on the factors and events that led to the creation of 
ALBA through a historical narrative. It was argued that since its inception, ALBA 
has been put forward as an alternative to not only the Washington Consensus but 
to all other forms of neoliberalism. It argued that while a large body of research has 
suggested that Chávez has played an integral part in the creation and development 
of ALBA, Chávez should not be seen as a totalizing force who moulded the regional 
bloc. Rather the chapter has argument, that at least to a degree, ALBA can be 
understood as a merging of a sequence of particular opinions around common 
themes - emancipation from neoliberalism and aspirations to challenge the status 
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quo, all of which was brought together by Chavez The chapter then moved on to 
specifically look at the evolution of ALBA, tracing its development from its creation 
to present form. It began by looking at the initial implementation of neoliberal in 
Latin America, beginning with Chile in 1973. It provided an account of how the 
implementation instigated a series of events, such as the oppression of the left, the 
suppression of popular organisations as well as the workers’ movements, leading 
to the reconstruction of Latin American economies along free-market lines, through 
manufacturing consent. It has also suggested that this manufacturing of consent 
within the region had two main characteristics, the first one being the oppression 
of the national development strategy by a new form of regionalism which was 
carried out by the second characteristic, that of US hegemony. This chapter has 
suggested that the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which was initially 
launched in 1994, can be seen as a form of new regionalism.  It has proposed that 
the US inspired FTAA intended to reshape the region in a specific way that was 
aligned with US interests. Chapter five argued that it was out of resistance to this 
form of new regionalism that ALBA was created. It has also suggested that ALBA’s 
creation is representative of the left’s resistance to US imperialism as well as a form 
of contestation against the US-sponsored FTAA. It represents not only a move by 
the left to develop a substitute for the FTAA but also it can be seen as an attempt to 
create a mechanism to combat western-style economic integration, replacing it 
with a new political and economic model know as twenty-first-century socialism, 
which aims to transform Latin American societies through establishing new 
political, economic and social alliances. The main objective of which is to create a 
‘patria grande’ in the Latin American and the Caribbean region based on 
independence, sovereignty and identity. 
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The chapter then went on to look at the Cuban-Venezuelan joint declaration, which 
is seen as the preamble of the inaugural ALBA treaty. It has suggested that the joint 
declaration as well as the apparent impending establishment of the FTAA that not 
only led to the creation of ALBA but inspired the foundational principles that the 
ALBA treaty is built on. Principles centred around aspirations to broaden solidarity 
among Latin American, aspirations centred on transforming Latin American society 
through education, participation and through the elimination of social inequalities. 
This chapter has also suggested that both the experiences of Venezuela with its 
success in its Bolivarian social missions and Cuba’s ‘internationalist’ experience led 
to a shared belief that a workable regional integration model was possible. 
However, chapter five has also suggested that while the creation of ALBA began 
with the joint declaration between the two countries, its emergence should be 
viewed in the context of the developments within the political economy Latin 
America at that time. It cites mass disenchantment, the rise of social movements 
opposed to neoliberalism as well as the election of left and centre left governments 
in several Latin American countries as contributing factors, which led to the 
creation and development of ALBA.  
The chapter then went on to discuss the expansion and development of ALBA. It 
has argued that the rise in prominence of a shared ideological understanding of the 
importance of ALBA for the region led to its expansion through membership. It has 
suggested that newly elected left-leaning government who shared in this belief 
began to join the regional movement beginning with Bolivia under Morales in 2006. 
From there the chapter points out that with the Bolivian adhesion to the alliance, 
the regional project began to further develop its integration model through the 
adoption of the ‘’Peoples Trade Agreement’’ or TCP. This addition served to refine 
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the integration project and for the first time it begun to develop beyond mere 
commitment, it offered an alternative trading mechanism to the proposed trade 
agreement of the North. The chapter then went on the outline the TCPs main 
objective, which was to provide a distinct form of trade integration that is 
complementary to the national interests of participating members as well as the 
region, as opposed to market driven forms of trade. The chapter highlighted that 
2009 marked a turning point for the movement as ALBA began to evolve again, 
reorienting its focus in relation to the development of cooperation amongst its 
member states (reaching nine in there year) but also through the establishment of 
international relationship with countries such as China, India, Russia, Syria and 
Iran, the combination of which further legitimized ALBA as a Latin American 
regional movement. 
The chapter then went on to look at the organisational and institutional structure 
of ALBA.  It has highlighted that its institutional structure developed alongside its 
membership expansion. It then went on to look at ALBA’s organisational structure 
given a detailed account of its makeup. It looks specifically are the role and 
functions of the Presidential Council, the Political Council, the Economic Council, 
the Social Council and lastly the Council of Social Movements. 
From there, the chapter gave an in-depth account of ALBA’s Grand-National 
concepts, which led to the creation of its grand-national companies (GNCs) and 
grand-national projects (GNPs). It suggested that ALBA’s grand-national concept is 
essentially a political concept but incorporated other elements. Primarily, it is 
based on the Bolivarian vision of a Latin American union. Within an ideological 
context, the concept is grounded in what can be seen as a set of shared beliefs by 
ALBA member states, with regards to a critical stance in relation to neoliberalism, 
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as well as an emphasis placed on sustainable development, social justice, 
sovereignty, self-determination as well as developing a regional bloc that has the 
capacity to produce sovereign regional policies. Then chapter then went on to look 
at ALBA’s development of grand-national companies (GNCs), which were created in 
opposition to multinational corporations (MNCs) and transnational companies 
(TNCs). It has suggested that GNCs were purposefully designed to favour the 
production of goods and services for the satisfaction of human needs as opposed to 
being profit driven. The chapter highlighted that each GNC acts fundamentally as an 
economic instrument that attempts to create and develop a wide area or network 
of fair trade between ALBA member states. The chapter then goes on to discuss the 
grand-national projects (GNPs) and their orientation towards goods and services 
that satisfy human needs within the emergent ALBA markets.  Before giving a 
detailed account of the operational capacity of both GNCs and GNPs, the chapter 
focuses on the new regional financial architecture (NRFA) that ALBA has created 
with the establishment of the Bank of ALBA.  Its creation has two purposes, to 
firstly fund GNPs and GNCs but also it was created as a way to reduce its member-
states reliance on international financial institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) and the US. The chapter then 
turned its attention to ALBA’s expansion of its NRFA with the creation of SUCRE, its 
regional trading currency which was created to help to facilitate trade and 
exchange between member-states but was also created in an attempt to circumvent 
the US Dollar. The chapter then goes on to focus on Venezuela’s role with regards to 
the financial support of the various GNPs and GNCs. It suggests that Venezuela’s 
role and the financial support for GNPs is vital as is the case with Petro ALBA, 
whose success is completely dependent on Venezuelan oil.  The chapter then 
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looked at various GNPs in other fields such as TeleSur within the 
telecommunication sector, which has gained international recognition in recent 
years, as well as ALBA’s educational projects, which can be considered one of its 
most successful GNPs. It has also highlighted, that there is severe limitations and 
inactiveness with regards to some GNPs and cited serve mismanagement as the 
cause of its failure as is the case with ALBA Agriculture.   
The purpose of chapter six was to specifically look at the ways in which ALBA can 
be seen as a viable counter-hegemonic project that looks to challenge US-inspired 
neo-liberalism. Additionally, the chapter sought to determine the extent that the 
Alliance has acted as a mechanism of support for small states. In order to fulfil this 
objective, the chapter firstly situated this research within the broader academic 
literature and justified its contribution by specifically addressing the gap that exists 
between ABLA’s aspirations and the reality of the project on the ground. As 
academic research carried out on ALBA has been notably sparse.  This deficit has 
meant that the available literature on the Alliance is both dated and to a large 
extent out of touch. As a result, this examination has been conducted in order to 
produce an up-to-date research paper that sheds light on ALBA’s evolution and 
current situation. It argued that the use of semi-structured interviews with various 
political elites that work within the ALBA, as its primary method of assessment was 
an optimum method of analysis as the chosen target group, could offer a unique 
perceptive as to how the regional movement operates but also because they could 
give an insight into the evolution of the movement, from its beginning to its current 
form as well as offering a complete new avenue to explore the inner workings of 
the regional movement.  Chapter six argued that by conducting interviews in this 
way, valuable insight into the internal workings of the regional movement would 
 242 
be gained, allowing it to determine the extent of the gap between the participating 
political elites aspirations for the regional project and the reality of where the 
movement actually is. 
Chapter six has suggested that ALBA’s ambitions and ideological underpinnings, 
which have shaped and guided the regional alliance since its creation in 2004, have 
not entirely translated into tangible results. Although ALBA as an Alternative 
(2004- 2005) ambition did in fact become a reality with the failure of the FTAA. 
ALBA as an Alliance (2005 - to present) however, while achieving some success 
with various social programmes in the early years has failed in its ideological drive 
towards creating a Patria Grande within Latin America. The chapter has proposed 
that essentially this failure is the result of ALBA’s inability to remain internally 
coherent and united with regards to governance and institutional structure. ALBA’s 
ambition with regards to creating a new regional financial architecture, although 
innovative and initially revolutionary, has only highlighted its inability to 
implement and follow through on its agreements. While there are many reasons 
why ALBA’s various initiatives have failed to bring about the changes that the 
Alliance envisaged, chapter six suggests that fundamentally the Venezuelan 
economy lies at the centre. Every aspect of ALBA’s ambitious development of a new 
financial architecture for the region has been facilitated, funded and utilised 
primarily by Venezuela. Although participating member states have benefited from 
the various initiatives implemented under ALBA’s economic zone for shared 
development, it has become apparent that the various projects future as a whole is 
completely dependent on Venezuela’s ability to continue to finance them. Given the 
economic instability that Venezuela has experienced since 2012, the future of 
ALBA’s economic zone for shared development is uncertain. 
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The chapter then looked that the extent that Venezuelan foreign policy has 
influenced ALBA. It specifically wanted to determine how the deterioration of 
ALBA’s primary financial backer has affected the project’s ability to attract 
members, in light of the current economic and political upheavals that the Maduro 
government is presently experiencing. It suggested that since becoming a petro-
state in the 1920s and a democracy in 1957, Venezuela has had a very active and 
successful foreign policy. Its ability to pursue foreign policy objectives successfully 
is a result of its active pursuit of a multifaceted identity, which has resulted in the 
development of strong ties with various groups and regions. Chapter six has also 
suggested that ALBA has to a large extent become the cornerstone of Bolivarian 
Venezuela’s foreign policy and a means by which Venezuela is attempting to situate 
itself as the leader of the anti-U.S. ideological agenda in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. It has suggested that building on the various identities, Venezuela has 
developed since the 1960s, Chávez was able to gain support for ALBA membership 
from a variety of left-leaning states within the region as well as social movements 
operating across the region. This allowed him to construct an alliance of support 
towards his foreign policy positions, or at a minimum censor opposing viewpoints. 
From here the chapter went on to determine how Venezuela’s strong presence 
within ALBA has affected the regional bloc. This was investigated in two phases, 
2004-2013, which looks specifically at the influenced of Chávez within ALBA and 
the wider Latin American region, and from 2013 to present, which looked at ALBA 
in the Maduro era. Chapter six proposed that the lack of membership expansion 
towards the end of the Chávez era can be explained by the charismatic leader’s 
dominance within ALBA, his vocal rejection of the Latin American right and his 
outspoken negative view on the US, which all contributed to polarized Latin 
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America. On one side you have a group of countries eager to sigh sign free trade 
agreements with the US and on the other you had those belonging to ALBA. 
Furthermore, Chávez’s active political support for left-leaning politicians very often 
acted as a detrimental factor, causing many to lose elections. It has also suggested 
that a lack of ALBA expansion can be explained by its strong ideological overtones, 
which meant in many instances, that the larger wealthier Latin American states as 
well as the smaller Caribbean economies were put in a position where they had to 
choose between closing themselves off to the possibility of new trade deals with 
the US or ALBA membership.  The chapter went on to look at how Chávez’s death 
impacted ALBA.  It looked at how domestically the loss of its charismatic leader 
coupled with political instability and economic uncertainty has underwritten much 
of ALBA’s progress to date. It has also suggested that given the current financial 
constraint that the Maduro government finds itself in, it is unlikely that Venezuela 
will be able to continue to bank roll ALBA and its various initiatives nor will it be 
able to influence the direction of the regional project.   
Lastly this chapter attempted to understand the Caribbean’s place within ALBA. 
It proposed that while undoubtedly membership of the Alliance has benefited the 
Caribbean, particularly in relation to financial assistance. Their involvement in the 
Alliance has not equated to a totalizing ideological commitment. It determined that 
although ideological similarities are apparent to a small extent, the level of 
commitment from Caribbean member states to ALBA’s overall objective in creating 
a counter-hegemonic regional movement to challenge the US and neoliberalism is 
non-existent. Rather, their alignment with the regional movement operates on a far 
more functionary platform.  It determined that the overarching reason for 
Caribbean accession to ALBA can be explained by its access to ALBA funds, attained 
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through membership, which allowed the various Caribbean governments to roll out 
various development initiatives which in turn played well with voters and has 
helped alleviate some of the financial problems which have crippled the small 
island economies of the Caribbean. 
Chapter seven situated ALBA - understanding its demise and potential future -
within a neo-Gramscian framework. The chapter’s purpose was to determine the 
extent that ALBA could be viewed as a counter-hegemonic form of resistance that is 
engaged in a war of position against open regionalism, US hegemony and, by 
extension, neoliberalism. It suggested that ALBA in its early years, evidently 
represented a pattern of development that corresponded with Cox’s understanding 
of a counter-hegemonic movement engaged in a war of position, as its initial 
development involved an orchestrated attempt to restructure society from below. 
However, chapter seven determined that the regional project’s development since 
then, has not equated to the same kind of resistance it was once heralded for. 
Rather, ALBA’s momentum and support has consistently deteriorated, as a result 
chapter seven has proposed that ALBA has fallen short of maintaining the 
necessary conditions that could have potentially led to the creation of a viable rival 
structure. 
The chapter then looked at ALBA as a form of counter-hegemony/resistance, its 
effectiveness and potentialities. It looked at ALBA’s specific form of regionalism 
and argued that while ALBA views itself as a counter-hegemonic form of resistance, 
in reality ‘observable ALBA’ paints a different picture.  From its anti- US/neoliberal 
initiatives to its alternative institutional structure, ALBA in practical reality is 
dysfunctional, irregular and to a large extent chaotic.  Chapter seven has argued 
that on the surface ALBA operates via a kind of brand governance, whereby the 
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champions of ALBA depict the movement as a unitary integration scheme. However, 
the chapter has proposed that behind this ‘brand’ façade, ALBA’s internal workings 
represents a highly unpredictable and unstable group of projects, whose very 
existence and future is almost completely dependent on its funder, Venezuela.  
Although ALBA’s very existence and construction as an alternative path to 
development and regionalism represents a counter-hegemonic response to the 
crippling dominating forces of neoliberalism and the US, chapter seven argued that 
ALBA’s complete lack of a functioning internal structure and commitment from its 
member states has detrimentally affected its ability to operate as a viable 
alternative regional movement for the region.  
The chapter then looked at the extent that the creation of the Alliance’s economic 
zone of shared development has been successful in challenging neoliberalism and 
US hegemony. With regards to the TCP, chapter seven has argued that while 
ideologically speaking, the TCP meets all the criteria for acting as an agent of 
resistance to both US hegemony and neoliberalism, in reality however; the 
initiative has failed to move beyond its ideological ambition. Its existence, although 
initially ground-breaking, has not produced any conclusive or even measurable 
results as it has failed to be implemented. Additionally, legal issues arising between 
other regional and international organisations as well as institutions constrained 
the TCP negotiators’ capacity to move beyond the existing standards in any 
innovative or revolutionary sense. The combination of which, resulted in the TCP’s 
inability to get off the ground. Twelve years on as chapter seven points out, the 
trade and investment scheme has failed to act or operate in any measurable way, as 
a form of resistance to neoliberalism and US hegemony. In relation to the ALBA 
Bank, chapter seven has argued that its over-reliance on Venezuela as its primary 
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funder has been a determining factor in relation to its ability to perform its primary 
function. It has suggested that while the bank is at its core a form of resistance, its 
inadequate funding mechanism and its staunch anti-profit-making stance along 
with its intrinsic link to the Venezuelan economy makes its likelihood of survival 
extremely grim. The SUCRE in theory the mechanism should promote cooperative 
regionalism and reinforce endogenous development, legitimizing and reinforcing 
ALBA as an engine for resistance. However, chapter seven has argued that what is 
observable with the SUCRE paints a vastly different picture. Instead of the SUCRE 
being used as an inclusive currency mechanism by member-states to reduce 
transaction costs, fewer than twenty transactions have taken place through the 
mechanism without Venezuelan direct participation. The majority of transactions 
that have occurred have been highly concentrated on trade between Venezuela and 
Ecuador, 90 per cent of which has consisted of Venezuela importing Ecuadorian 
foodstuffs. Not only does the above explicitly reveal that instead of being used as 
mechanisms which further integrates ALBA member states and its specific form of 
regionalism, the SUCRE has predominately been used as a political tool by the 
Venezuelan government, to secure political support of the masses at home. Having 
a constant stream of Ecuadorian food imports has meant that the Venezuelan 
government is less reliant of hostile local elites and their companies. In this way, 
the SUCRE represents the weaponisation and politicisation of imports served to 
keep the Maduro government in power while simultaneously reducing the 
Venezuelan oppositional elites’ ability to gain any strategic foothold politically. 
Chapter seven then suggested that while ideologically speaking GNEs represent 
joint state ventures that should enhance both productive capacity in relation to 
intra-ALBA trade and regional integration within the ALBA space, in reality 
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however, very few have ’become operational. Since the GNEs introduction into the 
ALBA Framework in 2007, only 3 GNEs have become operational, and of those 
three operational GNEs, it is impossible to measure or even monitor any real 
progress they may have made because every kind of bilateral joint state venture 
have been branded as ‘’grand national’’ with official acknowledgment or 
permission. What has been even more damaging to the operational ability of GNEs 
however, chapter seven has argued, has been GNEs inescapable association with 
the Venezuelan economy, in particular the petro state’s oil industry. Dependence 
on the Venezuelan economy has meant that cash flow problems stemming for 
Venezuela’s dysfunctional currency regime has resulted in Venezuela’s inability to 
finance the projects. This in turn has affected ALBA as a regional integration 
initiative to be just that- regionally integrated. Furthermore, failure to deliver on 
financial promises has created a space for doubt, about ALBA’s ability to develop 
functional initiatives that can together act as a viable form of resistance against US 
hegemony and neoliberalism.  From here, chapter seven looked at specific factors, 
which have affected ALBA’s ability to become a viable regional project for the Latin 
American region, factors such as internal incoherence and subsequent its de-
legitimisation.  
From what is observable, chapter seven has argued, ALBA’s internal governance 
structure consists of volatile and unstable coalitions of officials, who convene at 
sporadic intervals depending on presidential interest. It has suggested that the 
executive secretariat – ALBA’s only bureaucratic body – is unmanageably 
overwhelmed that it has become impossible for it to provide any meaningful 
direction or oversight for the movement. As a consequence of the above, a lack of 
accountability brought about partly by an absence of concrete commitment by 
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member states as well as partly by Venezuelan dominance, has deepened both 
internal disorder and neglect. This lack of commitment by ALBA member states, 
chapter seven has argued, is observable with members’ lack or minimum 
participation in ALBA projects, but more specifically, with projects that don’t 
necessarily offer immediate gains to its participants, such as the SUCRE (90 per 
cent of all transactions are between Venezuela and Ecuador). Chapter seven 
suggests that internal incoherence is also observable through ALBA’s inactivity in 
relation to ALBA summits and official declarations, which in recent years have been 
sparse (the last ALBA summit took place in 2015).  
At the core of many of its problems, chapter seven has argued, has been an inability 
to establish adequately functional – let alone demonstrably superior – alternatives 
to neoliberal institutions in societies they have long dominated.  Additionally, the 
centrality of ALBA’s bottom-up economic and political inclusion discourse has 
increasingly and consistently deviated from reality on the ground, this in itself has 
had an extremely negative effect on ALBA’s credibility across the board, specifically 
in relation to social movements, as it has become increasingly apparent that their 
involvement in ALBA exist only on paper after 2005. Furthermore, chapter seven 
has argued that there is an unmistakable gap between ALBA’s design and its 
implementation; this represents a severely dysfunctional governance structure. 
The severity of this gap has only increased with time and has led to major problems 
for the Alliance; most notably ALBA’s specific kind of governance has developed a 
reputation of not only impotence but, worse still, toxicity.  
Chapter seven has argued that all of these observable problems as mentioned 
above, which have affected ALBA’s ability to function at an adequate level, can 
predominately be explained by Venezuela’s dominance within the project. Chapter 
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seven has argued that Venezuela’s dominance within ALBA is at such a high level 
that their respective destinies have become intertwined. 
From an economic perspective, the petro-state’s reliance on oil exports has 
increasingly led to numerous problems for ALBA. Firstly, from an ideological 
perspective, Venezuela’s development model is extractivist in nature, this in itself 
goes against ALBA as a collective stance on climate change and specific member 
states. Secondly, the Alliance and Venezuela’s stability is intrinsically connected to 
extremely unstable oil prices. This volatile dependence became apparent with the 
2015 dramatic fall in oil prices, which led the petro-state to dramatically reduce 
available funding and support for ALBA initiatives, leading in many cases to project 
stagnation. 
Chapter seven has argued that while it is true to say that developments of ALBA 
coincided and reflected the radical developments of Venezuela in the mid-2000s, it 
is also fair to say that ALBA now has become synonymous with the abysmal 
political and economic situation that Venezuela is currently experiencing.  Their 
perspective destinies have become so intertwined that it has become impossible 
for the Alliance to become in any way detached from the petro state. Furthermore, 
with the above considered, chapter seven has argued that ALBA should be seen as a 
mere extension of the Bolivarian state. From neo-Gramsci’s perspective,  
Chapter seven has argued, Venezuela is currently experiencing a hegemonic 
struggle under its present government. Similarly, to the Fijo government’s demise, 
the Maduro government is facing a continuous and evidently relentless assault 
brought about by various oppositional forces. Although such oppositional forces 
are fractioned and disorganized, Maduro’s government has begun to unravel as the 
social consensus for Chavismo has begun to lose its legitimacy. This erosion of 
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consensus, which has led to the current hegemonic struggle, has been brought 
about by a number of factors, most notably by Venezuela’s severe economic decline. 
One of which, as chapter seven has cited, has been a massive decrease in support of 
Chavismo since 2015. This decline in combination with heightened inflation, food 
shortages and the persistent rise in violent protests, has enormously reduced the 
Maduro government’s popularity. Chapter seven has argued that the current 
Venezuelan government has made no attempt to address these detrimental 
economic issues to date. As a result the Maduro government ‘’reliant on the 
mobilizing power of the party and the state it controls, as well as on the continued 
incompetence of a fragmented, tone deaf, and inconsistent opposition’’ (Cusack, 
2018a). However, chapter seven has also argued that as long as there exists a 
fountain of accessible discontent and resistance, the rise of a less inexperienced 
opposition will remain a substantial threat. Lastly chapter seven has suggest that 
this twofold political and economic reliance on the ‘’continuation in power of one 
party in one key member state, thanks to the price of one volatile commodity, 
represents a grave failure to institutionalised meaningful participation from ALBA’s 
wider membership’’(Cusack, 2018a). 
In the final section of chapter seven, ALBA’s specific brand of ‘post-neoliberal’ 
regionalism was explored. The chapter argued that ALBA, rather than being 
distinctive and transformative or in any way representative of a ‘post’ neoliberal 
model, it portrays a model on the brink of failing. It has argued that ALBA slow 
deterioration, supports the idea that Latin American regionalism as essentially 
intergovernmental or interpresidential. It has suggested that while ALBA’s  ‘move 
away’ from open regionalism towards a political concentration of autonomous, 
resurgent, developmentalist states (Cusack, 2018a), its failure to deliver on its early 
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promises raises questions about the real impact and distinctiveness of its model of 
regionalism.  
Rather than creating a model that has the capacity to undermine or even 
potentially replace open regionalism, with an alternative governance structure that 
confronts and contests various neoliberal processes across various domains. In 
reality, ALBA’s uneven implementation, Venezuelan centrism, and ‘’bottom-up’’ 
development model has hampered its developments and its future potential. 
Chapter seven has also argued that the Latin American region as a whole is going 
through somewhat of political transformation currently. The rise of the right in 
Argentina, Chile and Brazil has begun to reshape the Latin American political 
environment. It has argued that the idea of the ‘pink tide’ and Chávez’s Bolivarian 
revolution lives on in the hands of a sole handpicked successor, Nicolás Maduro. 
Considering the state of Venezuelan affairs, its diminishing economy and abysmal 
democratic institutions, it is evident that it can no longer be seen as a poster boy 
for the left or as an aspiring model.  Regionally, chapter seven has argued, 
discontent brought about by economic turmoil has been a driving force for the turn 
right in Latin America. It has been suggested in chapter seven that this discontent is 
principally a consequence of a slowdown of economic growth in which began in 
2012, leading to regional economic underperformance and with the case of Brazil, 
severe economic recession. This downturn led to a reduction in public spending, 
which as a consequence has resulted in the diminished popularity of the left. 
Leading in some instances to the right gaining power, as was the case in Brazil, 
Chile and Argentina and in other instances, a retreat of radical or far-left politics, as 
was the case with Ecuador. Chapter seven has argued that in the Ecuadorian case, 
Lenin Moreno’s moderate left stance boded well amongst the masses but severely 
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hampered its relationship with former president Correa, along with Venezuela and 
ALBA.  This loss of solidarity with Venezuela but more specifically with ALBA has 
cumulated in Ecuador’s withdrawal from the regional project. This withdrawal 
signifies the changing nature of leftist politics in the region. Chapter seven has 
suggested that Moreno’s active disassociation with ALBA and with the far or radical 
left more broadly, can be understood by three important aspects. Firstly, ALBA as a 
‘brand’ of regionalism has become fatally toxic. This is as a result of Venezuelan 
centralism to the regional project. Secondly, the shifting tide of politics in Latin 
America from left to right and from far left to moderate, represents a changing 
sentiment amongst the masses and within the wider international community, this 
in turn has informed the direction of governments’ projected ideology and political, 
regional and economic affiliations. For Ecuador, due to a repositioning of ideology, 
membership of ALBA is no longer a viable option. Lastly, Latin America is a region 
like no other, in as much as regional organisations are plentiful. Essentially, their 
very existence can be seen as a product of a particular time and as a result, regional 
projects often become redundant with changes in state ideological positioning. Just 
as it was the case with CAN, Mercosur and to a large extent UNASUR, it seems that 
ALBA now has lost its shine. ALBA’s specific brand of regionalism or indeed its 
leftist ideological core, while initially grew in popularity as it represented for many, 
a regional ideological alignment that could potentially restructure or revolutionize 
the regional space, is now, as chapter seven has argued, as an obsolete and 
redundant project with very little to offer.  
In the last part of chapter seven, an overview of three potential future scenarios in 
relation to the ALBA were outlined. The first being dismantlement. However, this 
future outcome as chapter seven has suggested is highly unlikely as it would run 
 254 
against Latin American tradition if one considers that no Latin American regional 
integration project, to date, has ever been officially declared dead. The second 
possibility is a reboot. Potentially, the signing of a new treaty or important 
declaration could possibly breathe new life into the Alliance and trigger a renewed 
activation. This reboot, according to chapter seven, could be motivated by a 
diplomatic offensive from the Pacific Alliance group for instance, which is always 
seeking to expand the reach of its free trade agreements. However, chapter seven 
has suggested that this possibility also seems highly unlikely, as opposition to free 
trade has waned in recent years. Furthermore, Venezuela’s internal economic and 
political problems have led to an evident lack of strong leadership within ALBA and 
with Cuba’s attention turned towards mending US relation, no other ALBA member 
states seem up to the task of leading the Alliance through this reboot. 
The third and, the most likely scenario for ALBA as chapter seven has suggested is a 
stalemate and indifference. The chapter has argued that a ‘zone of indifference’, 
where regional actors are tolerated within the broader region as long as they do 
not impose new costs, seems the most likely future scenarios for ALBA. The chapter 
uses the example of the Andean Community to illustrate its point, and argued that if 
one considers how incapable the Andean Community’s has been at transitioning 
out of the this ‘zone of indifference’ despite having a large regional bureaucracy, it 
makes it even more likely that the Alliance, a poorly institutionalised grouping, will 
remain in deadlock.  
8.3 Research limitations and recommended avenues for further research 
 
This thesis has been empirically enriched by direct consultations and 
correspondence with ALBA’s political elites. This approach to understanding ALBA, 
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its viability and potential future was an essential part of this research. The chosen 
methodology allowed this thesis to explore ALBA beneath its surface. Considering 
the lack of available current research, the work produced in this thesis has added 
value to this field of study, in relation to ALBA, the nature of counter-hegemony and 
neo-Gramscian studies more generally. By framing ALBA within a counter-
hegemonic context, placing it within the neo-Gramscian school of thought, the 
thesis was able to assess the regional movement through a lens of analysis, which 
allowed for thorough exploration. Previous ALBA studies that have utilised this 
approach have produced work that has painted a positive picture of the regional 
movement and its potential, however, earlier research conducted, encapsulated a 
regional movement that was in its embryonic stage. Its momentum had not yet 
slowed nor had the Venezuelan political or economic situation reached a point 
where it had altered or hampered ALBA’s development or future prospects. The 
work produced in this thesis provided an up-to-date account of ALBA’s current 
form and investigated the ways in which the regional movement has evolved since 
its creation.  It specifically looked at how the current political and economic 
situation in Venezuela as well as the Latin American left more widely, has affected 
ALBAs counter-hegemonic potential. The use of semi-structured interviews for 
ALBA’s political elite offered a unique perspective not only in relation to how the 
regional movement operates but also because it gave an insight into the evolution 
of the movement. Essentially, it offered a completely new avenue to explore the 
inner workings of the regional movement. By conducting interviews in this way, 
valuable insight into the internal workings of the regional movement has been 
gained, which has aided this work in determining the extent of the gap between 
ALBA’s aspirations and the reality of where the movement actually is.  
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By accessing ALBA through a neo-Gramscian framework via counter-hegemony, 
this thesis was able to track ALBA’s evolution from its promising early stages of 
development, to its current demise. This very targeted analysis allowed for an 
expanded understanding of both counter-hegemony and regionalism within the 
wider context of the Latin American region. Specifically, this thesis looked at the 
idea of post-neoliberal regionalism, and how ALBA has been used to understand 
this construction within its early years of development. This thesis has argued that 
since ALBA’s evident deterioration this concept has become void. This work’s 
analysis of ALBA’s structural makeup and internal workings presents a clear 
contrast to this concept. Rather than a post-neoliberal regional movement that 
operates outside the remit of neoliberalism, ALBA as this thesis understands it, 
represents a regional movement like every other – one that despite its ideology and 
somewhat alternative structure still relies on the same internal and global system 
to operate in. Likewise, the concept of counter-hegemony, which has been used 
numerous times to understand ALBA, both within academic literature and from the 
perspective of ALBA members themselves, to a large extent has been misplaced, if 
ALBA’s current situation and potential future are taken into account. Although it is 
evident that ALBA does present a form of counter-hegemonic form of resistance, its 
current state and likely future represent a regional project on the verge of collapse. 
Regardless of its anti-neoliberal ideology, its dysfunctional internal hierarchal 
structure and dependence on an unstable state to fund and guide the regional 
movement, has meant that its survival is dependent on the Venezuelan economy’s 
ability to stay afloat.  
A severe lack of available data has limited this research’s scope. While official ALBA 
declarations make up the bulk of the available resources, even those have become 
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sparse in recent years. Statistics produced by the ALBA Bank along with trade flow 
figures from the SUCRE, tend to be out-dated and to a large extent, unreliable due 
to the political position of these Venezuelan financed programmes.  This evident 
lack of accurate and current created an obstacle for evaluating the regional 
movement, thus limiting the scope of the research. Secondary sources were relied 
on heavily to provide an account of ALBA development and progression. Lack of 
coherency in relation to GNEs and GNPs in relation to official ALBA declarations 
and reports limited this thesis’s ability to fully evaluate their effectiveness and 
progression. Overall the severe lack of transparency with various ALBA initiatives 
stunted this research’s ability for exploration. However, the aforementioned 
challenged allowed for an alternative investigative approach to ALBA. Using semi-
structured political elite interviews and the application of critical IPE, this research 
was able to effectively evaluate the extent of the gap between ALBA’s ideology and 
its reality on the ground. Within the wider context, this thesis as a result has 
opened a variety of potential avenues for further research. As cited in this thesis 
Latin America is a region like no other, in as much as regional projects are plentiful. 
Essentially, their very existence can be seen as a product of a particular time and as 
a result, regional projects often become redundant with changes in state ideological 
positioning. The exploration into the wider dynamics of Latin American realism 
would make an interesting case for analysis. While, this research has touched on 
this wider context, briefly in chapter eight, with a limited investigation into the 
changing political dynamics of Latin American regionalism, with the decline of the 
left, further research is needed. This decline signifies a loss of solidarity with an 
ideology over twenty years in the making. An investigation into this shift and its 
effect on regionalism, specifically on the leftist style brand of regionalism would 
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make an interesting case for analysis. Furthermore, an in-depth analysis of factors, 
which have led to the repositioning of the left, as has been the case with Ecuador. It 
follows therefore, that an investigation into the repositioning of the left and what 
this means for leftist inspired forms of regionalism, constitutes a further 
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